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Abstract / Summary 
 
Over the last two decades, social cohesion has become a widespread political concern. 
Governments across Western Europe consider how social cohesion may be at risk and 
propose political initiatives to safeguard cohesion. This objective is usually seen to 
require the active contribution of citizens who are called upon to evince responsibility 
for social unity. Cohesion agendas have been developed with the intention to instil this 
responsibility through measures of social activation. The proximity between cohesion 
and activation, however, has rarely been explored. While their mutual dependence tends 
to be considered as a given or a natural fact, this thesis seeks to show how the two 
orientations have been conjoined as a result of changing conceptualizations of society in 
political debate. In studies of such debates and of agenda-setting moments, the thesis 
examines the development of new concerns, concepts and political measures in France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 
Cohésion sociale was introduced in the context of ambiguous definitions of social 
exclusion that had emerged in French political discourse since the early 1980s. It was 
developed as a political objective that would respond to Jacques Chirac’s diagnosis of 
fracture sociale. Bürgergesellschaft in Germany was defined against the background of 
anxiety about collective immobility, social sclerosis and political apathy. In the early 
2000s, it proved to be a vehicle for a turn towards activation in welfare state reform. In 
Britain, community cohesion was introduced in response to a spate of unrest in the 
English North. In its most prominent conceptualisations, it responded to the diagnosis 
that these and other social problems were the result of misguided multicultural 
objectives and behavioural deficiencies among ethnic minority populations.  
 
The thesis treats the formation of these agendas as a challenge that requires both 
interpretation and critique. It proposes a perspective on how society is imagined in the 
course of the formation of social cohesion agendas. It suggests that in particular the 
imaginary coincidence of disintegration and unity is characteristic of this social 
imaginary and provides for a sense of urgency that frequently underpins remedies of 
activation. The thesis concludes that where cohesion is said to be lacking, populations 
are selectively targeted and ethnic minority groups, welfare recipients, or the 
unemployed are being subjected to new demands. The critical concern of the thesis is to 
explore how new concerns with social unity have led to the adoption of requirements 
that are placed on the doorstep of those that are less able to comply. 
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Introduction 
Social cohesion has become an issue across political arenas. It ranks highly among 
concerns with crime, anti-social behaviour and street violence; racism, ethnic 
segregation, so-called ethnic enclaves, parallel societies and parallel lives; increasing 
numbers of welfare recipients and an ossified welfare state; decreasing turnouts at 
elections and increasing apathy towards social and political affairs. The suggestion is 
either that social problems such as these are caused by a lack of cohesion or that their 
presence puts cohesion at risk. Despite ambiguity, the political objective of cohesion 
seems to offer the semblance of a blueprint for the remedy of social problems. Political 
strategies, measures and instruments that are seen to generate cohesion, to allow for its 
preservation, or to ward off its decline, have been conceived across socio-economic, 
civic and cultural domains of concern. What seems to unite these strategies is maybe not 
the nature of their concern or the measures they envisage but, as Ash Amin (2005, 614) 
suggests, a similarity in how they understand the remedial effects of cohesion: it is 
conceived as a “regenerative tonic” that can be infused in order to avert social problems, 
improve social relations and the quality of society as a whole. 
More than a matter of how to perceive society, social cohesion usually comes with the 
claim for the adoption of particular measures to establish conditions of cohesiveness or 
to remedy the causes of their deterioration. The reference to cohesion is accompanied by 
the request that such conditions need to be established through the active contribution of 
populations towards this task. This commonality indicates that cohesion is not just a 
perspective that has become fashionable or a term that is newly pervasive. It is a 
concept with a corresponding political project. 
The presence of political interest in the conditions of social unity may not seem 
surprising. A concern for order is long established in political thought. With Thomas 
Hobbes, it has been a starting point for early-modern conceptions of statecraft. 
Moreover, social integration tends to rank highly among governmental priorities ever 
since in the 19th century society began to be conceived as an object that requires 
stabilizing interventions (Donzelot 1994; Castel 1995). In its contextual manifestations, 
for its particular perspectives on society, and as a political project, however, the new 
interest in cohesion requires examination. Political uses of cohesion should be 
scrutinized for their conceptions and normative understandings of society, for their 
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accounts of social disintegration and of the cohesive society, and for the measures that 
they envisage for averting disintegration and for achieving social unity. Given its recent 
pervasiveness in European political discourse, the new turn to cohesion needs to be of 
interest for its politics. 
The politics of cohesion that is examined in this study is formulated in response to the 
perception that the failure of social, economic and political arrangements puts social 
unity at risk and bears out a number of newly urgent social problems. Although this 
failure is consistently invoked, its nature and the causes of alleged crises of cohesion are 
usually less than clear and – as demonstrated in this thesis – vary across national 
contexts where cohesion has become a concern. However, problems that are identified 
as a result of such failures are often said to require new efforts of political counter-
balancing, social regulation and governance. In its most common understandings, social 
cohesion has to be addressed by new methods of political intervention and a new sense 
of individual responsibility. 
Social theorists have expanded on the development of such political objectives. In his 
writings on the Third Way, Anthony Giddens (1998, 37) has given the politics of 
cohesion an influential expression. 
Social cohesion can’t be guaranteed by the top-down action of the state or by 
appeal to tradition. We have to make our lives in a more active way than was 
true of previous generations, and we need more actively to accept 
responsibilities for the consequences of what we do and the lifestyle habits we 
adopt. 
He sees a “need to re-establish continuity and develop social cohesion in a world of 
erratic transformation” (1998, 67). The resulting political imperative for a “new-style 
social democracy” is to foster “an active civil society” (1998, 78). Other public 
intellectuals associated with centre-left reformism have put forward parallel 
suggestions, though they are usually more careful than Giddens to maintain a position 
of critical distance towards the politics they describe. In La nouvelle question sociale, 
Pierre Rosanvallon (1995) speaks of the need to reconsider ‘social rights’ and to move 
towards a new focus on obligations, understood as “a moment of the reconstruction of 
the social” (ibid, 181). Rosanvallon (ibid, 222) suggests “[t]he classic opposition 
between individual and collective is no longer workable. We can no longer separate the 
reform of mentalities and that of structures, of individual moralities and political 
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imperatives”. Earlier, Ulrich Beck’s (1986) work on the Risikogesellschaft postulated 
the inadequacy of risk management by means of conventional practices of social 
solidarity. In a new world of uncertainty, individuals allegedly have to meet the 
proliferation of risks with an adaptation of their Biographiemuster (biographical 
template), which would need to aspire to new degrees of flexibility and activity (1986, 
205).1
Despite considerable differences, these accounts share the understanding that social 
change can only be successfully achieved and potentially catastrophic scenarios of 
social collapse avoided, if individual orientations catch up and respond to new 
imperatives with a measure of heightened activity and a new sense of responsibility. 
Social cohesion, the Council of Europe (2004, 8) concurs, is a “responsibility shared by 
all”. To meet this responsibility, new dispositions, character traits and value orientations 
in the pursuit of individual and collective activity are said to be required. The fostering 
of such dispositions has become a key political concern. 
 
Regardless of whether one conceives of the politics of cohesion following Giddens’ 
theorisation or cognate expressions in social theory, it is conspicuous how social unity 
and individual activity have been brought together over the last two decades. As a 
counter-balance to problems that arise when cohesion is either insufficient or absent, 
ideas of social activity, activation and mobility have been introduced across European 
states. Activity, in various shapes, has become a strategic remedy where social cohesion 
is seen to be defective. Thus, when this investigation suggests that cohesion is 
accompanied by a politics, it points to the coincidence of cohesion and activation. 
Cohesion is usually accompanied by requests for populations to evince activity, 
mobility and responsibility. Consequently, this study is not merely interested in the new 
pervasiveness of a concern but in how and why cohesion seems to require measures that 
activate and mobilize populations. 
                                                 
1  Ruth Levitas (2000, 204) points to a flaw in ‘risk society’ thinking, namely that “one cannot define 
a society in terms of its discursive strategies for dealing with the negative consequences of its 
material practices”. See also Johansson (2007) and Castel (2003) for critical remarks on how there 
is a slippage from analysis and description towards endorsement in Beck’s writings and, more 
generally, a problem with how ‘risk’ is complicit in shifting the burden from structural inequality 
towards individual behaviour. 
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Perspectives on cohesion 
The spread of cohesion across European public policy is conspicuous. Non-state actors, 
pressure groups, think tanks and research institutes alike have picked up the notion. A 
lack of cohesion has become a popular explanation for crises and problems and a 
starting point for various kinds of public policy activity. Arguably, over the last three 
decades there has been an unfolding of such concerns to an extent that might make it 
appropriate to conceive of the emergence of cohesion as a juncture or watershed 
moment, when previously unarticulated concerns with social disunity, disintegration, 
and social decline began to underpin a new interest in unity and social integration. How 
and when exactly this occurred, and what has been the driving force of this kind of 
historical shift, appears rather unclear. It may be a concern for the kind of “epochal 
analyses” that, as Raymond Williams (1991, 413) puts it, show interest in the “main 
lineaments and features” of social change. This concern and the attempt to comprehend 
changing intellectual currents and long-term social change are not of primary interest 
for this thesis. 
The question of why at a particular moment in time cohesion could become 
intellectually appealing, strategically attractive and thus widely used, is difficult, maybe 
even impossible to consider without a discussion of how it emerged in concrete political 
and discursive environments. Analysts, particularly in Britain, tend to conceive of the 
rise of cohesion as exemplary of certain epochal transformations, which are 
occasionally said to be leaning towards communitarianism (Robinson 2008), 
neoliberalism (Jones and Ward 2002; MacLeavy 2008), or some mixture of both. 
Besides problems for analyses that infer epochal transformations from the discussion of 
a limited number of cases, there is a risk of closure and over-generalisation, which 
means that this investigation opts for a less abstract, albeit more tentative, perspective 
on the formulation of political concerns. 
We may be better advised to consider the need for political actors to position 
themselves, to be inventive and strategic in their diagnoses of social problems and to 
offer appealing solutions that mobilize constituencies and outmanoeuvre opponents. 
Derek McGhee (2003, 380), in his analysis of ‘community cohesion’, points to New 
Labour’s “‘super market sweep’ tendencies” and its “highly selective ‘smash and grab’ 
deployment and understanding of concepts and social theory”. This seems to speak for a 
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perspective that considers such ‘tendencies’ with an interest in the strategic purposes of 
their deployment, rather than with a view of how they resemble positions in political 
and social theory – resemblances that are approximations at best. 
Jon Burnett (2008) usefully suggests that community cohesion can be understood as an 
expression of “liberal integrationism”. Arun Kundnani (2007; 2009), too, identifies a 
“liberal integrationism” in the new British fixation on social cohesion and national 
identity. His analysis corresponds with interesting accounts, such as by Christian Joppke 
(2008, 541; 2009, 116), on how states in Western Europe discover their liberal identities 
and formulate new requirements of belonging to a “liberal people”. Joppke sees the 
emergence of “a less procedural, more substantive variant of liberalism that prescribes a 
shared way of life, in which, say, man and women are equal and the secular trumps the 
religious” (2010, 138). Liberalism “transmutes into an identity, an ethical way of life to 
which everyone is expected to conform” (ibid, 142). Identifying a “civic turn” across 
European states, Per Mouritsen (2006; 2008) points to different moments of a related 
movement. The new salience of the concept of cohesion seems to fit this diagnosis of 
how an emerging integrationist orientation newly defines who belongs and who doesn’t. 
Although these accounts are immensely useful, they generally do not consider the 
political conditions of either “identity liberalism” or the “civic turn”. Mouritsen has 
written authoritatively on how ideas of citizenship and belonging are currently being 
reconsidered where newly perfectionist and exclusionary principles take hold 
(Mouritsen and Olsen forthcoming). His account is less instructive for our 
understanding of the political conditions of this reconsideration (Mouritsen 2011). More 
generally, the politics of the ‘civic turn’ or ‘identity liberalism’ remain largely 
unexamined. A question for Joppke and Mouritsen would be why minority separatism 
was discovered and constructed as a pertinent social problem at a particular point in 
time? What are the political conditions of such constructions that surely do not just float 
freely in political discourse but require articulation, argumentation and marketing? Such 
questions tend to be elided in favour of somewhat sanitized macro perspectives on 
changing intellectual currents. Increasing “governmental concerns with social cohesion” 
(Mouritsen 2011, 1) are acknowledged as a given, not as in need of examination for the 
conditions of their emergence.  
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‘Integrationism’, the ‘civic turn’ or ‘identity liberalism’ are useful perspectives on new 
conceptions of social unity that have become politically relevant. They correspond to 
concerns in political and sociological theory that we consider below. But such 
characterisations alone do not give us sufficient purchase to understand how 
‘community cohesion’ was introduced in Britain; why, in France, fracture sociale 
became a central theme in political debate; or how Bürgergesellschaft shaped political 
discourse in Germany. Integrationism circumscribes a trend, albeit loosely, but not the 
political dynamics that might make particular types of concern politically salient, 
plausible and widely used. To conceive of such dynamics, as well as for a better 
understanding of political change in the longer term, it is necessary to expose epochal 
analyses to the less than clear-cut circumstances that characterise how cohesion has 
been defined and introduced at particular points in time. 
Although this investigation will suggest that there are similarities in how cohesion has 
been deployed across various contexts, and a certain logic to its utilisations that should 
make us reflect on changes of an ‘epochal’ kind, the starting point for this study will be 
these deployments—and not the place of cohesion in intellectual history or how its 
currency reflects long-term transformations of government or society. We propose to be 
alert to what cohesion does when it is referred to in political debate, and we suggest that 
this requires an understanding that is neither aloof from the political process nor 
absorbed with the literality of policy language in a way that would make both critical 
distance and an interest in symbolic and discursive operations of social cohesion 
impossible. We suggest not being stuck with face-value understandings of social 
cohesion, but to take its place in political discourse seriously by considering its strategic 
and imaginary possibilities. Such efforts needs to be contextually grounded and need to 
consider cohesion not as an abstract possibility or theoretical argument but as political 
language in use. The starting point for this thesis will be the currency of social cohesion, 
the concerns it bundles and addresses, and the strategic benefits it holds for its users. 
The spread of cohesion 
This variety of users is an interesting phenomenon in its own right. Social cohesion was 
adopted – notably in relation to equitable economic development – by the European 
Union (Council of the European Communities, 1986), by the OECD (1997), the Council 
of Europe (2000, 2004a), various think tanks (Barclay 1994, Berger 1998) and research 
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institutes (prominently, the Canadian Policy Research Initiative), before finding a way 
into the repertory of social policy rhetoric across western states.  
The European Union began making sustained use of the notion of cohesion after its 
adoption in the 1986 Single European Act in relation to inequitable economic and social 
developments across its member states (see Hannequart 1992; Hooghe 1996). As a 
social policy orientation, it was further developed within the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs (DG V) – 
in line with then-President of the European Commission Jacques Delors’ agenda of 
social dialogue (see Wendon 1998). The European Union’s Lisbon Agenda of 2000 
accompanied the strategic goal of becoming “the most dynamic and competitive 
knowledge-based economy in the world” with a concern for the divisive side effects of 
competitiveness, a concern to be met with a new emphasis on cohesion. As “territorial 
cohesion” and in relation to diverse characteristics of Europe’s regions, the theme has 
been introduced in relation to their “harmonious development” (European Commission 
2008, 3) and inter-regional cooperation. It continues to be a prominent policy objective, 
not least in relation to the perceived need to cushion the emphasis on competitiveness 
(see European Commission 2010) and to give at least a limited meaning to notions of 
European identity and citizenship (Hansen and Hager 2010).  
The Council of Europe (2004, 3), less concerned with the conditions of economic 
growth and more interested in human rights and political participation, has established a 
Directorate General of Social Cohesion that is concerned, as stated in the Council’s 
Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion, with the “strains and stresses caused by divisions 
and potential divisions” in societies. With its 1995 ‘World Summit on Social 
Development’, the United Nations ascribed a vital role to social cohesion to counter 
“developments that include social polarization and fragmentation” (United Nations 
1995, para. 68), developments that could potentially escalate in the “real contemporary 
experience” of “total social breakdown” (ibid., para. 69). In light of the novelty of its 
inception, and since the reference to the theme of cohesion in political language 
preceding the 1980s is scarce, this turn to cohesion is an impressive sign of the diffusion 
of policy language among international and supra-national institutions.  
The spread of cohesion across international and intergovernmental organisations is 
paralleled by its new significance for national policy-makers, national research institutes 
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and think tanks. In the 1980s, Canada has been among the first to incorporate the notion 
in its public policy repertoire, in particular in relation to the challenging diversity of its 
multi-lingual and multi-cultural composition (Breton 1980; Beauvais and Jenson 2002). 
The late 1990s and 2000s saw a turn to cohesion across European states. Policy-making 
in France, Germany and Britain has become increasingly concerned with the stability 
and quality of social relations. In various local idioms, social cohesion has become a 
motif of considerable force that national governments employ in their analyses of 
societal change, to define political objectives and conduct public policy. 
In policy strategies following the 2001 unrest in Northern English localities, the British 
government initiated and supported the development of its own version, community 
cohesion. In the late 1990s and early 2000s successive French governments introduced 
an encompassing social vision, a new cap social, under the banner of cohésion sociale. 
Similar policy orientations have been established in other European states, such as the 
German Bürgergesellschaft, which draws on a particular notion of civic solidarity and 
has gained considerable attention as template and rallying cry in social reform debates.  
New concerns about social unity that are expressed using the language of cohesion often 
seem elusive. Commentators frequently suggest that the concept of cohesion itself 
appears amorphous and vague. Paul Bernard (1999, 48), considering the French 
cohésion sociale, argues that the “notion …  shows the characteristic features of a 
quasi-concept, that is one of those hybrid constructions that politics (le jeu politique) 
proposes in order to seek out a possible consensus on how to understand reality – as 
well as for the construction of reality.” Beauvais and Jenson (2002, 30) concur: 
cohesion is a “quasi-concept” that will be “judged not only by its analytical rigour but 
also by its utility” and that will be “challenged, rejected and dismissed by those who 
have other ideas how the future should be designed”. Karsten Fischer (2006, 25-6) 
remarks that “crises of cohesion” are an expression of a tension between the liberal 
constitution of modern states and the desire to revert back to more substantial notions of 
the common good. He suggests that cohesion needs to be understood as a creature of 
this tension, a construction (ibid., 16). The definition of cohesion seems to depend on 
contexts, purposes and not least on the perception of the kinds of crises that cohesion is 
supposed to address. This dependence of cohesion is mirrored in the diversity of roles it 
plays for actors with different concerns and objectives. The European Commission (eg., 
2010) usually employs cohesion in relation to economic development. The Council of 
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Europe (2004; 2008) considers cohesion to be an antidote to social divisiveness, 
extremism and the discrimination of minorities. National governments have put forward 
particular understandings of the cohesion theme that equally respond to divergent 
perceptions of social crises. 
What cohesion, then, may be seen to mean depends on interpretation. Rather than 
addressing invariable concerns, various versions of cohesion have been developed in 
particular contexts, in line with the institutional remits of different users and responding 
to particular kinds of concern, all with their own conceptual and intellectual histories. In 
response to what cohesion may be seen to mean, Ade Kearns and Ray Forrest (2000, 
996) suggest that it is usually 
used in such away that its meaning is nebulous but at the same time the 
impression is given that everyone knows what is being referred to. The usual 
premise is that social cohesion is a good thing, so it is conveniently assumed that 
further elaboration is unnecessary.  
Ian Buck (2005, 44) concurs and emphasizes how, as it has been coined in relation to 
urban affairs, social cohesion 
is used as a label for social success, often without much thought about its exact 
meaning. It is popular shorthand in policy discussion, but cannot be regarded as 
a useful single concept for exploring the complex issues involved in urban social 
structures and processes. 
Frequently, however, the reference to cohesion as a strategic policy goal reflects 
understandings of the notion not as a contested concept in need of specification, but as 
an undisputed necessity. In a report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Inquiry into 
Income and Wealth, Sir Peter Barclay (1994, 34, emphasis added) noted that “regardless 
of any moral argument or feelings of altruism, everyone shares an interest in the 
cohesiveness of society.” Where the meaning of the concept did not appear as naturally 
given, there have been various efforts to specify and operationalize versions of the 
cohesion theme. In one such effort, Forrest and Kearns (2001, 2128) point to “a shared 
sense of morality and common purpose; aspects of social control and social order; the 
threat to social solidarity of income and wealth inequalities between people, groups and 
places; the level of social interaction within communities or families; and a sense of 
belonging to a place”.2
                                                 
2  These five dimensions were also adopted in Ted Cantle’s (2001) influential report on ‘community 
cohesion’, which listed ‘common values and a civic culture’, ‘social order and social control’, 
‘social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities’, ‘social network and social capital’ and 
 Morality, order, solidarity, equality, interaction, community, 
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family life and belonging: the list of pertinent aspects of cohesion is long. How these 
are differently emphasized and conjoined requires an approach that pays interest to the 
role of interpretation that informs how cohesion is defined.  
There have been various attempts to demarcate the scope of different versions of the 
concept, such as of community cohesion (Local Government Association 2004), 
cohésion sociale (Ministère de l'emploi 2005a) and Bürgergesellschaft (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002). Empirical social analysis, has been concerned to develop indicators 
for cohesion, and – frequently in line with the social capital agenda and its empirical 
research programme (Putnam 1995) – to develop strategies for measurement (see 
Hirschfield and Bowers 1997; Berman and Phillips 2004; Council of Europe 2005; 
Chan, To and Chan 2006; Council of Europe 2008). Such ideas have been 
operationalized differently and various suggestions pay particular attention to 
happiness, attachment to place, sense of security and belonging, or social and civic 
participation. In a report entitled The Social Quality of Europe Beck et al. (1997, 284) 
conceive of cohesion as concerning 
the processes that create, defend or demolish social networks and the social 
infrastructures underpinning these networks. An adequate level of social 
cohesion is one which enables citizens ‘to exist as real human subjects, as social 
beings’.  
The conditions allowing for the existence as a ‘real human subject’ are bound to be as 
disputed as what it means to be ‘a social being’. The conception of society as made up 
of ‘networks’ and their ‘social infrastructures’ speaks to a specific understanding of the 
social. This understanding can hardly be taken as a given, not least as network ideas 
have been developed in a variety of different ways (see Castells 2000) and have been 
subjected to various types of criticism (Castel 2003; Boltanski and Chiapello 2005a). 
Cohesion, then, seems normatively dependent on conceptions of the ‘good life’ in 
society, which is measured, empirically, in terms of place attachment, social networks, 
happiness or ‘belonging’. It is also dependent on the nature of society and of ‘the 
                                                                                                                                               
‘place attachment and identity’ (see Chapter 5). Regarding this enumerative character of cohesion, 
Ian Buck (2005, 47) suggests that cohesion entails the “appeal to ideas of what makes a good 
society or a good city, without really specifying or prioritizing them”. It is characteristic of the use 
of cohesion in political debate. The idea frequently seems to be that cohesion covers a 
commitment to a set of objectives that exist in virtual harmony. Even without prioritization, it is 
clear that the five-fold and other definitions of cohesion are normatively dependent on contested 
concepts, such as on understandings of order, solidarity and identity. 
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social’. These interdependencies highlight the need to consider understandings of social 
cohesion as interpretations. 
The social scientific analysis that is concerned with the measurement of cohesion 
frequently sidesteps this need for interpretation. It is largely unconcerned with how 
cohesion relies on particular imaginations of ‘the social’. It is not the purpose of this 
investigation to take issue with the development of an empirical programme of 
measurement or to dispute its relevance. But it has to be acknowledged that efforts to 
quantify cohesion are not unproblematic and never quite as ‘natural’ as purported. They 
are situated in the context of particular conceptual and normative understandings of 
society. They entail imaginations of society and these imaginations are of interest in the 
interpretive perspective that is introduced in Chapter 1.  
Conceptual histories 
While cohesion is sometimes specified with the help of indicators and methods of 
measurement, other specifications place the term in a tradition of concerns. The 
reference to cohesion is frequently accompanied by claims to theoretical lineage in 
social theory, most frequently to Émile Durkheim (Pahl 1991; Lynch 2001). Inasmuch 
as cohesion articulates concerns with social or political order, there is indeed a very 
broad tradition of related concern in political theory (Wrong 1994).3
The presence of social order, something that requires explanation given disintegrative 
tendencies seen to be at work, has been traced to acts of coercion, mutual self-interest, 
or a normative consensus: perspectives associated with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau 
respectively (Wrong 1994). Similarly to their different understanding of the sources of 
 Attempts to 
support the contemporary use of cohesion with reference to long-standing concerns 
need to be queried with regard to how they might conceal a moment of interpretation. 
While there are established concerns with political order and social integration, there 
also are contemporary interests, understandings of society and strategic calculations that 
should be of interest. The following considers some general claims to conceptual and 
theoretical lineage, before turning specifically to a discussion of cohésion in the work of 
Émile Durkheim and to historical responses to his perspective. 
                                                 
3   It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a thorough discussion of the tradition of this 
concern. See Dennis Wrong’s (1994) The Problem of Order: What Unites and Divides Society for 
a compelling overview of conceptions of order in political and social theory. 
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order, the efforts required for its preservation and the ‘natural’ state of society have 
been conceived differently. Famously, for Thomas Hobbes disorder is natural and order 
artificial. In Chapter 29 of the Leviathan, he considers internal threats to the social 
compact and how ‘internal diseases’ may endanger the Commonwealth’. When its 
institutions  
come to be dissolved, not by external violence, but intestine disorder, the fault is 
not in men as they are the matter, but as they are the makers and orderers of 
them. … [T]hey cannot without the help of a very able architect be compiled 
into any other than a crazy building, such as, hardly lasting out their own time, 
must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity. (Hobbes 1994, 210) 
For Hobbes, after the problematic exit out of the state of nature, established order 
remains fragile. Institutions that secure the Commonwealth require considerable efforts 
to be preserved and calibrated.4
Significantly, the struggles of the 19th and 20th century, with their new politics of race, 
identity, culture and class, added further dimensions to these conceptions. Maybe most 
significantly, political theory’s exclusive concern with the preservation of order has 
been amended by an interest in its unmaking. With socialism, feminism and anti-
colonialism, the concern is not to preserve but to overcome bourgeois society, the 
 The nature of such efforts, in light of the chaotic 
condition of unorganized society, has been a concern in political theory over time. From 
Plato and Aristotle (for whom order was decidedly more ‘natural’ than for Hobbes) and 
their concern with the ordering of the polis, to Machiavelli’s interest in the ideal, but 
sadly unavailable institutions of the republic, both classical and early modern political 
theory has grappled with conditions of order.  
                                                 
4  Thomas Hobbes’ suggestion that an ill-designed Commonwealth – a “crazy building” – “must 
assuredly fall upon the heads of ... posterity” (Hobbes 1994, 210) provides a good account of the 
metaphorical nature of the language of integration and disintegration. Quentin Skinner (1996, 
139), considering such metaphors, points to two functions of Hobbes’ language. The first is the re-
description of “actions or states of affairs in such a way as to lend additional force to whatever 
interpretation we may wish to put upon them. The other is by colouring or enhancing our 
arguments by means of the figures and tropes of speech.” This work of ‘rhetorical re-description’ 
offers accounts or stories that present issues in a particular light and dramatizes their presentation 
by using metaphor. Dennis Wrong (1994, 3-4) gives a list of such metaphorical conceptions: 
“‘Cement’—sometimes ‘social cement’—‘glue,’ ‘magnetic forces,’ ‘ties that bind,’ ‘the fabric of 
society,’ or ‘the social bond’ are invoked and questions are asked about their nature and their 
strength, that is, the degree to which they are successful in ‘holding society together,’ preventing it 
from ‘breaking down,’ ‘falling apart,’ ‘disintegrating,’ or succumbing to powerful ‘centrifugal 
tendencies.’ Such language is redolent of physical, mechanical, chemical, and biological imagery, 
whether drawn from science or from everyday life. All language, to be sure is metaphorical, but 
some language, it can be argued, is more metaphorical than other language.” The invariably 
metaphorical nature of how social order and disintegration are presented will be of some concern 
in Chapter 1. 
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hetero-normative system of patriarchal social relations, or the invisible whiteness that 
marks its racialized system of representations. Concerns with social order have therefore 
been articulated with different conceptual vocabularies and have responded to changing 
types of concern.  
The relation of social cohesion to these concerns and to other concepts that are more 
firmly established in political theory – such as social integration, harmony, or political 
order – is not clearly defined. Arguably, with cohesion greater emphasis can be placed 
on the dimension of inter-personal unity. ‘Order’ sounds statist, impersonal and 
authoritarian, whereas harmony, however, is imbued with an emotionalism that does not 
fit in well with the customary terminology of liberal politics. While integration may 
refer to the haphazard combination of parts, cohesion is often used to point to the 
tightness, quality and persistence of ties between individuals. The Oxford English 
Dictionary (1989, 450) suggests as definitions the “action or condition of cohering; 
cleaving or sticking together”, or – as distinguished from adhesion – the “union of like 
organs”.  
There is, then, a certain understanding of cohesion as pertaining to moral orientations 
that are purposively shared. In this sense it may appear somewhat closer to the German 
tradition of thinking of social ties in terms of Bindung (attachment) – a notion whose 
relationship to cohesion the German sociologist Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (2002, 26) 
considers as follows: 
In terms of social relationships, cohesion denotes a high degree of proximity, 
especially in terms of space, but also in other forms of inescapable interpersonal 
connectedness. Cohesion means a state in which people’s behavior and actions 
can be observed, where spontaneous social control is possible and often 
operative.  
This emphasis on proximity, tightness and a measure of control – as it is present in the 
German Bindung – has not stood in the way of cohesion becoming a prominent notion 
in contexts where different, maybe more liberal and less organic traditions of 
conceiving of social relations had previously been more influential.  
It is clear that the conceptual relationship of cohesion to alternative notions is fairly 
murky. This lack of conceptual clarity leads to a situation in which particular horizons 
of meaning that are present in cohesion do not foreclose its adaptation across contexts. 
As regards its more specific place in social theory, there are divergent claims to origins 
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and lineage. Ferdinand Tönnies’ (1991[1935]) duality of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
is occasionally mentioned, just as Talcott Parson’s (1967) ‘normative integration’, or 
the work of Charles Lockwood (1999).5
Durkheim indeed uses cohésion, yet only somewhat casually as a byword to notions 
such as regularité (1922[1893], vi) or intégration générale de la societé (1922[1893], 
28). It is not on par with relatively well-defined concepts, such as solidarité. As is well 
known, Durkheim’s work is usually understood as a qualified defense of the moral 
potentials of modernity. The strong communitarian and, to some extent, anti-modern 
vein in which cohesion can be invoked, speaking to anxieties about value loss or moral 
decay, may seem rather foreign to his concerns. This position becomes reasonably 
evident when taking into account the political context in which Durkheim developed his 
social theory. The historical environment for the development of Durkheim’s social 
theories was characterised by quarrel between liberals, leftists, conservatives, 
monarchists and political Catholics in late 19th century France. The public debate over 
the miscarriage of justice that had seen Captain Alfred Dreyfus sentenced to life 
imprisonment in French Guiana, the Dreyfus Affair, triggered significant debates about 
French identity and the sources of solidarity that were required for French society to 
cohere and prosper. It was also the place for Durkheim to articulate his understanding of 
social solidarity in response to political questions of considerable urgency (Bredin 1983; 
Birnbaum and Berlière 1994).  
 Most frequently, however, and reaching back 
somewhat further to the progenitor of a scientific interest in social relations, it is Émile 
Durkheim’s work that is emphasized. Ray Pahl (1991, 348) sees a trajectory from 
‘Durkheim to the European Commission’, and its interests in exclusion and cohesion in 
the 1980s and 90s. Ruth Levitas considers the prominence of social cohesion as the 
signal of a new ‘Durkheimian hegemony’ (Levitas 1996). It seems appropriate, then, to 
consider some aspects of Durkheim’s understanding of cohesion, its intellectual 
trajectory and reception. 
Durkheim, in short, suggested that modern individualism does not necessarily lead to 
social fragmentation. The reactionary interventions of those accusing the supporters of 
Dreyfus, the Dreyfusards, of weakening national unity with their support for the rights 
of an individual had misunderstood, Durkheim alleged, the nature of modern solidarity. 
                                                 
5  Berman and Phillips (2004, 4) even claim that cohesion is “more or less directly descended” from 
Tönnies’ duality.  
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Individualism and the collective social aspirations, the modern conscience collective, 
should not be seen to be in conflict. In fact, individualism had become an ineliminable 
part of modern social arrangements and could by itself provide for sources of modern 
solidarity. This is what Durkheim has in mind when he, without a pejorative meaning, 
refers to the ‘cult of the individual’: 
The cult, of which he is at once both object and agent, does not address itself to 
the particular being which he is and which bears his name, but to the human 
person (la personne humaine) wherever it is to be found, and in whatever form it 
is embodied. Impersonal and anonymous, such an aim, then, soars far above all 
individual minds (consciences particulières) and can thus serve them as a 
rallying point. (Durkheim 1973[1898], 48) 
The establishment of a society with moral purpose, showing a strong conscience 
collective, is possible without reverting to pre-modern ideas of homogeneous unity that 
fail to take account of the irrevocable individualism of the modern situation. The 
defence of Drefyus was thus, Durkheim alleged, precisely in line with the sources of 
modern solidarity and not at all, as the anti-Dreyfusards suggested, a threat to the social 
and moral integration of the French nation. Defending individual rights means 
defending “the vital interest of society, for [it] prevents the criminal impoverishment of 
that last reserve of collective ideas and feelings which is the very soul of the nation” 
(ibid. 53-4). In De la Division du Travail Social, Durkheim (1922[1893]) gave this 
account a somewhat more elaborate underpinning when he brought the social forces of 
differentiation into the picture—forces that may provide for a type of normative-
functional interdependence, famously coined as ‘organic solidarity’.  
Organic solidarity, in short, is integration through difference, while mechanic solidarity 
is integration by virtue of similarity. While pre-modern or tribal societies were seen to 
cohere ‘mechanically’, modern society allows for the former—though this does not 
mean that the appeal to similarity has become irrelevant. Indeed, modern societies are in 
many ways characterised by the phantom pains of lost homogeneity. Collective symbols 
and ritualized functions remain important, and Durkheim refers in particular to the penal 
system and the symbolism of dispensing punishment for the maintenance of a modern 
conscience collective (see Chapter 2 in more detail). Durkheim, arguably, did not 
conceive of the pluralism that now characterizes many Western cities, where questions 
of how homogeneity and cohesion may be achieved or sustained, and what rituals and 
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collective symbols this requires, have become relevant in new ways. Gerd Baumann 
(2011, 288) thus suggests that 
[n]arrow readings of Durkheim view rituals as crystallizations of basic values 
uniformly endorsed by communities that perform them with a view to 
themselves, ultimately to create and confirm their cohesion as communities. In 
plural societies,  this position is complicated by the presence of ‘Others’, be it as 
‘visible’ participants or as ‘invisible’ categorical referents.  
Rituals and symbols that can sustain a modern conscience collective may be seen to be 
more difficult to establish under such conditions. Not just socio-economic 
interdependence, but cultural pluralism and the dispersal of governmental authority 
appear – or are considered – as salient features of modern social conditions (Bauböck 
1996). Attempts to make Durkheimian ideas relevant for the present day are faced with 
novel challenges. 
It is not the point here to suggest a particular perspective on Durkheim, or to argue for 
particular understandings of his sociological theory. But it is important to note that the 
reference to Durkheim in support of a concern with social cohesion remains 
unconvincingly narrow as long as it fails to take full notice of the nature of his 
suggestions. For Durkheim (1952[1897]), atomization, social disintegration and anomia 
constitute real problems that arise from pathological forms of social integration. 
Durkheim’s remedy, however, does not depend on the imposition of values or the 
institution of a wholly new kind of solidarity that is absent from the social contexts at 
hand. Durkheim’s critique of the pre-modern conservatism of the anti-Dreyfusards is a 
repudiation of the suggestion that social pathologies can be countered with an infusion 
of values, and his normative functionalism is not concerned with values that are 
instilled, imposed or artificially inserted to provide for collective aspirations. Rather, he 
argues for careful and contextual considerations of the potentials of modern types of 
social organisation. We may speculate that he would reject policies concerned with 
reverting back to pre-modern notion of togetherness without a basis in lived reality. 
Anthony Giddens (1971, 72) thus rightly remarks that Durkheim’s core proposition is 
that “society is not, in spite of the declining significance of traditional moral beliefs, 
inevitably tending towards disintegration.” Veit Bader (2001, 132) puts this 
Durkheimian commitment as succinctly as possible: the unity of modern society 
“cannot be opposed to differentiation; on the contrary, differentiation is its way to create 
unity.”  
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This does not mean that moral integration is negligible or unimportant; quite the 
contrary (Durkheim 1952[1897]). There is a different, social-integrationist sense in 
which cohesion – much more in line with Durkheimian ideas – may be seen to support a 
conception of social and moral unity. We develop this suggestion in the following 
section where we are less concerned with sociological theory and more with the variety 
of contextual and political uses of cohesion. 
Two types of cohesion 
Cautious sociological analyses and pluralist social theory tend to emphasize that 
contemporary societies do not require emphatic ideals of political unity or social 
cohesion (Mann 1970; Unger 1975; Bader 2001). It seems, though, that such 
reservations do not necessarily hold much sway in political debate, where a concern 
with social fragmentation, disunity or, for example, partisanship in the political system 
is often widely evident. Even the political entrepreneurship of contemporary social 
theorists like Anthony Giddens (1998; 2000) often supports and substantiates political 
propositions – usually in response to perceived tendencies of disintegration – that are 
deeply imbued with a language of communality and shared social morality (see also 
Beck 1992; Rosanvallon 1995). Despite the fact that such contributions and the public 
discourse of social cohesion more generally often appear undertheorized and alarmist, 
they point to one significant distinction. That is the difference between a sense of unity 
that is to be found in cultural or moral homogeneity, and a sense of differentiated unity 
where – despite diversity and pluralism – shared orientations, shared dispositions and, 
most significantly, a shared spirit of activity provides for integrationist unity. 
The anti-Dreyfusards, however, have recently experienced some belated success. The 
political trend across Europe indeed shows a strong desire for cultural homogeneity, in 
particular where cultural diversity is experienced in newly challenging ways and where 
the perceived otherness of post-immigration groups is considered to be a problem. 
German Leitkultur, recently reinvigorated in Angela Merkel’s attack on 
multiculturalism, and the recent grand débat on French national identity (Sarkozy 2009) 
show the continued appeal of homogeneous nationhood. Britain is no exception and 
notions of cohesion have been used here for similarly anti-pluralist purposes. In an 
article for a journal published by the Royal United Services Institute, Prins and 
Salisbury (2008, 23) put their case for cohesion as follows: 
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The United Kingdom presents itself as a target, as a fragmenting, post-Christian 
society, increasingly divided about interpretations of its history, about its 
national aims, its values and in its political identity. The fragmentation is 
worsened by the firm self-image of those elements within it who refuse to 
integrate. This is a problem worsened by the lack of leadership from the majority 
which in mis-placed deference to ‘multiculturalism’ failed to lay down the line 
to immigrant communities, thus undercutting those within them trying to fight 
extremism. The country’s lack of self-confidence is in stark contrast to the 
implacability of its Islamist terrorist enemy, within and without.  
In the face of ‘terrorist threats’, radicalism and ‘home-grown terrorism’, cohesion is 
presented as the antidote to cultural uncertainty. It therefore justifies bold and 
aggressive efforts in defence of ‘Western values’. In Britain, this understanding of 
cohesion is prominently associated with Douglas Murray and his Centre for Social 
Cohesion.6
The language of social cohesion that has recently gained popularity in both national and 
supranational policy-making contexts is usually of a different kind. The sense of unity 
that is appealed to, rather than being grounded in ideas of cultural sameness, is more 
directed towards the idea of shared activity. The political agendas of community 
cohesion, cohésion sociale and Bürgergesellschaft generally speak of responsibility, a 
civic spirit, and social activity. A good example of this is a report for the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation where cohesion is introduced in response to notable social 
problems: “the factors which are fostering the social diseases of drugs, crime, political 
extremism and social unrest” (Barclay 1994, 34). While the sense of a purposive unity 
plays a role for tackling ‘social diseases’, this unity is not to be found in cultural or 
social homogeneity. It is conceived differently and works with the appeal to civicness, 
shared interests and shared dispositions.  
 Murray points to cohesion as a necessary state that British society must 
achieve in order to prevail in the ‘clash of civilizations’. Although this portrayal of how 
cohesion is at risk is widespread across Western Europe, it is not our concern – at least 
not primarily and exclusively. The homogeneity of Leitkultur and the new prominence 
of anti-pluralist arguments in debates on national identity is important to consider, and 
requires urgent exploration and critique. But it does not exhaustively capture the ways 
that social unity is invoked with cohesion. 
These conditions are not appealed to as pre-existing, but as objects whose achievement 
requires continuous efforts; social unity needs to be maintained through the deployment 
                                                 
6 See http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/. 
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of sophisticated means of governmental intervention, autonomy needs to be exercised, 
and individual dispositions that are harmful to social cohesion need to be changed. As 
Pekka Sulkunen (2007, 328, also 2009) points out, the newly prominent idea is that 
“[s]ocial integration follows automatically from the autonomy of individuals.” This 
understanding of social unity thus emphasizes autonomy and its exercise in individual 
efforts that need to be undertaken in the pursuit of social cohesion.  
These efforts may themselves be seen as dependent on certain preconditions. Some 
individuals are certainly better equipped than others to exercise their autonomy and 
become active in the sense that such understandings of social unity are seen to require. 
This matches the understanding that the problematic behaviour of certain groups 
constitutes a particular threat to social unity through ‘ethnic segregation’, political 
apathy, or social exclusion. The capacities for the pursuit of particular kinds of activity, 
such as for the kind of ‘mixing and mingling’ that is expected of ethnic minority groups 
or for ‘active citizenship’, may be unevenly distributed in society. The conditions of 
purposive unity, though they are separate from what is required when unity is conceived 
of as substantial, homogeneous similarity, are not without their own accounts of who 
belongs and who doesn’t. Out-groups are therefore identified by their inability to pursue 
desirable forms of social activity, rather than through their deviance from ethnic, racial, 
cultural or religious homogeneity.  
These ideas are developed in more detail in Chapter 2, where we also provide a review 
of the literature on activation and suggest that social activity, when it is conceived as a 
requirement for social unity, can take various shapes. It is not just activity in the labour 
market that may be introduced as a requirement, but also mobility, tolerance, active 
citizenship and, more generally, the flexible pursuit of projects.  
At this stage, these preliminary thoughts only serve to highlight our suggestion that 
political appeals to substantial homogeneity and to purposive unity are not as far apart 
as they might appear. In reference to unity and cohesion in political discourse, the 
distinction between cohesion in a Durkheimian sense and substantive similarity in the 
spirit of the anti-Dreyfusards may not be as conspicuous as in their respective 
theoretical agendas. Both, for example, may be invoked where new boundaries between 
in- and out-groups are drawn and new hierarchies between desirable character types are 
established. This parallel is particularly apparent considering that both kinds of 
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cohesion have accounts of disintegration that partially overlap and that may be 
politically invoked and deployed in similar ways.  
From theory to interpretation 
The variety of theoretical conceptions, the overlap of arguments and the murky nature 
of its political expressions mean that cohesion is difficult to pin down. The concept of 
cohesion is maybe best understood as a ‘floating signifier’ that is open to be 
appropriated and filled with meaning in different ways. Contextual understandings of 
this concept are likely to reflect political motivations and objectives, rather than a 
semantic substance or a theoretical tradition. Speaking from the Australian context, 
James Jupp (2007, 17) points to a further challenge: “most of the perceived threats to 
social cohesion have been based on worst-case scenarios which never materialized in 
reality.” Ray Forrest and Ade Kearns (2001, 2126) concur: 
[O]ccasional predictions of cohesion in crisis typically rest on assumptions that 
the social element of a previous era is crumbling and that we are being 
collectively cast adrift in a world in which the previous rules of social interaction 
and social integration no longer apply.  
Predictions of cohesion in crisis have become considerably more widespread, and the 
threat of social disintegration has become a frequent motif in political debate. Crime, 
Tony Blair (1993a, 28) suggested in his early positioning as Labour’s prospective 
leader, “arises from our disintegration as a community”. “A solution to this 
disintegration”, he added (Blair 1993b), must come from the rediscovery of “values and 
principles”. Gerhard Schröder (2000a) invoked a “general sense of insecurity” and 
proposed Zivile Bürgergesellschaft as a solution. Jacques Chirac’s (1994; 2007) 
reference to fracture sociale, the central theme of his 1995 campaign for the French 
presidency, equally invoked and channeled a sense of anxiety about a particular 
understanding of social and moral disintegration. 
In its relationship to these invocations of crises, cohesion seems to demarcate not so 
much a field of conceptually informed understandings of society, but a broad array of 
concerns that can be substantiated in different ways. In the formulation of such 
concerns, popular anxieties about moral decline, cultural dissolution and value loss may 
coincide with more nuanced and theoretically informed understandings of threats to 
cohesion, such as the ones that point, following Durkheim, to difficulties in the social 
division of labour or to declining ‘social capital’. In political language, the two are often 
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difficult to distinguish and they may inform and support one another. A significant 
challenge for this investigation, then, is that it needs to consider the effort that goes into 
the construction of contextual understandings of cohesion. This requires a careful 
analysis of the ways in which various understandings of social disintegration – be they 
informed by public anxieties, derived from social theory, or introduced in relation to 
material social problems – come together in political debate and become relevant for 
policy-making purposes. 
In this context, James Jupp’s comment on the ambiguity of threats is instructive for how 
it omits the concern with how social cohesion itself is defined and projected. The 
particular salience of scenarios of disintegration is poorly conceived if its referent 
object, the idea of society as stable, natural and empirically ‘out there’, remains 
unexamined. The construction of threats to cohesion needs to be understood in relation 
to the imagined ‘cohesive society’ and to the efforts that go into the projection of a 
vision of integrated social life. To understand how social cohesion becomes a palpable 
and plausible theme in contemporary politics, we need to consider the coincidence 
between imaginaries of social disintegration and imaginaries of social cohesion.7
Research question 
 While 
Chapter 2 makes suggestions on how to conceive of activation as a requirement of the 
politics of cohesion, Chapter 1 reviews this interpretive moment and suggests a 
conceptual framework for its analysis.  
Drawing together the elements that have been raised in this preliminary discussion, we 
may then suggest that social cohesion has been saliently adopted in relation to a range 
of notable social problems across Western states. While we need to distinguish between 
different understandings of cohesion, in public debate various invocations may coincide 
and reinforce one another. The analytical challenge for this study is that cohesion is 
neither just an analytical concept in the social sciences; nor is it only a prominent theme 
                                                 
7  Approaches that consider the construction of societal insecurity in the tradition of Carl Schmitt 
(1996) as part of the invocation of a state of emergency, by contrast, appear of limited use. It is not 
merely the invocation of disintegration, but the way disintegration connects to the wholesome, 
cohesive and integrated community, no less a construction, that accounts for how the politics of 
cohesion operates. The notion of ‘societal securitization’ (Waever 1993, 23-6; Buzan, Wæver and 
Wilde 1998, 128) takes the societal self as a pre-analytical, natural given. The point, however, is 
that the insecurity of disintegration, identity loss, or societal fragmentation is as much open to 
constructions as its counterpart, the invocation of cohesion or a stable societal identity. Not one but 
two dimensions need to be considered.  
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in political discourse. It is both, and its various uses are characteristically in-between 
everyday, public policy and social science discourse. 
Rather than imposing a conceptual framework on debates that are empirically 
multifarious and oftentimes confused, we suggest a different kind of organisation that 
resonates with the way Barclay (1994) and others conceive of cohesion as a solution to 
various problems or with Amin’s (2005, 614) “regenerative tonic” in relation to broad 
constellations of social problems. Social cohesion has become prominent in relation to 
fields of concern and constellations of social problems. New languages of social unity 
have become salient across different domains, thus indicating that cohesion is 
differently negotiated and problematized across countries as well as across different 
fields of application. In Germany, Bürgergesellschaft problematizes civic apathy, 
declining turnout at elections and the weakening of civil society organisation. In France, 
cohésion sociale responds to exclusion sociale, a field of concerns that invokes in 
particular the failure of the French socio-economic model and the welfare state to create 
social inclusivity. In Britain, community cohesion has been coined in relation to urban 
unrest among predominantly Muslim youths, to ethnic segregation and so-called 
‘parallel lives’.  
Forms of social cohesion have thus become salient in different ways and across 
different domains. In the three contexts preliminarily identified here these forms 
correspond to political, socio-economic and communalist fields of concern. These 
contextual variations of cohesion foreground different qualities that are seen to be 
required in order to address important social problems. These qualities include civic 
values and commitment in the voluntary sector, individual responsibility in the welfare 
state and inter-communal engagement between ethnically marked groups or individuals. 
Despite this variety across its fields of application, a common denominator among the 
politics of cohesion is the emphasis on the need for individuals to become more 
responsible, to change their lives and, in general, to become active. The idea of 
generalized activity is a shared feature of cohesion across the contexts and the concern 
is thus to consider how social cohesion has been introduced and defined in political 
agendas in a way that puts new emphasis on a sense of activity, mobility and individual 
responsibility. There are three components to this question. 
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• The turn to cohesion is puzzling, given the relative novelty of the notion in 
public policy agendas. While cohesion is often invoked as a conventional, long-
standing and natural concern of government, this thesis is interested in pointing 
out its construction and the imagination of society that makes cohesion a salient 
concern. It re-traces the introduction of the cohesion theme and its adoption for 
public policy purposes in France, Germany and Britain.  
• Cohesion indicates a newly powerful mode for making sense of society. It works 
as a focal point that bundles together diverse anxieties about the viability of 
contemporary social arrangements and draws attention to some, however 
imprecisely delineated, root causes of social decline. When it is deployed in 
policy language, it involves a shift away from the surface treatment of social 
diseases and allows actors to claim to provide radical solutions to social 
dislocations. Such political deployments need to be considered in order to 
understand how cohesion has become a compelling and plausible motif. 
Developing the conceptual frame of ‘social imaginaries’, we introduce a 
particular perspective for the study of this motif.  
• Heightened activity is generally considered a suitable remedy for the social ills 
that are identified in the politics of cohesion. The coincidence between cohesion 
and social activation requires interrogation. Until recently, problems pertaining 
to the welfare state, race relations and political participation have conventionally 
been conceived as requiring different types of governmental activity; yet the 
politics of cohesion provides an alternative: social activation. 
In addition to these analytical interests, there is a critical concern that motivates this 
study. With cohesion as a political priority, marginalized populations are too often 
blamed for their own predicament through being described as insufficiently adapted, 
active, tolerant, connected, engaged or flexible. Welfare recipients or ethnic minority 
groups are called upon to change their ways. A first line of critique thus takes issue with 
the injustice of the politics of cohesion as it singles out the behaviour of disadvantaged 
groups. The second considers the theme of social cohesion for how its practical 
application and strategic deployment contrast with a more democratic imagination of 
the social. 
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This dual critical impetus suggests that the object ‘society’ needs to be opened up for 
the kinds of democratic imaginations that do not require perpetual activation. These 
suggestions are developed in more detail in the following two chapters, where the work 
of Luc Boltanski (2011) is considered for how it contributes towards a critical 
perspective on agendas of social cohesion. More significantly, however, this perspective 
is elucidated in the engagement with the development and deployment of social 
cohesion in three country cases. 
Three contexts of cohesion 
The discussion of developments towards social cohesion in three country cases serves to 
suggest answers to the three questions that we have posed. We study significant 
speeches, interventions in debates and the newspaper coverage to contextualize the 
development of cohesion in national agendas. We consider such interventions in the 
context of conceptual traditions and a competitive political environment. Given this 
broad interest, we do not claim to provide a picture of each country case that is even 
nearly complete. The core concern of the investigation is to bring out how social 
cohesion was introduced so as to coincide with and support new requirements of social 
activation. For this purpose, the investigation selectively engages with debates and 
representations. For reasons of length and feasibility, at other times it maintains a bird’s 
eye view, such as regarding the vast output of public policy material on cohesion 
strategies.  
Germany: Bürgergesellschaft 
In the context of recent revelations about wide-spread tax evasion among members of 
the German business elite, but also in relation to welfare fraud and youth criminality, 
Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble (2009) remarked that the according offences 
should not be seen as trivial: they pose a threat to social cohesion (Zusammenhalt der 
Gesellschaft). More than this, they are a symptom of the weakening of social bonds and 
of a lack of commitment to the common good. While such rhetorical gestures to moral 
decline are wide-spread among public figures with culturally conservative inclinations, 
gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt has been at the centre of wider debates in recent years 
– most notably in the course of the drawn-out legislative quarrels over immigration and 
naturalization procedures (Bade and Münz 2008). Equally, concerns with cohesion 
figured prominently in debates on the repercussions of an increasingly unequal 
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distribution of material wealth and the formation of a newly marginalized groups in 
society, as well as in debates regarding the precarious living conditions that result from 
increasingly flexible forms of employment (Heite et al. 2007).  
Figure 1: Mention of Zivilgesellschaft (grey) and Bürgergesellschaft (black) in 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (own data) 
 
In recent years, Bürgergesellschaft has been one of the most prominent expressions of a 
concern for cohesion. Introduced and defined in the early 1990s, the concept became 
widely used in German social and political reform debate in between 1998 and 2002 
(see Figure 1). One of the prominent participants in this debate, Social-Democrat MP 
Wolfgang Thierse, pointed out that “the relationship between individuals, state and 
society has become unclear and requires revision” in light of the experience of 
“dissolution, breakdown of social ties, new social polarisation” (Thierse 2002). 
Bürgergesellschaft seems to respond to this need for revision; it is frequently employed 
synonymously with Zivilgesellschaft, usually translated as civil society.8
                                                 
8  There are, of course, considerable difficulties with these translations in that they may fail to fully 
capture the particular contextual meaning of the original terms (Révauger 2001). The German and 
French chapters are thus, to some extent, attempts at reconstructing particular conceptual traditions 
that should make it somewhat easier to compare and contrast notions such as Zivilgesellschaft or 
exclusion sociale to their English counterparts. 
 The concept of 
Bürgergesellschaft emerged as a significant point of reference in social policy debates. 
It originally drew on the positive role of civil society movements in the democratic 
transitions in the East but became, at least since the late 1990s, a broader template for 
the remodeling of German society (Klein 2001). In these debates, the tradition of 
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Bürgergesellschaft and its socio-historical lineage are particularly significant and will 
be considered in some detail in Chapter 4.  
Bürgergesellschaft coincided with a significant re-orientation of Schröder’s Social 
Democrats towards the welfare state. The need to question traditional ways of service 
provision and to adopt the idea of an ‘enabling’ or ‘activating’ welfare state figures 
highly in programmatic statements that draw on the notion of Bürgergesellschaft. 
Shortcomings of the welfare state and civic apathy were seen to add up to a threatening 
scenario of social sclerosis. Bürgergesellschaft responds to this scenario in that it 
invokes a new sense of direction and responsibility. It has channelled public policy 
making towards an increasing reliance on civic and socio-economic activation and 
individual responsibility. 
France: Cohésion Sociale 
The liens sociaux, the binding ties of French society, have been considered to be 
problematic at different points in the history of the 5th Republic. Cohésion sociale 
became a full-fledged political objective and the headline title for social policy 
initiatives in 1997 and 2004/5 (see Figure 2). The crisis of cohésion sociale is widely 
portrayed as a crisis of the French social model, and planning for cohesion involves, in 
recent debates, a focus on the efficiency of welfare provision, the accessibility of 
services and equality in their provision. 
Despite a significant role for the state in the preservation of republican solidarity, the 
recent debate has incorporated components of social capital and civil society ideas that 
supplement a state-centred rhetoric (Levy 2005). French Étatisme is increasingly 
embellished with an emphasis on micro-social ties and intra-state relations that appear 
to sit somewhat uneasily in a republican tradition. While the inclusion into the 
opportunities afforded by the central state was originally situated at the core of 
strategies of cohesion, this has been increasingly supplemented with emphases on 
communal relations and active citizenship. Thus, while Denis Helly, a perceptive 
commentator of cohésion sociale, would still draw a contrast between French and 
American perspectives (Helly 1999), this appears to have lost some of its self-evidence 
(Helly 2008). 
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Figure 2: Mention of cohésion (grey) and cohésion sociale (black) in Le Monde and Le 
Figaro (own data) 
 
The turn to cohesion resonates with a new problem perception for the dirigiste model 
and a turn towards what Chevallier (2004) refers to as État regulateur: the state as an 
arbiter whose primary function no longer consists of social intervention, but instead in 
the guarantee and maintenance of social cohesion (2004, para. 5). In a similar vein, 
Hugues Sibille (1994) made a case for social cohesion as a contrast to an older 
understanding of welfare. The alternative to “redistributive solidarity”, Sibille argued, 
lay in “active citizenship”, “personalized relations, proximity, and the mobilization of a 
system of actors”. A new common sense in French public policy considers proximity as 
a “means of improving the quality of public services” (Cole 2006, 90). While this does 
not imply a diminishing scope for the state, it points towards new understanding of how 
the state intervenes: a “trend towards social activation” (Palier 2005, 139) has become 
evident in French social policy.  
Britain: Community Cohesion  
In the United Kingdom, references to cohesion have become widespread, and a 
particular version, ‘community cohesion’, has obtained a prominent position in New 
Labour public policy initiatives (McGhee 2003; Burnett 2004; Robinson 2005). For one 
prominent protagonist in the development of this agenda, Ted Cantle (2005, 26), 
‘community cohesion’ is  
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fundamentally concerned with changing underlying attitudes and values and 
represents a very different approach to the work presently done under the equal 
opportunities banner, which emphasises the use of systems and processes to 
constrain and change behaviour as a means of delivering equality and fairness. 
Cohesion has been introduced as a strategic goal for a wide range of policy activity, 
from urban renewal, asylum and immigration policies, to policing, race relations, 
economic recovery and domestic and international security. Conservative groups, such 
as Civitas (Stone and Edwards 2007) or its offshoot, the Centre for Social Cohesion, 
invoke cohesion to bring into focus the alleged weakness of liberal pluralism vis-à-vis a 
negative and unitary conception of Islam. Research institutes provide guidance to local 
policy-makers on issues of cohesion (iCoCo 2006), advocacy organisations increasingly 
frame their requests in the language of social cohesion and ministerial portfolios have 
been renamed to reflect the new concern. This is surprising, since the term, as David 
Robinson (2005, 1412) remarks, “had no place in the vocabulary of urban theory or 
public policy prior to the disturbances in 2001”. In fact, it was conspicuously absent 
from the British public debate, and it is only in the process in which the 2001 unrest of 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham was analyzed and interpreted that social cohesion, or a 
lack thereof, came to figure as powerful device in public discourse. 
Figure 3: Mention of cohesion (grey) and community cohesion (black) in The Guardian 
and The Times (own data) 
 
Proponent of the notion, however, were able to draw on a broad socio-moral turn that 
had become increasingly salient in the 1990s and culminated in the successful 1997 
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campaign of New Labour, rebranded as the party of community and social 
responsibility. In a number of episodes, such as the murder of James Bulger in 1993 and 
the ensuing political debates over how the killing signified a moral crisis, socio-moral 
arguments came to be tested (Hay 1995). Thatcherite competitive individualism was 
gradually put on the defensive, and society, the thing Thatcher said did not exist, 
returned with a vengeance. As early as 1995, Geoff Mulgan – co-founder of the think 
tank Demos and later Director of Policy at Downing Street – observed “an intensive 
search for a sense of community cohesion, for ties that can bind people together” 
(Mulgan 1995). David Marquand (1996, 9, emphasis in original), noticed the still 
“inchoate and tentative” intimations of this newly emerging theme: the “threat of 
fragmentation and anomie have fostered a new concern with the dangers of social 
exclusion and the a priori necessity for social cohesion” Moreover, towards the end of 
Conservative rule, Will Hutton (1995, 23-4) observed that Britain faced “explosive 
levels of stress. The individualist, laissez-faire values which imbue the economic and 
political elite have been found wanting”. 
Cohesion appeared as an extension of this socio-moral turn and its application in the 
area of ethnic relations. In the aftermath of unrest in 2001, ‘community cohesion’ 
became widely used in policy reports and public debate (see Figure 3).  “Civic pride” 
(Ouseley 2001), new “principles of citizenship” (Cantle 2001), or the creation of a 
“common vision” (Clarke 2001) for the localities affected by the unrest, were headline 
recommendations of officially commissioned reports. Chapter 4 examines in particular 
this early period of the politics of community cohesion in light of preceding debates and 
New Labour’s political agenda. 
Studying the politics of cohesion 
Political agendas in all three countries followed particular contextual developments. 
Social cohesion was not merely copied, such as by incorporating a set of readily 
available policy strategies from supra-national institutions or domestic counterparts. It 
was adapted, defined and made suitable for particular contextual purposes. As Pierre 
Bourdieu (2002, 4) notes on the international circulation of ideas, “texts circulate 
without contexts”; that is: “they do not take their context” or the particularity of their 
“field of production” with them. Invariably, they are re-interpreted in line with the 
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features of their “field of reception” (ibid.).9 For the turn to cohesion across three 
policy-making contexts, this means that we do not face clearly defined ideas or policy 
prescription, but interpretations that emerged in particular places and in correspondence 
with established concerns and features of political debate.10
Not just historical particularities but exigencies of political debate play a role in how 
agendas of social cohesion were developed. This has not taken place in an 
argumentative vacuum, but under conditions of political pressure. Cohesion came into 
the picture as an attempt to re-define society in competitive political environments. The 
introduction of fracture sociale, the commentary on political disaffiliation in Germany, 
and the idea of communal disintegration that Tony Blair invoked were characterized by 
strategic considerations. In relation to how he invoked the murder of Jamie Bulger in 
1993 to carve out a new social imaginary, Blair (2010, 57) remarks: 
 Hence, it will be necessary 
to examine how such features of political debate and historical understandings play a 
role in how notions of social cohesion were defined and substantiated in political 
discourse. The reference to the socio-political lineage of the concept of 
Bürgergesellschaft in German debate makes it necessary to consider the according 
claims in some detail. By contrast, the French concern with exclusion sociale and 
agendas towards cohésion soicale were substantiated by ambiguous conceptions of 
republican solidarity, which will be examined. New definitions of community and the 
socio-moral turn of New Labour provided a background for the adoption of community 
cohesion and require particular consideration.    
Very effectively I made it into a symbol of a Tory Britain in which, for all the 
efficiency that Thatcherism had achieved, the bonds of social and community 
well-being has been loosed, dangerously so.  
                                                 
9  This is also where the usefulness of political science literature on policy diffusion seems rather 
limited (see Simmons and Elkins 2004; Meseguer 2005; Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett 2007). 
While it may have a good account of how ideas travel, it certainly has less to offer on the re-
interpretations and the contextual adaptations that mark the diffusion process. 
10  A shared contextual feature is the commitment of all three governments to some loose tenets of the 
so-called Third Way. The Third Way has been defined by both its proponents and its detractors, in 
particular in the voluminous contributions of New Labour’s critics (e.g., Bevir 2000; Fairclough 
2000; Heffernan 2001; Jordan 2010). Those critics have taken issues with the reliance of Third 
Way rhetoric on allegedly sinister practices of political marketing, spin and focus-grouped policy 
concepts, as well as with its its moralizing tendency. What unites proponents and detractors in 
their analysis is the in-between place of the Third Way. Where “the Right does not have the 
answer to the problems of social polarization, rising crime, failing education and low productivity 
and growth” (Blair 1998, 2), the “fundamentalist Left [and its] belief that the state could replace 
civil society and thereby advance freedom fails equally” (ibid., 4). Chirac locates his political 
platform beyond “left- or right-wing objectives” (quoted in Emmanuelli and Frémontier 2002, 
para. 2). See also the joint manifesto by Blair and Schröder (2003). 
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While this may be a rare moment of frankness about such considerations, we need to be 
open to the strategic benefits of the rhetorical inventiveness that is characteristic of how 
community cohesion, cohésion sociale and Bürgergesellschaft were defined. 
This interest in strategy is not meant to suggest that the rhetoric of cohesion needs to be 
understood as window-dressing, or that its strategic deployments should (always) be 
considered as somehow inauthentic. It means that we must consider the introduction of 
cohesion in the context of constellations of political actors, competing for advantageous 
positions and rhetorical openings to define a political programme and outmanoeuvre 
opponents (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974; Hyde 2011). The definition of social 
orientations, as much as it may reflect genuine beliefs and normative commitments, 
equally responds to competitive pressures and should be understood as an act of 
political marketing. Gregor McLennan and Tom Osborne (2003, 61) make this point 
succinctly: 
‘Marketing’ is ... not something to be dismissed by critical sociologists, rather it 
is our bread and butter: how people develop ideas in relation to their most 
relevant publics, and how they advertise their values in doing so, is constitutive 
of, not supplementary to, the meanings and plausibility of the ideas 
‘themselves’. 
In following this interest in the framing of ideas and the operations of political language 
this project, in a very loose sense, is discourse analytical. It follows the suggestion that 
the operations of political language matter in how concepts are coined, problems are 
defined and strategies are devised. In trying to understand these operations in three 
different country contexts, it aims to make three specific contributions to the critical 
study of social cohesion. 
• The debates where cohesion is defined and contested – for its conceptions of 
society and for how social unity is at risk – take place in particular national 
contexts.11
                                                 
11  Although the impact of supranational institutions in the diffusion of policy language cannot be 
discounted and will be acknowledged where relevant. 
 In elucidating some of the parameters of these debates and 
addressing the way in which society becomes an object of political contestation, 
the thesis contributes to the understanding of how public, media and intellectual 
exchanges on social cohesion operate within such environments. Considering 
problematisations of social unity in particular fields, the welfare state, 
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citizenship and post-immigration ‘difference’, the thesis furthermore promises to 
provide a fuller understanding of the respective shapes of the politics of 
cohesion. 
• Regarding manifestations of social cohesion across country contexts, scholarly 
attention has so far not been focused on public debates and political agendas 
where social disintegration is presented as a problem and social cohesion is 
introduced as an objective. Admittedly, this study cannot provide more than a 
snapshot of each country case, where it investigates socio-economic, civic and 
cultural problematisations of cohesion respectively. By considering different 
arenas of social discourse and problematisations of social unity, the study 
nonetheless promises to provide some insights into similarities and differences 
in how social cohesion is conceived across national contexts. 
• For this purpose the thesis develops a toolkit that aspires to be of some 
theoretical and critical sophistication. It suggests a starting point for the critique 
of social cohesion. The critical concern of this thesis promises to make a 
significant contribution to our understanding of why we may want to either 
become or remain suspicious of how concerns with cohesion have recently 
informed public policy making across Western European states. 
These objectives stand against a background of changing political and social currents. In 
some sense, the moment of cohesion is over, and the three agendas investigated here are 
all things of the past. At this conjuncture, when society is newly imagined and defined 
either in extension of the politics of austerity, as a compensation or, rarely, in 
opposition, this concern with the past may turn out to be useful to understand the 
present (Hall 2011; Massey 2011). The thesis does not claim to engage with the present 
moment in much systematic order or analytical depth. However, it suggests that society 
remains a particular and powerful site for the definition of political objectives. To 
engage with the politics of the moment, we need to consider the imaginary efforts that 
inform understandings of society and political priorities. 
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Chapter 1: The imagination of society 
Introduction 
In an investigation into the historiography of antiquity, Randolph Starn (1975, 7) points 
to the appeal of the theme of decline. In the presence of random data, decline is readily 
drawn upon to organize historical experiences, and to chart out trajectories and a sense 
of sequence.12
no one directly perceives the ‘falling away or down from’ of states, cultures, 
economies, or of any other historical collectivity. The ‘perception’ is a 
generalization, analogy, or judgment; even in Jericho only the walls, not the 
state, came tumbling down. If we may speak and think of ‘falling away from’ in 
history, it is at least in part because a term such as ‘decline’ allows the random 
and concrete to be organized and may formalize a sense of different degrees and 
moments.  
 Decline is a construction, for  
While decline has been appealing across time and national traditions of historiography, 
the theme of dissolution has been considered as being characteristic of the experience of 
cultural modernity. In an extensive examination of dimensions of this experience, 
Marshall Berman (1983) takes the first chapter of the Communist Manifesto as his 
starting point. The “bourgeois epoch”, Marx and Engels famously suggested, was 
distinguished from all earlier epochs by  
[c]onstant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation. … All that is solid melts into 
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober 
senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. (Marx and 
Engels [1848]2002) 
Berman (1983, 15) suggests that this account informs the modern experience of a 
“paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it puts us all into a maelstrom of perpetual 
disintegration and renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish”. 
Literature, poetry, modernist architecture and modern sensibilities, Berman suggests, 
are steeped in and reflect the cultural experience of dissolution and constant change. 
How decline and dissolution are open to being used and embellished in political 
language is some way beyond the scope of this investigation. Arguably, however, both 
                                                 
12  Such as The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Gibbon 1994[1776]); the The Decline of the 
West (Spengler 1926); or Arnold Toynbee’s (1948) account of the cyclical rise and fall of 
civilisations. Toynbee (1948, 13) points to a “regular pattern of social disintegration” that is 
repeated in the “schism of the disintegrating society into a recalcitrant proletariat and a dominant 
minority” (ibid).  
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have a special place in political and cultural commentary. They underpin the recent 
success of television productions and best-selling non-fiction titles across Europe. In 
Britain, titles read The Abolition of Britain (Hitchens 2008), The Day Britain died (Marr 
2000) or After Britain (Nairn 2000). Thilo Sarrazin’s (Sarrazin 2010) book Deutschland 
schafft sich ab (Germany does away with itself) tapped into a sense of decline, 
postulated a biologistic account of the higher reproduction rates of people marked as of 
inferior intelligence (notably Muslims) and became the best-seller of recent decades.13
A similar sense of decline seems to underpin newly reinforced concerns with social ties. 
A long-standing vocabulary of social integration and disintegration has become newly 
salient. This is most visibly expressed in the prominence of concerns in political 
discourse, such as the Danish sammenhængskraften (Peters 2010), the Dutch sociale 
samenhang, the German gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt, or the French concern with 
its liens sociaux. The disintegration of society has become, as the following chapters 
illustrate, an increasingly relevant topic of political discourse. 
 
This appeal to anxieties about the socio-cultural fracturing of some romantically 
idealized notion of the Volksgemeinschaft has some precedents in German political 
discourse. In France, narratives of decline have been similarly successful in capturing 
the imagination, but tend to refer to the loss of cultural grandeur and international 
standing as well as to the decline of republican solidarity. Nicolas Bavarez’s (2003) La 
France qui tombe has offered an account that is powerfully substantiated by the 
commemoration of the years of post-war prosperity, les trente glorieuses (Fourastié 
1979), which were seen to have come to an end in the late 1970s. 
In surveying references to political dissolution in the UK, Arthur Aughey (2010) 
identifies a pervasive sense of “endism”. Endism, for Aughey (2010, 27), works with 
the dramatization of decline and dissolution in a way that is “discursively inventive, 
historically debatable and (as yet) politically unproven”. Political processes are 
prejudged, such as in relation to British devolution where the “becoming of separation is 
bound up in the is of devolution” (Aughey 2007, 142). Propositions of decline, he 
suggests, should be taken with a grain of salt as their narratives neither give realistic 
accounts of actual political, constitutional and socio-economic challenges, nor usually 
offer convincing grounds for predictions of national dissolution or social fragmentation.  
                                                 
13  At the time of writing Sarrazin’s book is in its 14th edition (see Garton Ash 2011) 
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What exactly it is that is at risk of dissolution is, more often than not, unclear. While 
pressures on government and its institutions have been conceptualized as instances of 
‘governmental overload’ or ‘ungovernability’ (see Mayntz 1993), it is difficult to 
imagine what it would mean, with Hobbes, for a modern Western state to “perish from 
internal diseases”. Institutional deadlock in countries such as Belgium, or the pressures 
of recent debt crises in Greece or Ireland, indicates potentially severe challenges to the 
continuation of certain kinds of financial, federal or administrative arrangements. 
Arguably, however, these pressures do not quite correspond to the existential experience 
of dystopian decline – leading to all-out civil war – that Hobbes’ ‘dissolution of the 
Commonwealth’ seems to signify or that the notion of ‘endism’ invokes. 
It is arguably even less clear what social disintegration, as a matter of actual social 
processes, might be seen to imply. Presumably, the disintegration of society means not 
the absence of social relations altogether (which would be better understood as solitude 
than as disintegration), but the decline of certain types of relations, which would be 
superseded by new and different kinds of social ties. A literalist understanding of 
disintegration that conflates symbolic invocations with material processes is bound to be 
confused.14
This conception of disintegration should not make us mistake imagination for a flight of 
fantasy or an inwardly-oriented construction of subjective experience. Social 
disintegration is usually introduced in political rhetoric in reference to tangible social 
problems. As collectively shared meaning, it is of considerable significance for how 
political problems are constructed. Just as the historiography of decline gives a sense of 
sequence to historical events, the political metaphor of social disintegration serves to 
organize the perception of social problems and may give politics a purpose. This 
purpose, this chapter suggests, is underpinned by imaginations of disintegration and 
cohesion, which account for a sense of urgency and immediacy in the politics of 
cohesion. 
 Languages of disintegration need to be understood as metaphorical in nature 
(Wrong 1994, 3-4) and, as we have pointed out before, disintegration and decline 
provide horizons for interpretation.  
                                                 
14  Critical questions that H.L.A. Hart (1967) put to Patrick Devlin in relation to the possibility of an 
empirical test for the so-called ‘disintegration thesis’ are particularly instructive in this regard (see 
Chapter 2).  
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This chapter introduces a framework for the interpretive challenges of making sense of 
these imaginary components of cohesion. This framework has to navigate between two 
positions. In governmentality studies, changing representations of ‘the social’ are 
considered with an interest in longue durée changes of governmental techniques and 
with a relative disinterest in the dynamics of agenda-setting and actual political speech. 
The emphasis in interpretative policy analysis on agendas, concepts, rhetoric and speech 
acts, by contrast, may be at risk of failing to account for the role of representations of 
‘the social’ and for how such representations are of relevance for understanding public 
policy initiatives. There is a risk in failing to consider background conditions of 
political change, such as of the role that imaginations of social relations play in the 
construction of policy problems. Our framework, very much tailored for the purpose of 
addressing the ‘turn to cohesion’, aims for the middle-ground. It proposes to be neither 
exclusively stuck in the minutiae of particular speech, nor to be too aloof from the 
political framing of social relations. This chapter develops this middle ground for the 
purpose of the contextual reconstruction of political agendas of cohesion in three 
countries. 
We consider, first, how ‘the social’ has been introduced and conceptualized as a domain 
of concerns and how, more specifically, the recent prominence of social-integrationist 
and moral-communalist concern is situated in this tradition. Second, we consider how 
society has been conceived as an inherently problematic space of forces and trajectories. 
Third, we draw a connection between such understandings of the social to the 
construction of social problems as it has been conceived in interpretive and 
constructivist policy analysis. We fourthly suggest that the policy-analytic interest in 
problem construction needs to be supplemented with an interest in the background 
conditions of social problems, that is, with social imaginaries. Social imaginaries have 
been conceived differently, and we draw on aspects of the work of Cornelius 
Castoriadis, Charles Taylor and Ernesto Laclau for relevant suggestions on how the 
imagination of society may be usefully understood for policy-analytic purposes. We 
conclude with suggestions on how social imaginaries should be considered and studied 
in interpretive policy analysis. 
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The invention of the social 
Society is conventionally considered as a domain that encompasses heterogeneous 
material. When ‘the social’ is invoked politically it often refers to various needs and 
concerns that are predicated on particular perspectives on the social forces and 
understandings of the normativity inherent in society. In this sense the social is a 
“problematic unity” (Dean 2010, 682) in at least three ways. First, it is seen to 
encompass diverse and problematic needs that are of concern and need to be catered for 
by government or through mechanisms of societal self-regulation. Secondly, the 
concern with social needs is usually underpinned by a concern for the integration of 
society at large. Lastly, the conceptual unity of society is loose and often disputed. Its 
understanding is problematic in the sense that the conception of society itself has been 
politically contested in modernity. Such contestations are of concern, since depending 
on how the unity of the social is conceived, different types of concern are foregrounded 
and different understandings of social regulation, public policy intervention, or welfare 
provision, are perceived as necessary or desirable. With social cohesion as a newly 
prominent perspective on society, we have suggested that there are two kinds of concern 
– integrationism and homogeneity – that have become significant in this regard. We will 
locate such understandings within a brief overview of how society and the social have 
been thematized.  
Only in the 19th century, Jacques Donzelot (1980; 1994) and Robert Castel (1995) 
suggest, was ‘the social’ discovered as a domain of concerns. Giles Deleuze (1980, ix), 
in relation to this “rise of the social”, points to its “beginning in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, [how] it sketches out its own originality in relation to older 
sectors, so that it is able to react on them and effect a new distribution of their 
functions.”15
His point is that the ‘social’ is the product, the coming together of a series of 
innovative interventions directed toward particular social evils. The ‘social’ 
realm is an artefact, conditional on the appearance of certain forms of social 
organisation and certain objectives: mass education, the supervision of ‘private’ 
 Paul Hirst (1981, 68), reviewing Donzelot’s (1980) work, observes: 
                                                 
15  Denise Riley (1988, 49) describes another useful characterisation of the beginnings of ‘the social’ 
as follows: “The nineteenth-century ‘social’ is the reiterated sum of progressive philanthropies, 
theories of class, of poverty, of degeneration; studies of the domestic lives of workers, their 
housing, hygiene, morality, mortality; of their exploitation, or their need for protection, as this 
bore on their family lives too. It is a blurred ground between the old public and private; voiced as a 
field for intervention, love, and reform by socialists, conservatives, radicals, liberals, and feminists 
in their different and conjoined ways.”  
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conducts in childrearing and health, public health measures, and attempts to 
eliminate pauperism.  
Tasks that had previously been conceived as either pertaining to the domain of family 
affairs or as falling under the realm of the self-administration of estates and guilds, or as 
requiring the benign intervention of churches or philanthropic elites, were now 
subsumed under governmental concern. New logics of social administration were 
developed, notably ones that were aimed at the minimisation of social risks, of 
insurance and the provision of material security (see in particular Ewald 1993 for a 
genealogy of such logics). 
Jacques Donzelot and Robert Castel link this discovery of the social to historical 
junctures that required new practices of administration. Donzelot (1994, 18) locates the 
discovery of faire du social at the moment when the Enlightenment ideals of French 
republicanism were confronted with democratic mass society, specifically in the 
upheaval of 1848, when new demands for social equality were articulated and had to be 
catered for by government. This occurred against the background of industrialisation 
where, with mass poverty and its consequences, a ‘social question’ was discovered and 
new types of social administration were introduced (Castel 1995). Moreover, the notion 
of popular sovereignty and the ideal, if not the practice, of democracy brought about a 
new concern for popular demands. Such ideals – and the gradual movement towards 
extending the franchise in the 19th and early 20th century – were at odds with a reality 
where the formulaic empowerment of democratic subjects had little to offer to a 
working class that faced everyday economic insecurity. The invention of society thus 
occurred when various rights and needs were discovered, defined as social, and targeted 
as such by various professions and subjected to new logics of regulation and the 
minimisation of risks. 
Such inventions, we have suggested before, did not bring about a consolidated and 
undisputed understanding of society. Instead, they marked the beginnings of a 
consideration of ‘the social’ as a site for analytical discoveries and as a domain for 
political intervention. Mitchell Dean (1999, 54) suggests that “the notion of society is 
never static or conclusively fixed” and that we should think of it as something that is 
“always already waiting to be discovered”:   
It was discovered and rediscovered: by philanthropists and social workers in the 
causes and effects of poverty; by doctors in the correlation between living 
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conditions and mortality and morbidity rates; by educationalists in the attributes 
appropriate to the properly socialized citizen, by social economists in the ill-
effects of political economy… (ibid.) 
Nikolas Rose (1999, 468) notes how the social, rather than being “invented by political 
thought” was  
assembled out of the work of a plethora of practical empiricists – doctors, urban 
planners, sewage engineers, statisticians and the like – in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century: the result of their work made it necessary for political 
thought to take a ‘social’ point of view. 
This points to the role of professions that define their mission – not merely against the 
background of empirically identifiable needs – but in line with particular conceptions of 
their role and their professional conduct. ‘The social’, it is safe to say, was not just 
discovered in theory but in the practice of fields such as philanthropy, social hygiene 
and criminal justice. 
But the contrast between theory and practice in such innovations should not be 
overstated. After all, “[i]deas always come into history wrapped up in certain practices, 
even if these are only discursive practices” (Taylor 2004, 33): 
what we see in human history is ranges of human practices that are both at once, 
that is, material practices carried out by human beings in space and time, and 
very often coercively maintained, and at the same time, self-conceptions, modes 
of understanding. (Taylor 2004, 29) 
Charles Taylor, in a contribution that will be of more concern to us later, directs us to 
both. He suggests that new understandings of society came to imbue a new ‘social 
imaginary’, a mode of self-understanding that was at the same time informing practice 
and informed by it. In relation to the social, the recognition was that “organized society 
is no longer equivalent to the polity; other dimensions of social existence are seen as 
having their own forms and integrity” (2004, 76). Taylor points in particular to the 
perspective on society as an economic organisation, as “an interlocking set of activities 
of production, exchange, and consumption, which form a system with its own laws and 
its own dynamic” (ibid.). This new objectification of society, Taylor suggest, is 
accompanied by a different conception that attributes to society a sense of agency. 
On one side, we become capable of imagining new free, horizontal modes of 
collective agency, and hence of entering into and creating such agency because 
they are now in our repertoire. One the other, we become capable of objectifying 
society as a system of norm-dependent processes, in some way analogous to 
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those in nature. On the one hand, society is a field of common agency, on the 
other a terrain to be mapped, synoptically represented, analyzed, perhaps 
preparatory to being acted on from outside by enlightened administrators. 
(Taylor 2004, 164) 
Those two modes of imagining society, as a terrain of social forces and one of collective 
agency, point to a certain conceptual tension, which has become central for modern 
understandings ‘the social’.16
The ‘invention’ of society, its discovery as a field of previously unrecognized forces, 
added further dimensions to an existing concern with order. It also provided for a new 
appreciation for the self-stabilising forces inherent in society, an appreciation that was 
frequently brought out through metaphorical conceptions of society as an organism or a 
body with the capacity for self-healing. In this context, the impact of mass society on 
moral life, health and psychological sanity of individual persons – and the challenges 
posed by atomisation and the declining force of tradition – were among the tasks taken 
up in the beginnings of the disciplines of sociology and psychology. Both contributed 
new conceptual vocabularies for social pathologies – such as anomie (Durkheim 
1952[1897]), alienation (Marx 1977[1844]), or neurosis (Freud) – that tie the concern 
with social order and its moral foundations to the possibility of a good life in society.  
 
In the context of this new concern with social relations, two alternative orientations can 
be discerned. One is more instrumentalist and follows the social-integrationist 
perspective that we have sketched out in relation to Durkheim; the other one is closer to 
substantialist understandings of moral character development. The former is 
exemplified by Tocqueville (1945[1835]) and his suggestion that individuals’ readiness 
to participate in the institutions and associations of collective life positively impacts on 
the quality of society, economic performance, and the functioning of the political 
system. Such arguments have recently been resurgent in the neo-Tocquevillean 
contributions of social capital scholars. Robert Putnam (2000, 19) suggests that 
“embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations” individuals generate the 
kind of social lubricant that facilitates transactions on all levels. The decline of 
associational life in Western democracies, Putnam argues, is a tragedy not only in and 
by itself, but because of its negative impact on democratic quality, the quality of 
                                                 
16   This has informed a concern with the increasing bureaucratisation of social life and with a ‘life-
world’ that is colonized by impersonal forces, notably market forces and administrative 
rationalities (Habermas 1981). 
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institutions, and a wide range of public goods. Public policies towards social 
integration, inasmuch as they are concerned with substantive policy problems caused by 
declining social capital, should advocate and promote civil society engagement. 
The substantialist perspective, on the other hand, has been prominently endorsed in 
various forms of communitarian theory and frequently draws on Hegel’s (1942[1842]) 
ideas regarding the necessity of inter-subjective relationships of recognition for ethical 
life and moral character development. Robert Bellah (1985) points to such connections 
between character and society and, for the case of the United States, raises the problem 
of a society “in which the individual can only rarely and with difficulty understand 
himself and his activities as interrelated in morally meaningful ways with those of other, 
different Americans” (1985, 50). His comments are broadly in line with the 
communitarian critique of liberalism for how it fails to recognize the social and cultural 
embeddedness of individuals, as well as the accordant value of undistorted cultural 
backgrounds for personal moral development: “the liberal self reflects the fragmentation 
of liberal society” (Walzer 1990, 21). Attaining the good life thus requires an 
appreciation of the ties that bind, of collective cultures and the quality of social 
relations. Where the social integrationist perspective emphasizes the positive side-
effects of social integration for the quality of public life, the latter perspective speaks 
predominantly of moral development. Human beings, understood as “encumbered 
selves” (Sandel 1984) rather than socially free-floating, are contextually situated. The 
quality of their social and cultural environment determines their opportunities to attain 
the good life. 
We have already suggested that such understandings may coincide in political rhetoric. 
Tony Blair, whose rhetoric we study in some detail in Chapter 5, was variously credited 
with being both ‘communitarian’ and ‘social capitalist’ (Hale 2002; 2006), and New 
Labour’s political rhetoric certainly provides sufficient examples for both 
interpretations. Jacques Chirac’s invocation of fracture sociale – see Chapter 3 – 
oscillated between the lamentation of lost morality and policy prescriptions that were 
profoundly in line with the social integrationist paradigm. Equally, the development of 
Bürgergesellschaft in Germany drew on concerns over a sense of lost togetherness – a 
loss that was prominently expressed with the commemoration of previous expressions 
of solidarity in the history of the Federal Republic, such as of the ethos of post-war 
reconstruction of the Wirtschaftswunder years. These symbolic portrayals of the 
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German collective as a community of fate (Schicksalsgemeinschaft) not only coincided 
with but were actively used to promote strategies towards social activation and new 
integrationist commitments in labour market and welfare reform. The conception of 
social unity as sustained through collective activity can, and in political debate 
frequently does, draw on both integrationist and substantialist ideals. 
Since the invocation of society in political speech, we have suggested before, is part of 
strategic efforts of political positioning, it is not surprising that various types of concern 
are articulated and invoked, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes separately, 
depending on contextual exigencies and on the appeal of the two themes distinguished 
above in particular situations. Both themes, however, are available to support 
expressions of concern about social unity and provide formulae for the 
problematisations of society. The act of problematisation should thus be understood as 
the foregrounding of particular conditions and trajectories – obviously at the expense of 
others. We discuss problematisation here as an act of interpretation.  
The problems of the social 
Michel Foucault (1997, 118) usefully considers problematisation as a ‘work of thought’. 
The study of problematisations asks 
what has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles of a 
practice into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical 
solutions. It is problematization that responds to these difficulties but by doing 
something quite other than expressing them or manifesting them: in connection 
with them, it develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given; 
it defines the elements that will constitute what the different solutions attempt to 
respond to.17
The problematisation of society would thus need to be understood as the attempt of 
arranging an object so that it becomes amenable to particular kinds of intervention. 
Before we consider the problematisation of social cohesion, we turn to recent 
conceptions of society that should be of concern for they the amount to an ultimate 
problematisation by invoking the ‘death’ of the social.  
 
The new currency of a social rhetoric stands in a somewhat curious relation to the 
purported decline of its subject, as it has been invoked since the 1980s. Margaret 
Thatcher famously declared there was ‘no such thing as society’, though she 
                                                 
17   See Thomas Lemke (2011) for a compelling overview of Foucault’s writings on critique. 
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subsequently complained about misunderstandings: “My meaning …was that society 
was not an abstraction, separate from the men and women who composed it, but a living 
structure of individuals, families, neighbours and voluntary associations” (Thatcher 
1993, 626). Mitchell Dean notes how the comment, quite in line with Thatcher’s later 
complaint, did not mark a “decisive break”. With its understanding of society as a 
“living structure” it merely articulated a “now barely contestable proposal”: “society is 
regarded less as a source of needs … and more as a source of energies contained within 
individuals’ exercise of freedom and self-responsibility” (Dean 1999, 152). 
Accordingly, Thatcher’s invocation of society should be seen as aligned with “theorists 
of social capital, who emphasize levels of trust and civic participation, or the advocates 
of ‘communitarianism’, who seek to ‘reaffirm shared values’” (ibid.). The disavowal of 
society as a domain of needs, and a new focus on the potentials for self-regulation that it 
contains, does not in this understanding signal the demise of society, but rather a new 
emphasis towards the two kinds of concern that we have sketched out previously. 
Arguably, the understanding of society, not as ‘a source of needs’, but as a container of 
social forces that need to be calibrated and mobilized, precedes the 1980s and 1990s. 
After all, social integrationism is no novelty and the welfare state – be it of Bismarckian 
or Beveridgean provenance – has always entailed an account not merely of needs, but 
also particular normative understandings of society, family life, or gender relations. 
Moreover, regarding the second kind of concern, the interest in how individuals are 
socio-culturally rooted has not just begun with the more recent prominence of 
‘communitarianism’. Dean and others, however, rightly suggest that since the 1980s the 
reference to new understandings of social mobility, activity and responsibility has been 
heard more frequently and has, with the salience of ideas of social capital and 
communitarianism, become newly relevant in politics. Stephan Lessenich (2006b, 614) 
suggests this goes hand in hand with the “re-interpretation of socio-structural into 
behavioural-psychological problems, the systematic inversion of collective and 
individual responsibilities, the rampant remoralisation of questions of social 
inequality.”18
                                                 
18  Nikolas Rose (1996, 228) considers these developments as leading towards the ‘death of the 
social’: “the object ‘society’, in the sense that began to be accorded to it in the nineteenth century 
… has ... begun to lose its self-evidence”. “[D]espite the undoubted persistence of the theme of 
society and social cohesion in contemporary political argument, ‘the social’ in the sense in which 
it has been understood for about a century is none the less undergoing a mutation” (ibid., 230). It is 
in particular the identification of ‘community’ as a new domain of governmental concern that 
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The re-interpretation of problems along these lines begs some questions as to how 
problematisation works. The shift in emphasis from concerns with social structure 
towards individual and collective behaviour arguably indicates a salient movement, and 
the following seeks to develop some insights on how this movement has materialized in 
the formulation of political concerns. 
Social problems  
Problem construction has been a concern in constructivist and interpretive policy 
analysis, as well as for social theorists concerned with the conceptual structure of social 
thought (see Osborne 2003). Among constructivist policy analysts there seems to be a 
consensus that problems should be considered as somewhat less-than-real. While they 
may refer to actual and empirically identifiable grievances, it is not the case that just any 
grievance comes to be perceived as a problem. Problems usually undergo a career, are 
subject to invocations and creative embellishment. They emerge from a state of latency 
and are brought towards increasing visibility and, if successfully introduced and made 
visible, may be used to describe a particular condition or situation as problematic.19
There is some dispute over the degree of ontological reality a policy problem should be 
accorded. Anthony Downs, for example, states that “objective conditions regarding the 
 
This career is usually accompanied by political pressures of agents advocating on behalf 
of such definitions. It may also draw on scientific innovation where new findings are 
introduced to highlight risks of conditions or behaviours that may previously have been 
considered unproblematic.  
                                                                                                                                               
makes Rose come to this conclusion. However, there may be a certain British bias in his account, 
since the invocation of community is not quite mirrored in policy contexts outside of the United 
Kingdom. More importantly, however, and not only in relation to Rose’s suggestion, we may want 
to avoid the notion of an era when ‘the social’ was somehow authentically articulated, 
unproblematically conceived as pertaining to ‘needs’, and not already infused with normative 
understanding of moving forces within society. The modern welfare state in its various shapes is 
not exempt from such understandings and not merely grounded on a neutral estimation of social 
rights or needs – something that Rose would probably acknowledge. Gøsta Esping-Andersen 
(1990, 23) says as much when he suggests that even in modern arrangements the welfare state is 
an “active force in the ordering of social relations” and that “state activities are interlocked with 
the market’s and the family’s role in social provision” (ibid., 21). Where the novelty of post-war 
welfare provision is that it introduced new ideals of security (and these seem to be what is ‘dying’) 
, it was for example decidedly biased towards a particular understanding of industrial work and 
towards the gendered division of productive and reproductive labour. 
19  Accordingly, a number of valuable studies into the career of policy problems offer thick 
descriptions of their emergence. Pfohl (1977) and Nelson (1984) describe the pre-history of how 
child abuse has been discovered as a ‘social problem’. Gusfield (1984) explores the construction of 
‘drink-driving’ and offers a detailed picture of the background conditions, cultural sensitivities and 
scientific consensus that allowed for this particular problem to capture the imagination 
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problem are far worse during the pre-problem stage than they are by the time the public 
becomes interested in it” (Downs 1972, 39). Thus, while Downs appears to distinguish 
between the reality of a problem – measured by the severity of grievances it causes – 
and its place on the policy agenda that is determined by the support it can draw on, 
other commentators abandon objectivity when accounting for problems (see Schneider 
1985). The large number of conditions that could conceivably be defined as problematic 
– but aren’t – should make us at least consider the process of problem definition with 
the same interpretive interests that, we have suggested, the notion of cohesion requires. 
Commentators have offered sophisticated models, such as Downs’ (1972) ‘issue-
attention cycle,’ models of ‘alternative specification’ (Kingdon 1984), or ‘framing’ to 
account for the first steps in the career of a policy item (see Dearing and Rogers 1996). 
The prior step, however, the discovery of problematic conditions that underpin such 
policy items is frequently treated as unproblematic. However, the transition of an issue 
from a “pre-problem stage” (Downs 1972, 39) to becoming a full-blown policy problem 
frequently appears intricate to retrace, and poses some aggravating questions about the 
ontological status of ‘policy problems’ (see Landry 1995). Critical accounts of the 
emergence of ‘social problems’ offer some clues in this regard. Since the 1970s, a 
number of commentators (notably Blumer 1971; Spector and Kitsuse 1973; Gusfield 
1984) have attempted to account for how conditions, previously perceived as 
unproblematic, come to be perceived as ‘social problems,’ and thus emerge as a concern 
for government. Blumer (1971, 302) offers a model that emphasises processes of 
‘societal recognition’ of grievances, struggles over legitimacy and mobilization of 
action that turns a situation into a social problem. Spector and Kitsuse (1973, 147) 
similarly highlight the dynamics of issue-raising, i.e. the conditions under which an 
instance may be defined as “offensive, harmful, and otherwise undesirable” and the 
process in which this definition comes to be accepted by a wider public. 
Donald Schön (1979, 261) puts the interpretive challenge vis-à-vis social problems as 
follows: “Problems are not given. They are constructed by human beings in their 
attempts to make sense of complex and troubling situations.” While Schön highlights 
the role of problem generation with an interest in metaphors, “underlying the stories 
which generate problem setting and set the direction of problem solving” (Schön 1979, 
255), Bruno Jobert (1992) considers the role of social interpretations in the construction 
of public policy problems: “[T]he pertinence of a social definition depends on its 
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capacity to insert itself into the referential model that renders society intelligible and 
which is at the basis of its processes of legitimation” (Jobert 1992, 220).  
Deborah Stone points to the role of narratives and, in particular, ‘images’ in the 
construction of policy problems: “Problem definition is a process of image making, 
where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and 
responsibility” (1989, 282). Struggles over causal stories, according to Stone, involve 
the “manipulation of images of conditions by competing political actors” (1989, 299). 
In order to garner support for a policy proposal, and in order to prevail in political 
debate, it is frequently not only the interpretation of a set of uncontested facts, but the 
very sequence of events and, accordingly, questions of cause and responsibility that are 
contested. Murray Edelman adds to this line of interest and illustrates how problem 
definition needs to be considered as an attempt to shape the “contours of a social world” 
(Edelman 1988, 13). Accordingly, “[t]he ‘career’ of an explanation of a problem 
manifestly hinges in part on the acceptability of the ideological premise it implies” 
(Edelman 1987, 12). Without prior imaginative efforts it remains unclear how new 
policy problems arise. As regards social cohesion, new images of society had to be 
established for it to connote and bundle an area of policy concern.  
Social problems are not mere reflections of social conditions out there; they do not 
merely arise as an expression of theoretical innovation and of newly acquired 
knowledge of society. The discovery of problems and their articulation in political 
discourse involves the construction of fitting imaginaries. This is what Murray Edelman 
(1988, 13) refers to when he asserts that the definition of policy problems shapes the 
“contours of the social world”. To account for the pertinence of a policy problems, it 
would, then, be necessary to consider not only how a covert issue could garner the 
support of powerful interests and thus become policy-relevant. Rather, the emergence of 
a configuration of social problems, such as the one that social cohesion addresses, 
occurs in a process of re-labelling and re-description. Phenomena, whose problematic 
status was already widely acknowledged – such as civic apathy, urban unrest, 
criminality, claiming benefits – were subsequently attributed to a lack of cohesion. 
It seems necessary, then, to extend the concern with problem construction to cover the 
construction of problem images and, more broadly, to consider the imagination of 
problematic conditions and how these imaginaries provide the backgrounds against 
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which individual policy issues become salient and appear urgent. Regarding the 
problem of social cohesion, problematic conditions are embellished and audiences may 
be captured by compelling images that offer an account of obstacles and solutions. 
Interpretive policy analysis therefore faces the challenge of considering how such 
images become plausible and compelling, but are also perceived as matters of urgency 
and immediacy. The following suggests that work on social imaginaries usefully 
responds to these challenges.  
Social imaginaries 
Arjun Appadurai (1996, 31), pointing to new international entanglements between states 
and spheres of cultural production, suggests that the “imagination is now central to all 
forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global 
order”. This time horizon appears a little dubious as, at least in relation to society, 
imagination has been at work for a long time. How society was invented as a domain of 
concerns, and how factual and normative understandings of the social were introduced, 
gives evidence of the significance of such imaginary understandings of society. The 
previous section has considered in particular how policy problems draw on such 
background understandings. With ‘social imaginaries’, the following introduces a 
perspective to understand this background and its relevance in the politics of cohesion.20 
It introduces the work of Charles Taylor, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Ernesto Laclau on 
imaginaries and suggests that their respective accounts constitute useful resources for 
studying the politics of cohesion, in particular because their accounts accentuate 
different aspects and therefore complement one another.21
Charles Taylor on imaginary building blocks 
  
Charles Taylor (2002; 2004), we have suggested previously, considers social 
imaginaries as modes of understanding a modern social order that inform and are 
informed by social practices.22
                                                 
20  The notion of ‘social imaginary’ is at home in French cultural studies. See, for example, Gilbert 
Durand (1973).  
 He offers some specific ideas on what he considers the 
building blocks of a modern imaginary. Imaginaries, for Taylor, refer to the “ways 
21  Parts of the following have been published in Critical Policy Studies (Dobbernack 2010) 
22  Charles Taylor’s (2004) Modern Social Imaginaries has been fully incorporated into his more 
recent tome A Secular Age (2007). As we are not concerned here with Taylor’s intriguing 
theorisation of secularism we draw exclusively on the 2004 book. All page references in this 
section refer to this book. 
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people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go 
on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the 
deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations” (23). They are 
thus both descriptive and evaluative and unite a sense of “how things usually go” (24) 
with expectations regarding social regularities and rightful demands. They may build on 
theoretical innovation. Crucially, however, they become effective in practice: 
people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices. … [A] new 
understanding comes to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t 
before. It begins to define the contours of their world and can eventually come to 
count as the taken-for-granted shape of things, too obvious to mention. (29) 
Taylor highlights four features of the imaginary of modern liberal-democratic order. 
The economy, the public sphere, popular sovereignty, and rights. Rather than a mere 
imagination of capitalist modes of production and exchange, the imaginary of ‘the 
economy’ constitutes a way of seeing society as “an interlocking set of activities, 
production, exchange, and consumption, which form a system with its own laws and its 
own dynamic” (76). This understanding “defines a way we are linked together, a sphere 
of coexistence that in principle could suffice to itself, if only disorder and conflict didn’t 
threaten” (76). Second, Taylor points to the public sphere, as an “extrapolitical, secular, 
metatopical space” (99), a space in which “rational views are elaborated that should 
guide government” (89). Drawing on studies by Habermas (1989) and Warner (1990), 
Taylor notes that this innovation of thinking of society fundamentally challenged older 
notions of order. It involved a “breach in the old ideal of a social order undivided by 
conflict and difference. On the contrary, it means that debate breaks out, and continues, 
involving in principle everybody, and this is perfectly legitimate” (90-1). A third 
innovation is the rise of notions of popular sovereignty, mostly, as Taylor contends for 
the case of the United States, by way of a “retrospective reinterpretation” (112). A 
“backward-looking legitimacy idea” provided a new reading of history through which 
new claims for equality and participation could be articulated. Fourthly, he draws 
attention to the discovery of rights. Those entered the stage as an “expression of our 
modern idea of a moral order underlying the political, which the political has to respect” 
(173).  
These modes of understanding became and as Taylor contends remain efficient not least 
by channelling new demands and expectations. Images of democracy provide a sense 
for what can be demanded of a political system (deliberation, elections). Images of the 
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law equip subjects, as rights-bearing individuals, with a horizon of how they expect to 
be treated by agents of the state and by one another. Order conveys, among other 
meanings, the idea of civility in everyday interactions. The understanding of society as 
an economy, we have already suggested, offered a new understanding of inherent social 
forces and how these may be administered. Such images are constitutive not only of our 
cognitive horizon, but of the types of practices – for example political participation, 
recourse to justice, everyday civility – that have become available in modernity. 
The modern imaginary, Taylor contends, is constituted by those elements. They form 
our collective horizon and amount to 
the lineaments of our understanding of moral order in contemporary liberal 
democracies. The way we imagine our social life is articulated in these forms. 
The society in which we live is not just the political structured order; we also 
belong to civil society. We are linked in an economy, can seek access to a public 
sphere, and move in a world of independent associations. (143) 
Taylor does not conceive of the transition from theoretical innovation to new practices 
in a strictly mechanical way (29, 33, 115). In fact, this seems to occur as a part of 
processes of sense-making in which actors adopt new practices by drawing on new 
theories that become plausible against the background of new social imaginaries. The 
relationship between theory, imaginary, and practice is not – and, for Taylor, cannot be 
– spelt out in an abstract form. It only appears open to be studied in its actual historical 
manifestations.  
Significantly, there appears to be considerable contingency in how available repertories 
and structures of meaning can be drawn on and mobilised for new purposes. What 
“starts as a mere census category may be mobilized into common agency [whereas] 
previously existing agencies can lapse into mere passive categories” (170). Such 
changes, reflecting the emergence and demise of certain types of imaginaries, are not 
theorized by Taylor. His study is not concerned with the actual practices of articulation 
through which new imaginaries may be instituted. As regards the longue durée that 
Taylor is concerned with, this might be the most appropriate form of investigation. 
However, in relation to a more delimited interest in how social imaginaries inform 
political debate, Taylor’s bird’s-eye perspective is clearly insufficient.  
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Cornelius Castoriadis on creative autonomy 
For Cornelius Castoriadis, social imaginaries are not merely images of something; they 
are not there “in order to represent something else”. By contrast, they are “the 
organizing patterns that are the conditions for the representability of everything that the 
society can give to itself” (Castoriadis 1987, 142).23
The mode in which meaning is given in the social-historical world is by way of 
symbolic relationships. Institutions constitute “symbolic networks” in which signifiers 
are brought in relation with signified: law, for example, is connected to norms and 
commands; money connotes value (117). Such symbolic networks are by definition 
unstable and susceptible to reassemblage. Indeed, they are “built on the ruins of earlier 
symbolic edifices and use their materials” (121). Accordingly, due to “virtually 
unlimited natural and historical connections, the signifier always goes beyond a strict 
attachment to a precise signified and can lead to completely unexpected realms” (121). 
Thus, one of the most significant tenets of Castoriadis’ theory is that meaning exceeds 
functionality. The way the social world is imbued with meaning cannot be explained by 
the functional requirements of structural components. The determinants of structure are 
in fact representations themselves. They are the result of meaning-making activity and, 
following Castoriadis, they are deluded inasmuch as they purport to provide complete 
knowledge of the social world. The questions that arise across social and historical 
contexts, and the way they are addressed, defy structuralist analyses that can only 
account for (imagined) functionalities within (imagined) conceptions of system or 
structure. The ordering of the social-historical world, however, produces reflections on 
collective identities, on historical missions, on collective values and beliefs that do not 
fit into preconceived schemes of this kind.
 In turn, the particular challenges 
facing a polity at a given time stand in relation to such representations: “problems, 
presenting themselves to a particular epoch or a particular society as a task to be 
completed, [can be understood] only in relation to an imaginary central to the given 
epoch or society” (133). 
24
                                                 
23  Page numbers in the following refer to Castoriadis’s (1987) The Imaginary Institution of Society.  
  
24  This is of particular relevance for questions of revolutionary agency as they were conventionally 
conceived in Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. Castoriadis suggests that such agency is not only 
misunderstood but inhibited by an orthodox structuralism that anticipates trajectories and 
outcomes (see also Kalyvas 1998; Comité Invisible 2007). However, this is not only a quarrel with 
orthodox Marxism, but with different varieties of structuralist theory. Castoriadis offers a strong 
critique of such types of theory and in particularly attacks the way it posits an essentially lifeless 
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Castoriadis’ work on the social imaginary is part of his critical reflection on Marxist 
theory and the rejection of the determinism of its orthodox forms (40). Against 
historical materialism, and against the hubris of theory that claims to all-knowingly 
account for the totality of social relations, Castoriadis aims to reintroduce the instability 
of meaning and the imperfection of knowledge. While knowledge of the social world, in 
a Marxist tradition, can either be true, an objectively accurate account of social laws and 
relations, or false, a result of alienation and false consciousness, Castoriadis (184) 
rejects such claims as profoundly absurd and politically reactionary: the factor of human 
creativity that continually leads to the “emergence of radical otherness, immanent 
creation, non-trivial novelty” needs to be taken into account. Significantly, however, the 
emphasis on creation does not mean that creative potentials and autonomous meaning-
making reign supreme. ‘Social rules,’ ‘objects’ and ‘forms’ in society may develop a 
life of their own and may be – in fact, most commonly are – instituted in a way that is 
not conducive to human autonomy. This is when the instituted imaginary obtains a life 
of its own, becomes autonomous and infringes upon the potential of human beings to 
create meaning (129).  
This emphasis on creative autonomy is Castoriadis’ (77) point of departure for his 
attempt to redraft a revolutionary project that places significance on the appropriation of 
the social imaginary. The social imaginary oscillates between “given structures, 
‘materialized’ institutions and works […]; and, on the other hand, that which structures, 
institutes, materializes” (108, emphasis in original); that is, between human activity and 
sedimented meaning, between acts of institution and the prevalence of the instituted. 
Accordingly, Castoriadis’ work supplies a critical yardstick for the measurement of 
social representations according to their conduciveness for agency, creativity and 
freedom.  
Such emphases have not been uncontested.25
                                                                                                                                               
system of mechanical connections. These, he suggests, are abstractions that do nothing to elucidate 
the horizons of our socio-historical existence (Castoriadis 1987, 120). 
 For our purpose, however, it is the 
contingency, creativity and critical edge of Castoriadis’ account that make it a 
25  There has been some criticism of Castoriadis for his overemphasis of creativity and autonomy. 
Iannis Stavrakakis (2007, 57) points to Castoriadis’ reliance on “a primordial source of human 
creativity associated, in certain respects, with the pre-symbolic psychic monad.” Moreover, the 
emphasis on creativity seems problematic at a time when creativity itself may be seen as 
“something like ‘fashion’, the endless repetition of permanent change under conditions of 
permanent imitation – production for the sake of production, ‘ideas’ for the sake of ‘ideas’ – and 
something which ultimately, perhaps precisely because of its character as a sort of compulsory 
52 
worthwhile contribution. Contingency means that there is no iron cage in relation to 
how society is imagined. Particular imaginations are creative investments that could 
have been imagined differently.  
Ernesto Laclau on dislocation and democracy 
As for Castoriadis, the possibility for the democratisation of collective representations is 
a concern for Ernesto Laclau. Laclau’s account of social imaginaries is woven into a 
comprehensive post-structuralist approach that can only be insufficiently revisited here. 
A main part of this approach is the impossibility to bring signifier and signified into a 
state of reconciliation. Identity, the congruence of both, can never be conclusively 
established. Identities and subject positions, once they have been carved out, remain 
unstable and conflictual. The same holds for society, its images and definitions that only 
exist “as an effort to construct that impossible object” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 112), 
reflecting the “impossibility of a final suture” (Laclau 1990, 125). Recurrent attempts to 
fix meaning in hegemonic projects, by establishing nodal points in discourse, or by 
proposing signifiers that subsume wide sectors of the social world are thus ubiquitous, 
but ultimately incomplete as the indeterminacy of the social world cannot be 
surmounted. In the space between meaning-making attempts and the impossibility to 
conclusively fix meaning, Laclau locates ‘myth’ and ‘social imaginary’. 
When structures of meaning become dislocated, new spaces emerge: “[d]islocation is 
the source of freedom”, Laclau argues (1990, 60), resonating with Castoriadis on the 
interplay of ‘institution’ and ‘the instituted’. In situations of dislocation, subjects can 
put forward new descriptions that stand in antagonistic relationships to dominant 
objectivities. Such descriptions, in Laclau’s account, are myths. “The mythical space is 
presented as an alternative to the logical form of the dominant structural discourse” 
(1990, 62). The content of myth entails the “intuition of fullness that cannot be granted 
by the reality of the present” (1990, 63). Thus, myth is a space where demands can be 
articulated and related to forms of desirable social life. When myth is inscribed with 
fullness, it becomes an imaginary – a “horizon … [that] structures a field of 
intelligibility” (1990, 64).  
                                                                                                                                               
heterodoxy, has conservative effects” (Osborne 2003, 512). There is a debate to be had, then, 
whether the strong focus on autonomy and creativity provides the critical purchase that Castoriadis 
envisages; or whether it is at risk of reaffirming a newly hegemonic understanding of creativity 
that is characteristic of a “new spirit of capitalism” (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005a); see Chapter 2 
for a discussion. 
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The elevation of myth into an imaginary is treated briefly in Laclau’s earlier work and 
he, at that point, bracketed a number of considerations that appear to have obtained a 
more prominent place in his later writings (see Glynos and Stavrakakis 2003; 
Stavrakakis 2007, ch. 2). It is particularly the question of what it is that makes a social 
imaginary more than a background picture of a factual or normative kind, but a project 
that agents are invested in, ‘gripped’ by and derive pleasure from that has been added to 
Laclau’s perspective. Jason Glynos, in this context, has suggested that Laclau’s work 
could benefit from a more systematic consideration of fantasy. In order to understand 
the ‘grip’ of ideological projects he proposes a concern for how the imaginary “pull[s] 
off this trick whereby it sustains its emptiness and simultaneously promises fullness” 
(Glynos 2001, 198). Together with David Howarth (2007, 147), he goes on to elaborate 
that 
fantasy operates so as to conceal or close off the radical contingency of social 
relations. It does this through a fantasmatic narrative or logic that promises a 
fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle is overcome […] or which 
foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves insurmountable […].  
Thus, the operation of fantasy consists in reaching out and tying together a sense of 
fullness, the promise of future social harmony, to scenarios of social decline and 
collapse. The promise of fullness relates to the feeling that ‘things fall apart’ but that, 
through the operation of public policy and the adoption of strategies of social 
management, they can be put together again. The way these connections are drawn and 
acquire a sense of naturality accounts for the strength of the social imaginary and its 
‘grip’. 
The study of social cohesion as a ‘social imaginary’ points to linkages and discursive 
operations that exceed the immediate semantic content of the concept. Cohesion, 
depending on how it is invoked, exhibits certain imaginary properties that may amplify 
its potency. Such properties include what Ernesto Laclau refers to as the “intuition of 
fullness that cannot be granted by the reality of the present” (Laclau 1990, 63; see also 
Laclau and Mouffe 2001, ch. 3;  and Laclau 2005, 71). Cohesion, frequently, alludes to 
apocalyptic scenarios of social disintegration that are tied to utopian ideas of a 
wholesome, peaceful and harmonious social life. Policy claims that are inserted into this 
‘imaginary horizon’ of fullness and catastrophe acquire a sense of urgency. Highlighting 
this “ideological moment” (Glynos 2001, 195) of cohesion may help us to understand 
the way it appears to require, naturally and urgently, practices of social activation. 
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Social Imaginaries and Interpretive Policy Analysis 
The analysis of the development of agendas of cohesion in the subsequent three 
chapters follows interpretive interests that may benefit from a consideration of social 
imaginaries – without slavishly following either of the perspectives introduced above. 
We may consider cohesion for dimensions of fantasy, be they utopian or dystopian; for 
conceptions and normative understandings of ‘the social’; and for the kind of 
background understandings of society against which social problems become available.  
The question remains how such dimensions of the imaginary may be considered in the 
examination of social cohesion on political agendas. For this purpose, we will outline 
three policy-analytic orientations that correspond to the contributions of Taylor, 
Castoriadis and Laclau and that inform the concern with a reconstructive examination of 
the politics of cohesion in this thesis.  
Meaning 
Following Taylor’s suggestions, the conceptual invention of cohesion may be studied as 
the production of new social understandings. Indeed, it is conspicuous how notions of 
cohesion have been coined and applied in contexts where there was little or no 
precedent. Cohesion was invented, and traditions in social theory were drawn on, 
mobilized and re-described for the purpose of this invention. In fact, while cohésion 
sociale looks back on occasional policy invocations in French post-war history, British 
community cohesion and German Bürgergesellschaft are, in the way they were defined 
in the time-frame that concerns us here, conceptual novelties. Their creation and 
consolidation can be studied in media discourses, speeches and policy documents over 
time. Moreover, the way the invocation of such notions serves to delimit new fields of 
concern and new areas of policy intervention is open to textual investigation. Taylor 
(2004, 170) points to how imaginaries come about: what “starts as a mere census 
category may be mobilized into common agency”. He draws attention to how social 
meaning emerges and provides the background for social practices and understandings 
that appear ‘too obvious to mention’. 
Critique 
Castoriadis’ perspective suggests a possible starting point for the critique of cohesion. 
Social cohesion, following Castoriadis, can be considered as an instituted horizon. The 
way in which cohesion is invoked as a positive vision that not only governmental actors 
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but also various problematic populations are required to subscribe to, seems to 
correspond to this critique of how social meaning is imposed. The requirements that 
cohesion introduces towards marginalized populations require critical interrogation. A 
sense of this imposition is reinforced by the degree of indignation that is frequently 
directed at those who challenge the conceptual framework of cohesion in favour of 
alternative problem accounts or visions of society. Castoriadis’ critique, with its reliance 
on creative agency, certainly appears somewhat romantic for how it subscribes to an 
ideal of self-determination in the construction of social meaning. Rather than 
concerning ourselves with the possibilities of how this meaning may be constructed, the 
following pays some attention to instances where collective agency – and the 
democratic appropriation of ‘the social’ – can be seen to provide a counterpoint to social 
imaginaries in the politics of cohesion.  
Fantasy 
The democratic re-appropriation of ‘the social’ is also a key concern of Ernesto Laclau. 
Crucially, however, he adds an interest in affective operations of the social imaginary. 
To account for the ‘grip’ of social cohesion we may use his perspective, and how it has 
been developed in particular by Glynos and Howarth (2007), to point to the ‘fantasmatic 
logic’ of its social imaginary. We are interested in the way in which ‘fullness’ and 
‘catastrophe’ coincide and in how this coincidence substantiates public policy 
proposals. The urgency with which policies towards cohesion are introduced and 
rhetorically supported can be explored by way of studying policy documents, by re-
capitulating how incidents and social trends are reported and by considering political 
speech.  
Interpretive approaches in policy analysis have in fact responded to similar concerns 
with meaning, critique and fantasy. Various suggestions have been made in recent years 
to move analyses ‘beyond empiricism’ and towards a consideration of the role of 
meaning (see Fischer 1998; 2003 for valuable overviews). Much of this new interest has 
been directed at deliberation, argumentation, rhetoric and political speech. Alan 
Finlayson (2006, 547), for example, usefully points to the role of rhetoric in “creating 
concepts, terms and images through which we first grasp a situation, or a problem, 
before we start to argue over it”. Herbert Gottweis (2007, 245) suggests that “words not 
only matter because they signify but also because they perform, shape, create, and 
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transform policy-making dynamics”. There is, of course, a certain difficulty in the 
consideration of rhetoric and policy discourses, given their transitory nature. Concepts, 
such as cohesion, are being introduced, substantiated in theory and practice, and fade 
away once their content has been exhausted, their political purpose achieved, or their 
meaning internalized to an extent that invoking the notion has become unnecessary. The 
rhetoric of cohesion has salience at particular points but, with changing political 
priorities, can be and has been superseded by different types of political rhetoric.  
In relation to the development of a particular policy idea, we may, then, distinguish 
between moments of introduction, argumentation, sedimentation and abandonment. In 
relation to the politics of cohesion, we are particularly interested in the early stages of 
its development and introduction. Given that our interest is in how society was 
conceived with social cohesion, and how such imaginations have been developed and 
introduced for particular political purposes, we will prioritise creation over 
argumentation and development over abandonment. This bias is not intended to suggest 
that it is insignificant to study political argumentation or to pay attention to how 
previously powerful policy concepts fade away and disappear. However, our primary 
concern will be to provide a contextually informed reconstruction of the development 
political agendas of cohesion. 
Finally, it may be necessary to briefly consider perspectives that conceive of such 
developments in purely mechanical and strategic terms. With their work on ‘vehicular 
ideas’, Tom Osborne and Gregor McLennan have made some intriguing suggestions for 
such purposes. Vehicular ideas, among which Osborne and McLennan count the ‘Third 
Way’ or ‘multiculturalism’, are concepts with loosely defined meaning and broad 
appeal to constituencies. They “emerge as ways of problem-solving and ‘moving things 
on’” (McLennan 2004, 485). They have ‘something’ of a principled commitment, but 
are essentially “resistant to theorization in any rigorous sense. […] Rather, they serve as 
inclusive umbrellas under which quite a range of advocates can shelter, trade and shift 
their alignments and allegiances” (ibid).  In this sense ‘vehicular ideas’ embody the kind 
of intellectual activity that is appropriate to a conception of the world as “an ever-
modernising one, one in which things do not keep still, and one in which it is a good 
moral and political quality to be able to shift one’s sense of values and organisational 
practice” (McLennan and Osborne 2003, 53-4). They are “not merely observations of 
what is here today or even coming tomorrow; they are notions which can disrupt and 
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distend reality, which announce ethical norms and deviations, strivings for now and 
strivings forever” (ibid, 63).  
There is a certain mechanistic bias in McLennan’s and Osborne’s account. To 
understand the vehicularity of an idea or policy concept, one surely would need to 
account for what it is that makes passengers want to travel with the idea, as well as what 
it is that makes a concept such as cohesion sufficiently gripping and evocative to be 
attractive to both users and recipients of cohesion discourse. This is where fantasy – 
what Glynos and Howarth (2007) suggest in their concern with ‘fantasmatic logics’ – 
needs to be taken on board to understand the appeal of cohesion and its social 
imaginary.  
Conclusion 
Social imaginaries are a loose conceptual tool. They serve to highlight background 
understandings of society that inform the definition of social problems and the adoption 
of governmental practices for their remedy. They may be used to shed light on how 
connections are drawn between desirable and undesirable conditions of society, between 
‘fullness’ and ‘catastrophe’, and to explore how such links underscore the urgency of 
policy proposals. Following Castoriadis and the intellectual tradition of ‘radical 
democracy’, they can even be applied as critical yardsticks to measure the extent to 
which social meaning is imposed, or emerges as a result of collective democratic agency 
and meaning-making.  
Nuances of meaning in how society is conceived – such as the distinction between 
substantialist and integrationist conceptions of social unity – need to be considered. 
However, although notions may be conceptually distinct, it is necessary to engage with 
the meaning that concepts acquire when they are deployed in political language. For the 
examination of this language, the concern of social imaginaries does not prejudge 
methodological decisions, but allows for a variety of critical and interpretive angles. 
The difficult role that cohesion plays in recent policy agendas points to the need for a 
multi-pronged approach to understand how fluid concepts might become profoundly 
important for practices of social regulation and governance. The concern with social 
imaginaries allows for this and, in line with the orientations and perspectives outlined in 
this chapter, highlights elements that are important to consider.  
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Among these are, first, strategic considerations, since the framing of society in public 
policy discourse is usually the result of political considerations about strategic benefits. 
One of such benefits, we have suggested here, is the definition of social problems, 
which provides for openings and allows political actors to appropriate and own political 
agendas. The salience of social problems in the politics of cohesion, moreover, points to 
certain imaginary qualities. Social disintegration is frequently invoked and contrasted 
with visions of cohesiveness, and this juxtaposition might account for a sense of 
urgency that policy prescriptions acquire. Finally, conceptions of social imaginaries 
point to some of the groundwork that is needed for a critical perspective on cohesion. 
The following chapter develops this critical perspective in more detail. It examines the 
requirement of activity that characterizes the politics of cohesion. 
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Chapter 2: The active society 
Introduction 
In how society is accounted for, and how pertinent social problems have been 
conceived, the reference to social activity has become as widespread as the one to 
cohesion.26
Janet Newman (2007, 364) suggests that “activation forms a condensate through which 
contemporary governance trends can be analysed”. Problematically, however, 
understandings of governance and the reality of ‘activation’ instruments in public policy 
are characterised by considerable diversity; a myriad of processes and practices are 
addressed with a single formula. There is a risk, Newman (ibid.) suggests, of losing out 
on “important differences in the forms of power and authority that are deployed” where 
activation is considered as the paradigm of contemporary social governance. 
Accordingly, this chapter suggests that the new interest in activity and prescriptions 
towards activation are indeterminate propositions that derive contextual meaning when 
 In public policy design, as well as in the burgeoning academic literature on 
the social governance of modern states, activity now is a prevalent theme. Critical 
analyses have sought to catch up. Mitchell Dean (1995, 569) observes “the 
displacement of the ethos of the welfare state with that of the ‘active society’”. Stephan 
Lessenich (2008) offers an account of how the welfare state is replaced by the 
Aktivgesellschaft, a process that – he suggests – is accompanied by a “reinvention of the 
social”. In The New Spirit of Capitalism, Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005a) 
suggest that the capacity for activity has become a core criterion in the determination of 
human worth. Understandings of activity, the role of activity in new conceptions of 
social governance, and the political objective of activation have been variously 
explored. More rarely have they been examined for the social imaginaries that underpin 
the new emphasis on social activity. This chapter offers a contribution towards 
understanding some the suppositions of this new emphasis. It suggests that new 
conceptions of society, such as those that were articulated in the politics of cohesion, 
have been a vehicle for the push towards activation. 
                                                 
26   Amitai Etzioni prominently developed a sociological theory for The Active Society (Etzioni 1968; 
McWilliams 2006). Etzioni did not refer to the much more recent phenomenon of activation 
instruments in public policy. He proposes a sociological theory for the “postmodern period” and to 
consider “the active quality [in how] societies or sub-societies (ethnic groupings, classes) acquire 
varying degrees of self-control” (1968, vii, emphasis added). 
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particular social problems are addressed. Among civic, socio-cultural or socio-economic 
domains of concern, diverse accounts of the activity that such domains are seen to 
require have been proposed. Since different conceptions of social activity have been 
proposed in areas as diverse political participation, community relations or labour-
market and welfare politics, it will be necessary to discuss what it is that unites 
propositions towards the active society across these domains. 
While some point to differences between national trajectories towards activation (see 
Serrano Pascual 2004; Bonoli 2010), others see a considerable convergence of 
instruments and strategies (see Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008). The notion of 
activation, introduced as a remedy to various social pathologies, has been brought into 
the picture for the purposes of labour market and welfare-state reform since the late 
1970s (Dean 1995; Walters 1997). Consolidated in more recent proposals, an emphasis 
on consumer choice in public service provision and the introduction of ‘back-to-work’ 
policies are particularly characteristic of these measures (Lessenich 2005; Bonoli 2008; 
Bonvin 2008; Eichhorst, Kaufmann and Konle-Seidl 2008; Van Berkel and Borghi 
2008). 
The prominence of the theme in public policy design is mirrored in new orientations in 
political science, notably in a turn to ‘governance’. There is a growing literature on how 
complex societies require social subjects to be or become active when faced with new 
challenges and in situations where previous modes of political steering are seen to have 
failed. In recent years, ‘meta-governance’, ‘network governance’, ‘empowerment’ or 
‘nudging’ are just a few of the propositions that have been developed along these lines. 
To be sure, activity – often presented as an invitation – is not merely considered to be a 
matter of individual choice. It increasingly becomes a requirement, such as when the 
receipt of benefits is made conditional on activity: a trend that is discernible across 
Western European polities (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008). Increasingly, activity 
underpins social policies that seek to mobilize populations and that are prepared to 
introduce penalties incurred by those that are considered to be insufficiently active or 
whose activity is considered insufficient or undesirable. Hence, it is a legitimate concern 
to consider how requirements for activity match capacities to be active. If the 
dispositions and lifestyles of already-active groups in society are generalized and inform 
a general framework of expectations for measuring those that are less fortunate and 
able, it seems appropriate to point out the bias and injustice of activation measures.  
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Cohesion and activity are frequently introduced in the same breath and in order to 
outline new and allegedly more appropriate notions of state activity. Eichhorst and 
Konle-Seidl (2008, 6) see a strong connection between the two ideas: 
Through improving access to work or subsidised work opportunities, activation 
strategies can help strengthen societal cohesion and alleviate potential tensions 
between tax payers and benefit recipients. This implies a re-orientation of social 
citizenship, away from freedom of want towards freedom to act while continuing 
to guarantee a socio-economic minimum standard.  
Indeed, the turn towards activation has been theorized as part of a reconfiguration of 
national models of social solidarity towards more ‘liberal’ or ‘libertarian’ ideas 
(Hvinden and Halvorsen 2001). However, the notion that cohesion and activity are 
mutually dependent, for example that social solidarity requires an ethos of public 
engagement or republican commitment, clearly does not need to be substantiated by 
liberal ideas or neoliberal ideology. The Council of Europe (2004a, 12), in a chapter 
entitled ‘social cohesion as a responsibility for all’ of its Revised Strategy for Social 
Cohesion, introduces the two themes as follows: 
A society is cohesive when people accept responsibility for one another. The 
values of present-day European society are not always conducive to this. Thus, 
an exclusive stress on the rights of the individual cannot form a sufficient basis 
for social cohesion. Individual rights will be best protected in societies where 
people feel a shared responsibility for the rights and welfare of all.  
It is not self-reliance that is emphasised here but ideas about mutual responsibilities, 
obligations and collective commitments. The rejection of ‘rights’ and the emphasis on 
obligations may be reminiscent of how liberal reformers point towards alternatives to 
the welfare state. The Council of Europe, however, seems to have a broader 
understanding. Collective activity provides for social integration, but the vision of 
society that is sketched out is one where mutual obligations, and not self-reliance, 
substitute the functions of welfare state provision. In how this new emphasis on activity 
may be achieved, the Revised Strategy for Social Cohesion suggests that 
various changes in concepts and methods of governance imply a move away 
from the omnicompetent State to new concepts of governance through 
partnership, or government as a form of contract between citizens and the State. 
(Council of Europe 2004a, 9) 
It may not be necessary to decide whether the various ways of how activation and social 
governance are considered are reducible to the same trajectory. For the purpose of this 
investigation, it is sufficient to acknowledge that the recent prominence of ideas about 
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new social governance, and the role that activity plays in these, are increasingly 
connected to concerns with social cohesion. As part of a “conventional wisdom” in 
contemporary urban governance, Ian Gordon and Nick Buck (2005, 6) point to the 
“repeated reference to the imperatives of (economic) competitiveness, (social) cohesion 
and (responsive) governance”. While such relationships between social cohesion and 
social activity are frequently drawn, this chapter considers the nature of the rapport and 
how it is established. 
This chapter first provides a historical backdrop on contemporary debates on activation 
and considers those in relation to dilemmas of social regulation in liberal political 
theory. Secondly, it examines in some detail the political logic of ideas of activation, in 
particular in welfare and labour market reform. Thirdly, it focuses on how in the 
literature on ‘governance’, society is conceived as in danger of fragmentation. Such 
conceptions usually underpin the suggestion that it has become necessary to go beyond 
‘conventional’ or ‘old’ forms of governmental control, which are purportedly 
inadequate to regulate society when it is conceived as fragmented, complex and multi-
layered. This ‘governance turn’ is of interest for how it supports new types of political 
steering that rely on the activation theme. Fourthly, the chapter points towards 
possibilities for a critique of social activation and uses the occasion for some more 
general comments on the critical impetus of the thesis. It concludes with suggestions on 
the study of social activation in the politics of cohesion.  
The chapter makes three interrelated suggestions. The activation theme is 
indeterminate; it can take more than one shape. In the politics of cohesion, it supports 
different kinds of propositions, such as towards political participation, flexibility in the 
labour market, the ‘active’ contribution of welfare recipients, or even the stipulation that 
communities need to become connected or ‘vibrant’ to overcome significant social 
problems. Activation is compelling for how it is substantiated by an emphasis on newly 
perfectionist subjectivities and by ideals of self-management and self-reliance. This 
emphasis has the potential to create new hierarchies, where empirical variations 
between social groups and individuals to conform to ideals of self-managed activity 
meet a reality where it is almost always those that are less able to meet such demands 
that became the target of activation measures.  
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Liberalism and the ‘societal interest’ 
Contemporary ideas on how the attainment of social goods requires certain types of 
individual conduct, such as in the current concern to activate the unemployed, arise 
against a background of persistent interest. The concern with aggregate effects of 
individual behaviour and its statistical measurement, we have suggested previously, 
emerged in the 18th and 19th century and has ever since been met by cautionary tales, 
notably in liberal political theory. Famously, John Stuart Mill (2011), addressing the 
‘tyranny of the majority’, considers situations when not only acts of government but the 
‘mandates of society’ may become oppressive. He considers social tyranny to be more 
severe than tyranny by government, since the former “leaves fewer means of escape, 
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself” 
(2011, 8). Mill has in particular the force of “prevailing opinions” (2011, 60) in mind 
that needs to be limited. To maintain such limitation is “as indispensable to a good 
condition of human affairs as protection against political despotism” (2011, 9). Part of 
our rightful expectations as free individuals, he suggests, is that we have the licence to 
frame “the plan of our life to suit our own character” (2011, 23).  
Such pursuits, as is well-known, are limited by the harm principle: as “soon as any part 
of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction 
over it” (2011, 142). Mill is cognizant of the fuzziness of the harm principle when it 
refers not to harm suffered individually, but to behaviour that is harmful to what is 
defined as the ‘societal interest’. He goes to some length to expose what he considers 
shady and illegitimate requests that may be put forward in the name of the greater social 
good. Regarding Mill and others (e.g., Tocqueville 1863, Ch. 15), the problem with the 
mandates of society, with the requirements of liberty or with the nature and scope of the 
societal interest is, of course, that such understandings are historically fluid.27
Mill’s classical liberalism, for example, would generally not be seen to be equipped to 
deal with the conditions of freedom in post-industrial mass societies. Poverty, different 
from how Mill saw it, is not usually understood as an accident, misadventure, or as 
 They 
respond to social and historical understandings that have frequently been revised. 
                                                 
27  Nikolas Rose (1999, xviii) gives a very broad sketch of how such understandings have shifted over 
time. He sees “a shift from a conception of the human being as a moral subject of habit, to that of 
the normal subject of character and constitution in the second half of the nineteenth century, to the 
social subject of solidarity and citizenship rights in the first half of the twentieth century, to the 
autonomous subject of choice and self-realization as the twentieth century drew to a close.”  
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resulting from character flaws; it is conceived as a social phenomenon. The socio-
economic situation where vast numbers are unable to live up the ideal of self-supporting 
autonomy – for reasons that have themselves proven to be contested – has put liberalism 
to a test. It arguably led to the fragmentation of liberal politics. In libertarianism, as it 
has became particularly influential in the United States (e.g., Hayek 1944; Nozick 
1974), a strong emphasis on autonomy is qualified by the stipulation that once an 
individual draws material support from society, his or her conduct are of social concern 
beyond Mill’s boundaries of non-interference. Coercive measures may be adopted in the 
interest of society as well as in the rational self-interest towards self-reliance that 
individuals are seen to have.28 Liberals of a different type have been concerned with the 
material conditions of autonomy and their absence for vast numbers. This has led to the 
proposition of various types of social reform programmes to provide for social security 
or to address individual traits that were considered to stand in the way of the exercise of 
autonomy.29
The ‘mandates of society’ or the ‘societal interest’ can be considered quite differently, 
even from within a liberal orientation. It may be seen to require the self-protection of 
society against the self-inflicted heteronomy of “welfare scroungers”, or – in particular 
where assumptions of guilt are questioned – as requiring the creation of material 
conditions that make freedom a possibility. Historically, the ‘social question’ of mass 
poverty, as it was discovered in the 19th century, led to a re-calibration of concerns with 
freedom and social regulation (Castel 1995). It brought about new social points of view. 
Whereas individual capacities were at the heart of classical liberalism, new perspectives 
took sight of aggregate behaviour and its statistical measurement. Populations were 
beginning to be conceived in the 19th century as exhibiting features that were of interest 
not merely as a reflection of individual conduct, but as properties of a ‘social body’. The 
governmental concern with the aggregate effects of individual behaviour, what Foucault 
(2004a) theorizes as ‘biopolitics’, brought about a new interest in lifestyle choices. The 
invention of society in the 19th century, as discussed in the previous chapter, saw an 
 It has been suggested that political liberalism has never been as averse to 
moral regulation as Mill envisaged it (see Hunt 1999).  
                                                 
28  This is exemplified in the logic of the British workhouse. In the workhouse benefits for material 
survival were granted under the condition that recipients handed themselves over to conditions of 
forced labour (Fowler 2008). The decline of the workhouse and the revision of the British Poor 
Laws occurred when a more nuanced perception on poverty, and how it needed to be managed by 
means of collective welfare provision, emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century.  
29  See King (1999) on dilemmas of liberalism in social policy-making and Freeden (1996) on 
nuances, political expressions and contradictions of political liberalism. 
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explosion of the number of social professions and of social practitioners. New kinds of 
rationalities were introduced in how individual conduct needed to be administered. 
Social problems were viewed not in relation to individual choices, but for the aggregate 
effects of such choices.30
In practice, this shift put into doubt the liberal disavowal of moral regulation (although 
this disavowal may never have been as strong a selling point for political liberalism as 
its preference for property rights and entrepreneurial freedom has been). John Stuart 
Mill’s (2011, 155) commitment to principled non-interference extended to obnoxious 
conduct, such as to drunkenness in public: “No person ought to be punished simply for 
being drunk”. In fact, “gambling, or drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or 
uncleanliness” – all those types of activity “which experience has shown not to be 
useful or suitable to any person's individuality” (2011, 152) – shouldn’t be subject to 
censure by authorities for their “extravagance” (2011, 154). They only give reason for 
interference for their negative externalities, such as the “breach of duty to family or 
creditors” (ibid.). Notions such as ‘negative externality’ are already firmly rooted in a 
particularly modern perspective on aggregate effects in society. By conceiving of 
individual conduct with a view to such effects, the liberal equation changed, not least 
for how conduct, such as drunkenness, would be evaluated and by what standards. The 
impact of cumulative behaviour – whether ‘obnoxious’ or not – on social integration 
became a new concern.  
 
There has been a variety of debates in which liberal arguments have faced ideas about 
the ‘societal interest’. The following section is merely concerned to consider some 
elements of such conflicts in relation to questions about social integration or cohesion. 
In Britain, for example, the 1957 report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual 
Offences and Prostitution (the Wolfenden Report) was the occasion for exchanges 
between theorists and social practitioners that are of interest in this regard.31
                                                 
30  Francois Éwald (1993, 24) puts this convincingly in his groundbreaking work on social prevention 
and insurance: “As pathologies are not manifested in individuals but in the relationships among 
individuals, they cannot be combated by assigning individual guilt. … Nobody can claim to 
struggle on his or her own against pathologies whose existence depends on others. And everybody, 
with a view to his or her own well-being, has to respect and want those things that society 
describes as the conditions of general welfare.”  
 Intellectual 
31  The committee included amongst others the Principal of University College Wales, Aberystwyth, 
Goronwy Rees, who was considered its most liberal voice. Maybe characteristically for his time, 
this did not stop Rees from accusing his old friend, Guy Burgess, who had defected to the USSR, 
of “depraved tastes” for his homosexuality (Higgins 1996; see also Rees 2000, 40).  
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debates that accompanied the work of the Committee were concerned not just with 
sexual identities and practices, but with the more general social effects of allegedly 
immoral or obnoxious conduct on society. Characteristically, homosexuality was 
lumped together with prostitution, and even the social effects of drunkenness were 
discussed analogously. Different from Mill, Patrick Devlin considered these effects as 
follows: “suppose a quarter or a half of the population got drunk every night, what sort 
of society would it be? You cannot set a theoretical limit to the number of people who 
can get drunk before society is entitled to legislate against drunkenness” (Devlin 1965, 
37). Arguing for the need to regulate alcohol consumption, Devlin made a more general 
case for the social regulation of individual conduct, based on the observation that 
“[t]here is disintegration when no common morality is observed and history shows that 
the loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of disintegration” (Devlin 1968, 7). 
H.L.A. Hart responded critically to the connections that Devlin drew between social 
integration and conceptions of social morality. He identified, first, a ‘classical thesis’ on 
the relationship between a unitary conception of morality and social unity, associated 
with Plato and Aristotle. On this account, the law is there “for the promotion of moral 
virtue” (Hart 1967, 1). Moral virtue, in turn, is seen to reflect unchangeable truths about 
the good life whose realization and pursuit provides for a solid foundation of society.32
as the cement of society, the bond, or one of the bonds, without which man 
would not cohere in society. … It is not the quality of morality but its cohesive 
power which matters. … The case for the enforcement of morality on this view 
is that its maintenance is necessary to prevent the disintegration of society.  
 
From the ‘classical thesis’ Hart distinguished the ‘disintegration thesis’, which he 
associated with Devlin. Devlin, Hart suggested, recognized that morality was transitory, 
rather than unitary and static. He was not committed to the preservation of eternal 
truths, Hart pointed out, but to the role that prevalent norms play for social integration. 
Morality, Hart (ibid.) characterized Devlin’s position, figures 
Hart’s quarrel was about Devlin’s inability to supply proof for the ‘disintegration 
thesis’. Absent this proof, ideas of disintegration needed to be considered as “disguised 
tautologies … depending entirely on the meaning given to the expressions ‘society,’ 
‘existence,’ or ‘continued existence’ of society” (ibid, 3). Until “psychologists and 
                                                 
32   The classical thesis, of course, has remaining defenders, such as Gertrude Himmelfarb (1995, 11) 
who pours scorn on the “the assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and relative, that they 
are mere customs and conventions, that they have a purely instrumental, utilitarian purpose, and 
that they are peculiar to specific individuals and societies.” 
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sociologists provide such evidence, supporters of the enforcement of morality would do 
better to rest their case candidly on the conservative rather than on the disintegration 
thesis” (ibid, 13).33
Hart’s request for proof appears reasonable enough.
  
34
Social activation in politics 
 Nonetheless, we want to sidestep 
such questions and consider the ‘disintegration thesis’ and its political manifestations as 
metaphorical in nature. Even where it is tautological, the “meaning given to the 
expressions ‘society,’ ‘existence,’ or ‘continued existence’ of society” (ibid, 3) is 
essential to consider not for how it reflects truths, but for the role that these 
understandings play in the formulation of political programmes (such as for how the 
Wolfenden Report impacted on the Sexual Offences Act 1967 that decriminalized 
homosexuality between men). The types of governmental regulation that are considered 
legitimate and appropriate are usually substantiated by social imaginaries. The new 
focus on social activation has to be considered for its conceptions of society and of the 
societal interest. The following section, hence, considers dilemmas and debates where 
the ‘societal interest’ is newly defined in relation to the alleged inactivity of individuals 
and social groups. 
The idea that activation has to play a privileged role in welfare and labour market 
reform was introduced in the 1970s. It was conceived in response to the recognition of a 
new constellation of social problems and, in particular, to what French sociologists have 
considered as the emergence of a ‘new social question’ (Castel 1995; Rosanvallon 
1995). This question refers to puzzlement, beginning in the 1970s, about how and why 
the post-war social economy had failed to redeem its original promise of universal 
prosperity, full employment and social security. With the decline of industrial 
production, the primary labour market seemed increasingly unable to absorb 
                                                 
33  As a variation of the ‘disintegration thesis’, Hart introduces the ‘conservative thesis’. It describes 
“the claim that society has a right to enforce its morality by law because the majority have the 
right to follow their own moral convictions that their moral environment is a thing of value to be 
defended from change” (ibid., 2). Hart remarks, the ‘disintegration thesis’, if it is not supported by 
substantial proof, collapses into the ‘conservative thesis’, which is grounded in principled 
majoritarianism. See also Dworkin (1966). 
34  His puzzlement about the ‘disintegration thesis’ corresponds to Michael Mann’s (1970, 432) 
sociological quarrel with ‘normative consensus’ theory. Consensus sociologists tend to assert “that 
some ‘minimum’ level of consensus about certain ‘critical’ value is necessary to social cohesion. 
As this level is never precisely specified, we cannot very easily come to grips with the argument” 
(Mann 1970, 432). 
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populations (Bonoli 2007). Systems of social protection were seen to have failed in as 
much as they were built on the idea that everybody – or at least the primary, male 
breadwinners – would find a place in the labour market. New populations on the 
margins of society were brought into view as victims of social dislocations and as proof 
for the failure of old modes of social solidarity. The measures that were proposed for the 
‘inclusion’ of these marginalized populations would differ significantly from what had 
been envisaged as part of the post-war welfare state arrangements; the activation of 
unemployed and welfare recipients began to be introduced as an alternative to previous 
systems of social protection.35
Giuliano Bonoli (2010, 443) elaborates on this and provides a useful periodisation of 
‘active labour-market policies’. For the labour shortages of the 1950s and 60s, the 
objective of activating interventions was the ‘upskilling’ of the labour force. Following 
the economic crises of the 1970s and in the context not of shortage, but of 
unemployment, the objective became occupation. Since the mid-1990s the goal of 
policies has been to encourage the “reentry of unemployed persons and other non-
working individuals into the labor market” (ibid.). Following this latest transformation, 
which Bonoli (2010, 448-450) considers as the ‘activation turn’, activity has become 
widely conceived as a remedy to a variety of problems. Not just re-entry into the labour 
market, but civic participation, relations between ethnic majority and minorities were 
conceived as problems that required solutions parallel to the political instruments 
designed to increase labour market participation.  
  
There are considerable differences in how socio-economic problems have been 
conceived and remedies of activation applied. In France, a new interest in exclusion 
sociale made the integration of marginalized populations, living under conditions of 
precarité, a particular concern. In the United States, ‘new poverty’ became the concern 
of a line of ‘dependency’ thinking. Lawrence Mead (2006, 110) pointed to so-called 
‘cultures of poverty’ and suggested that the “greatest cause of today’s poverty may 
simply be that the attempts […] to equalize opportunity have failed to persuade many 
blacks and Hispanics that it is worth working.” Anti-dependency politics generally put 
emphasis on cultural attributes of populations on the social margins (Dean and Taylor-
Gooby 1992), and suggests that there is a need to “animate society” (Mead 2006, 115). 
                                                 
35  Chapter 3 elaborates on the French context of these developments in more detail.  
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The development of workfare politics follows a similar argumentation, but is not in all 
circumstances concerned with the cultural attributes of welfare recipients (Handler 
2004). Britain has followed the US precedent, though in its New Labour years the focus 
on obligations that is characteristic of workfare politics has been accompanied by the 
concern to increase social investment (Taylor-Gooby 2008). With the Hartz reforms of 
2003-2005, parallel strategies of social activation have been implemented in the 
redesign of German systems of social protection.  
While these examples point to a certain convergence towards activation, national policy 
traditions remain significant to consider. Different orientations towards the social 
position of unemployed or marginalized populations have been developed across 
national policy-making contexts, and the meaning of activation as a political strategy 
towards new social problems appears fairly contextual. Even within labour market 
reform, activation is an ambiguous proposition for the variety of tools used and 
objectives pursued. Despite this ambiguity, the proposition of activity certainly exhibits 
a certain ‘vehicular’ pull for how, maybe because of this ambiguity, it can “act as focal 
points of political agreement” (Bolini 2010, 450-1).  
While the current turn towards activation in public policy design is celebrated by some, 
others remain sceptical not only of the relevant administrative practices but of very 
notion of activity and empowerment. Activation has been criticized for how it involves 
“opening up more of the person to governmental power, requiring them to collaborate in 
the development of new subjective orientations to the worlds of work and welfare” 
(Newman 2007, 366). The dispositions of welfare recipients and unemployed persons 
are brought into a domain of governmental concern, such as when social entitlements 
are made “contingent upon the individual’s conduct, responsibilities and compliance 
with obligations” (Van Berkel and Borghi 2008, 398).  
The new governance of activation may be characterised by a mixture of elements: the 
emphasis on consumer-choice and empowerment; democracy; ‘empowerment’; as well 
as new and reinforced sanctions. Van Berkel and Borghi (2008, 399) see this mixture 
reflected in a tension between ‘new governance’ and ‘activation policy’: “whereas the 
former emphasises the voice and choice that policy users should have in service 
provision processes, the latter emphasises the obligations and individual responsibilities 
of unemployed persons in activation, which reduces rather than enhances their active 
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involvement in service provision”. In activation strategies, Newman (2007, 371) 
suggests, citizens are conceived as “partners” and “consumers”, but also as “the object 
of coercive strategies”. There may be overlaps and tensions in “different instantiations 
of the ‘active’ citizen” (ibid.).  
Activity, just as cohesion, is a theme that is given specificity and meaning in the 
contexts of its invocation. As an abstract notion, it is no more than a loose suggestion 
that where inactivity is the problem, activity is the solution. The ‘active society’ is, 
William Walters (1997, 224) suggests almost tautologically, an “argument [that] holds 
that the best way for governments and other agencies to address social problems is 
through the promotion of ‘activity’.” Eichhorst et al. (2008, 2) point to the appeal of the 
idea of activation: 
At first sight, activation is a compellingly simple idea. For people of working 
age, doing something useful – especially working – is much better than sitting 
out time on a public benefit, however generous or meagre it may be. This is 
certainly desirable for better social cohesion, solidarity and the long-term 
viability of welfare states and public budgets. It is probably this straight-forward 
normative idea that is responsible for the widespread appeal and success of 
policy measures introduced under the label of activation. 
In current public policy proposals, the suggestion usually is that the interference of 
activation strategies, though it should not be taken lightly, is in the rational self-interest 
of inactive populations and thus appropriate. When individual immobility is considered 
to be the cause of social problems and a burden on public finances, the societal interest 
in pursuing activating interventions becomes a compelling proposition. Since the lack of 
activity is also seen to stand in the way of individual self-realization, the governmental 
interest in activation seems in line with a conception of human desires and aspirations.  
While such calculations do not differ significantly from the dilemmas already identified 
by Mill, their context appears to have changed. Liberal ideas of self-reliance have been 
newly emphasized and seem to inform newly perfectionist conceptions of human 
behaviour. The current British reform agenda with its emphasis on benefits 
conditionality and activation is exemplary in this regard. In a recent statement titled 
‘21st Century Welfare’ (Department of Work and Pensions 2010), Iain Duncan Smith, 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, emphasizes that “problems are interrelated 
and their solutions lie in society as a whole” (ibid., 1). A “culture of worklessness and 
dependency” needs to be addressed and a new contract established “about a responsible 
71 
society working together to improve the quality of life for those who are worst off”, in 
order to produce “positive behavioural effects” (ibid.). 36
While it would go too far to suggest that the current agenda of activation represents a 
clear reversal to 19th century conceptions of welfare, the turn towards activity has 
conspicuous precedents in British social policy. The 1832-34 Poor Law Commissioner’s 
Report introduced the function of the Workhouse as that of infusing  
 In fact, the “current benefits 
system gives little consideration to the behaviours it generates” (ibid, 10) and provides 
“poor work incentives” for single parents and young people (ibid). In order to 
countervail the ‘culture of dependency’, a stiffened regime of sanctions needs to be 
introduced where benefits are withheld until “those who fail to meet their obligations … 
demonstrate that they have re-engaged with their personalised set of commitments” 
(ibid., 30).  
new life, new energy into the constitution of the pauper; he is aroused like one 
from sleep, his relation with all his neighbours, high and low, is changed; he 
surveys his former employers with new eyes. He begs a job – he will not take 
denial. (cited in King 1999, 227) 
Ideas that motivate the current emphasis on responsibility and the push towards activity 
have been historically appealing.37
[l]ifestyle change becomes a core concern of the welfare system. Incentives and 
sanctions are deployed to help secure positive outcomes. These have to be 
shaped through orthodox democratic mechanisms and should be geared to 
substantive freedoms. …The welfare system is designed to increase solidarity, 
 Moreover, their appeal extends beyond political 
boundaries. For example, Anthony Giddens, a Labour Peer, recently outlined his ideas 
for the ‘the post-industrial welfare society’: “Welfare should be redefined in terms of 
personal autonomy and self-esteem, as desirable qualities of the good life. The 
cultivation of these qualities allows individuals to adapt to change and to make the most 
of their opportunities in different areas of their lives” (2007, 122-3). Autonomy is linked 
to self-esteem, whose lack “has been shown to be bound up with a range of social 
problems, including poverty, crime and poor health among others” (ibid, 123). 
Accordingly,  
                                                 
36  Although the Coalition’s original policy blueprint did not envisage a reduction of benefits for 
those that are most vulnerable, this commitment appears difficult to maintain against the 
background of austerity measures and in line with the new Conservative commitment to introduce 
a £500-a-week ‘benefit cap’ (BBC 2011). 
37  These developments may be seen to put some doubt on what remains of post-war ideals of social 
citizenship and social rights, such to “live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society” (Marshall 1950, 10). 
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but above all through helping to reconcile cultural and lifestyle diversity with 
overall social cohesion. (ibid, 131)  
Activation – the ‘energization’ that Giddens (1998, 63) had already envisaged as a core 
tool of the Third Way – is justified by positive social and individual outcomes, for how 
it heightens self-esteem, increases autonomy, averts social problems and preserves 
social cohesion. Lifestyle change remains the core objective of current welfare reform 
initiatives, and in this regard there clearly is continuity between New Labour and the 
current Coalition government. 
Whatever the merits of the new welfare reform measures, it is clear that they strongly 
draw on ideas of self-reliance, autonomy and responsibility, which are further enshrined 
as conditional requirements for welfare provision. These understandings of responsible 
conduct and social activity have been expanded beyond the welfare state and, arguably, 
have taken hold in the domain of immigrant integration. The (abandoned) ‘activity 
condition’ in Labour’s Earned Citizenship proposals is an example for this extension 
(McGhee 2010, 84-5). More generally, Christian Joppke draws attention to how new 
expectations are introduced, for example in naturalisation procedures where the 
attitudes and dispositions that need to be demonstrated to become eligible for 
citizenship have been revised and new expectations in the area of conduct and 
behaviour have been introduced (Joppke 2010, 140). 
It is not our intention to quarrel with the activation thesis, or with arguments in favour 
of ‘responsibility’ and ‘self-reliance’, on a level of generality. Activity may be more 
desirable than passivity, though this proposition offers only limited ground to judge the 
measures envisaged in various reform proposals, be they in welfare reform or 
citizenship law. It is important to recognize, however, that social activation policies 
usually put forward requests neither for generalized activity, nor for self-determination 
in how individuals are supposed to exert their activity, but for pre-determined types. 
The kind of activity that is requested is usually highly regulated in accordance with 
particular understandings of the social interest. The ‘disintegration thesis’ and its 
prescriptions as to what kinds of moral conduct are conducive to social cohesion 
remains conspicuous in recent reform initiatives. By contrast, the mobility of unwanted 
immigrants, their movement in the labour market, or intra-communal activities of ethno-
religious groups are not usually embraced as examples of self-reliance and activity (see 
also Lessenich 2009b, 169, 171). Despite such biases, the idea of activity has been 
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introduced as a counterpoint to older paradigms of welfare provision and social security. 
It has not only been adopted by governments but also been endorsed in the political 
science literature on ‘new governance’, where various types of strategies towards 
activation have been devised.  
New Governance 
Accounts of ‘governance’ have generally been inspired by an interest in changing 
relationships between state and society. The notion, governance, has spilled over across 
social science disciplines and fields of public policy application. Arguably, its 
attractiveness is partially explained by how it allows for diverse ideas to be subsumed 
under a common heading and to capture a wide range of ideas on how modern states, 
both domestically and internationally, respond – or, mostly, fail to respond – to new 
challenges, a new global connectedness, the proliferation of actors, and the ‘complex’ 
reality of modern social systems among them. As it speaks to the need to overcome 
ossified state structures, to de-bureaucratise governmental apparatuses, and to 
‘empower’ civil society actors, ‘governance’ moreover seems to arouse vaguely positive 
feelings. 
As part of the political science interest in governance, it has become commonplace to 
suggest that the exercise of top-down authority to implement decisions, deliver public 
services and intervene in social affairs has gradually given away. The new complexity 
of society, it is a frequent suggestion, requires methods that respond in a calibrated and 
fine-tuned way.38
                                                 
38  Jan Kooiman (1993, 46), an influential governance theorist, for example notes how by “stressing 
the complexity (patterns), dynamics (forces) and diversity (meanings) of interactions on different 
levels, governing and governance capacities are not seen as isolated and incidental top-down 
efforts of steering, managing, controlling or regulating, but as reflecting and representing the basic 
characteristics of the systems they are part”. Complexity in the social world, accordingly, has to be 
met with complexity in the means of governmental interference. As in Kooiman’s account, 
conceptions of ‘the social world’ in governance literature frequently follow a cybernetic 
perspective or systems-theoretical conception of society. A different governance theorist, Andrew 
Dunsire (1993, 22-3) puts the systems theoretic case for disintegration exemplarily by suggesting 
that the “apocalyptic question is whether social change at an ever-increasing rate, towards ever-
increasing complexity, diversity and criticality, can be accommodated by the arrangements 
societies now make to keep disturbances within bounds and to steer change away from undesired 
and towards desired directions … or whether – in no long distant future – some random fluctuation 
in turbulence will produce a catastrophic decline in compliance, in governability, leading to social 
chaos.” Jürgen Habermas (1976, 2), also committed to a systems perspective in his work on the 
Legitimation Crisis, provides a somewhat more sophisticated conception when he relates ‘systems 
integration’ to ‘social integration’: “crises arise when the structure of a social system allows fewer 
possibilities for problem solving than are necessary to the continued existence of the system. In 
this sense, crises are seen as persistent disturbances of system integration.” This becomes 
 Commentators commonly point to the declining importance of 
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sovereign policy implementation that was seen to follow logics of ‘coercion, command 
and control’.  Government is seen as shorthand for old modes of state activity and of 
policy-making that is “backed by formal authority” (Rosenau 1992, 4), divided into 
relatively discrete issue areas, and best understood as involving the “formal and 
institutional processes which operate at the level of the nation” (Stoker 1998, 17). By 
contrast, there is no thick consensus as to what governance involves. Among a 
minimalist definition may be the idea that not just the state and its agencies, but various 
private actors now usually contribute to the deliberation on and the implementation of 
political decisions (Ronit and Schneider 1999; Hall and Biersteker 2002; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002). Political steering, accordingly, does no longer need to be backed up 
by governmental sanctions (Stoker 1998, 24-6), as it follows logics of persuasion and 
deliberation among a variety of newly empowered actors (Risse 2000; 2004).  
Mark Bevir (2003, 210) critically observes how governance often appears to be 
predicated on “[a]llegedly given pressures”, which should be understood as 
“constructions of the particular narratives that currently happen to dominate the political 
debate”. One such narrative has to do with increasing complexity, the problem of 
‘ungovernability’ (Mayntz 1993), and the notion of social fragmentation. Following 
Hart’s critical interrogation of Devlin’s propositions, the following section considers the 
‘disintegration thesis’ of new governance. 
The disintegration thesis in governance 
The emphasis on the novelty of governance seems to suggest a Copernican turn in the 
operation of politics, the decline of Étatist rationalities of government and the 
‘withering away’ of the omnipotent state. This is frequently seen to have occurred over 
the last few decades of the 20th century. Milward and Provan capture the prevailing 
spirit (2002, 360, emphasis in original): 
Modern governments by their scale and scope are complex and highly 
differentiated. Complexity has been compounded by the trend toward 
establishing principal-agent relations with private firms and voluntary agencies 
                                                                                                                                               
potentially problematic “when the consensual foundations of normative structures are so much 
impaired that the society becomes anomic” (ibid, 3). While Habermas does not understand systems 
failure as apocalyptic as such, he sees an interdependence between systems and the social world 
and points to a potentially catastrophic impact of Systemversagen on social life-worlds. Habermas, 
of course, has been accused of offering too stark a choice between a conception of rationality and, 
if this rationality remains unrealized, the prospect of social and cultural catastrophe. Hart’s 
puzzlement about the ‘disintegration thesis’ may apply to Habermas, too. 
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as a result of purchaser-provider relationships. At the same time, the central 
government has become hollowed out as power is devolved to state and local 
governments. 
While the last decades of the 20th century have been marked by an increasing currency 
of economically oriented policy paradigms, remodelled conceptions of the welfare state 
and processes of globalization and Europeanization, it should be fairly difficult to 
determine what aspects of ‘the new’ in governance are actually radically new. Across 
European states, private or semi-public actors have certainly played a role in political 
processes and in the provision of public services well before recent ‘turns’. Moreover, 
as a sceptical antidote to exaggerated ideas of how globalisation voids domestic politics, 
it has become somewhat more widely accepted that states have not lost quite as much 
control as often seems to be implied. After all, when sovereign power is outsourced or 
devolved, this usually occurs by way of a sovereign act (Pierre and Peters 2005). 
Moreover, the social complexity that seemingly requires a radical departure from how 
we need to think about the state does not seem quite as novel as is suggested. 
Complexity that leads to social differentiation and requires efforts of social calibration 
has been a central feature of how, already with Durkheim, ‘the social’ was conceived. 
Guy Peters (2000, 37) quite rightly points to a distorted historical sense in how 
governance theorists appear to assume “a golden age of the state in the not too distant 
past. In that period the state was presumed to be pre-eminent and virtually unchallenged 
in its exercise of control over the economy and society.”  
It is not the point to dispute that the international entanglement of states and new 
domestic complexity may be perceived as salient challenges that require new types of 
governmental response. It is worth noting, however, that social fragmentation and 
complexity – just as the various dimensions of decline and disintegration discussed in 
the previous chapter – is a notion that depends on interpretation.39
                                                 
39  This is particularly evident in the commitment to many governance theorists to two perspectives 
that are ambiguously related. There is a strong apocalyptic inclination, and the notion that systemic 
failures and new social complexity pose an imminent risk if they fail to be met by the new 
governing techniques. Simultaneously, there is a celebratory streak in governance theory that 
recommends new forms of steering for how they are genuinely liberating, empowering, and 
conducive to autonomy and to individual and collective well-being. 
 Its reliance on 
particular conceptions of society does not disqualify governance theory. However, 
where social fragmentation is invoked, we may reasonably ask what it signifies. We 
may, moreover, question perspectives that conceive of social fragmentation as a 
naturally given and introduce remedies as a matter of inevitability. The following 
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briefly considers four propositions that loosely belong to the ‘new governance’ turn for 
how they draw on conceptions of society and recommend particular strategies of social 
activation.  
Network Governance 
In contrast to a focus on fixed institutional architectures inhabited by vertically 
integrated, independent actors, the network concept is often used to illustrate new 
principles of spatial organisation. In public policy planning, it is usually drawn on to 
emphasize how actors interrelate, collaborate, and are organised across the social 
landscape. A different strand in the literature points to instrumental reasons for the 
emergence of networks. Mayntz (2003, 31), for example, asserts that “[n]etworks 
typically emerge where power is dispersed among the agents in a policy field, but where 
co-operation is necessary for the sake of effectiveness”. A network, Sørensen and 
Torfing (2007, 10) suggest, has 
a regulative aspect since it provides rules, roles and procedures; a normative 
aspect since it conveys norms, values and standards; a cognitive element since it 
generates codes, concepts and specialized knowledge; and an imaginary aspect 
since it produces identities, ideologies and common hopes.  
Network governance makes suggestions on how these environments can be shaped in 
order for policy outcomes to be achieved.   
Metagovernance 
When command-and-control types of state intervention are either seen to have failed or 
to have become undesirable, metagovernance is seen to denote a backdoor through 
which to sustain a measure of political control. In this vein, the notion promises the best 
of both worlds: exercising control and avoiding undesirable policy outcomes, while 
granting leeway for non-state actors to solve problems largely of and by themselves. In 
this sense, metagoverning is not new. It refers to types of political intervention that have 
been characteristic at least of the ideal type of liberal social intervention that only 
envisages a place for the state on the margins of self-regulating processes. The 
contribution of the recent literature on metagovernance is to refine the liberal state’s 
toolkits for such purposes. Eva Sørensen (2006, 102) conceives of metagovernance as 
an alternative form of governing that differs from sovereign rule in that it is not 
based on direct and detailed top-down control but on a plurality of indirect ways 
of influencing or coordinating the actions of self-governing actors.  
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Metagovernance draws on ideas of ‘co-governance’, backdoor control’, the framing of 
‘self-governance’ and ‘story-telling’. The latter notion is seen to involve, for example, 
“shaping ... interests through the formation of the meanings and identities that constitute 
self-governing actors” (Sørensen 2006, 101). ‘Story-telling’ as a form of governmental 
intervention involves working upon the ideational framework around given policy 
issues (Sørensen 2006, 109-110).  
Empowerment 
In relation to the ‘new complexity’ stipulated in the discourse of governance, theorists 
point to the need to adopt particular efforts of political steering and social intervention. 
Hendrik Bang (2004, 160) for example suggests that “complexity must be handled with 
complexity”. This  
can be done by enabling more and more people to transform themselves into 
self-reflexive individuals who can, are willing, and understand how to, exercise 
a difference or practice their freedoms in and through the processes whereby 
binding decisions are made for a given society, terrain, field, domain or grouping 
of people (ibid.) 
Bang conceives of this as ‘cultural governance’, but it has also been introduced as 
‘empowerment’. The notion of empowerment captures a positive spirit towards 
devolving centralised authority to local agencies, their employees, citizens, customers 
and organized interest groups at local levels. These strategies are frequently introduced 
as in the interest of local self-determination, efficiency, effectiveness, and, more 
broadly, to tackle challenges for political steering in societies marked by complexity. 
Some contributors go so far as to suggest a systemic imperative for empowerment under 
conditions of complexity. Complex problems in social systems require complex 
solutions—and processes of empowerment may be suitable for arriving at a kind of 
‘complexification’ of governing mechanisms.  
There is also a more critical concern with ideas and practices of empowerment. Pierre 
and Peters (2000) see the potential for paradoxical effects of ‘mutual empowerment’: 
with local governments, workers at local state agencies and their customers all 
‘empowered’ it is likely that conflicts ensue. Indeed, the lack of centralised coordination 
among mutually empowered actors might mean that “conflicts would be propelled 
upward in the political structures” (2000, 23), thus fostering unintended centralization, 
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rather than the intended decentralization of power.40
Nudging 
 Following a more Foucauldian 
line, Barbara Cruikshank (1999, 58) suggests that with empowerment the “individual’s 
will and freedom to act are brought into line with the social good not through their 
negation but through the activation and maximization of the individual’s will”. 
A recently influential notion of social activation has been introduced by Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein (2009) with their idea of ‘nudging’. Nudging is about the 
‘optimization’ of individual choices. It abstains from direct interference but intends to 
shape individual strategies of choice by shaping its circumstances. It claims to be a 
version of ‘libertarian paternalism’: libertarian for its commitment to choice and 
paternalistic for its intention to frame an ‘architecture’ of choice. “Better governance”, 
Thaler and Sunstein (2009, 15) suggest,  
requires less in the way of government coercion and constraint, and more in the 
way of freedom to choose. If incentives and nudges replace requirements, and 
bans, government will be both smaller and more modest. So, to be clear: we are 
not for bigger government, just for better governance.  
Responding in particular to the protracted American debates over the scope of central 
government, nudging purports to be a middle ground, a “real third way” (2009, 253). 
“The sheer complexity of modern life”, the authors suggest (ibid, 254), “undermine[s] 
arguments for rigid mandates or for dogmatic laissez-faire. Emerging developments 
should strengthen, at once, the principled commitment to freedom of choice and the 
case for the gentle nudge.”41
This emphasis on freedom of choice and individual capacities for choosing is exemplary 
of the ‘active society’. Nudging illustrates a tension that is equally pronounced in 
empowerment, meta- and network governance. The potential for social self-regulation is 
positively evaluated, either as a good in itself or for how it contributes to governing 
outcomes that could otherwise not be attained. At the same time, it is argued that it is 
necessary to channel social self-regulation so that it contributes to desired outcomes. If 
it remains unchanneled, the natural activity of social actors may lead to disastrous 
  
                                                 
40  See also Handler (1996) and Fischer (2006) for critical accounts of empowerment in public policy 
design. 
41  Before the 2010 general election, nudging was considered as a candidate for the governing 
paradigm of a British Conservative government (Sparrow 2008). Within the British Cabinet 
Office, a ‘Behavioural Insight Team’ has been established that is advised by Richard Thaler. 
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governing outcomes. In the nudging scenario these are ‘bad’ life-style choices, such as 
the choice of sweets at the supermarket till. The ‘choice design’ that politicians have to 
contemplate, according to Thaler and Sunstein, operates similarly, only on a larger 
scale. 
Ideas of activity have been proposed in different ways, and a variety of strategies have 
been developed by political scientists and public policy practitioners. We have already 
suggested that such strategies correspond to features of the social and political domains 
where problems are identified that are seen to require measures of activation. Ideas of 
activity in the labour market, civic activity and political participation, and notions of 
socio-cultural activity, in particular of ethnic-minority groups that are invited to increase 
their contact with majority society (their ‘bridging capital’), are distinct for how they 
respond to particular social problems. They share the understanding that activity 
constitutes not only the most plausible response to social problems, but also that 
activation appears as the most suitable entry point for governmental intervention. The 
following three chapters develop these propositions in more contextual detail. While the 
critical engagement with different types of the politics of cohesion is a concern for the 
investigation of the three country cases too, the following section proposes some aspects 
of a critical perspective on the active society.  
The critique of activation 
A tension in governance discourse that has been identified before is also reflected in 
activation strategies. They appeal to the exercise of autonomy that can only produce 
desirable outcomes if it is severely channeled. This tension has not kept activity from 
becoming influential in public policy design. With ‘empowerment’, ‘nudging’, 
‘metagovernace’ or ‘network governance’, the previous discussion has introduced four 
recently prominent examples of how activity ideas have been used in theoretical 
advances that underpin practical suggestions for how society should be governed. While 
the diversity of ‘activating’ policy instruments and administrative practices makes it 
unfeasible to present an encompassing overview, the following considers some avenues 
towards a critical understanding of activation in ‘new governance’. We briefly discuss 
problems with the idea of ‘responsibility’ in activation before considering in some detail 
suggestions made by Stephan Lessenich, a German sociologist. We then turn to recent 
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work by Luc Boltanski, a French social theorist, who provides a pragmatic and 
minimalist foundation for the critique of social activation. 
Jørgen Elm Larsen (2005, 136) suggests that if there is anything that can be considered 
as characteristic of the idea of an ‘active society’ it is the notion of self-reliance, which 
has become a “dominating element in the reshaping of social policy”. Clearly, self-
reliance and responsibility are popular, but also problematic formulae that may support 
diverse measures and instruments in recent social policy reform. Jean-Michel Bonvin 
and Nicolas Farvaque (2004, 20) point to one aspect of the problematic implications of 
responsibility, which “without the provision of fair and enabling conditions … may lead 
to disastrous outcomes for people.” Bonvin elaborates on this in a critical discussion of 
responsibility in the politics of activation. The idea with responsibility is to pursue 
objectives that are, at a macro level, about “increasing the employment rates” and, at a 
micro level, about the acceleration of “reintegration into the labour market”: “This issue 
being settled, the challenge faced in social policies boils down to finding the most 
efficient modes of governance in order to promote such responsible behaviour among 
the local agents of the welfare state and the beneficiaries” (2008, 67). Drawing on 
Amartya Sen’s (1993) ‘capabilities’ approach, Bonvin argues that a considerable part of 
the instruments and practices pursued under the label of activation fall short of a 
meaningful understanding of responsibility. ‘Empowerment’, for example, is not by 
itself “sufficient to foster responsibility. Indeed, if a person adequately empowered is 
not free to use his or her capacity in the way s/he chooses to […], it still does not make 
sense to speak of responsible or irresponsible behaviour” (2008, 368). Apart from the 
absence of meaningful choice that might make the reference to responsibility seem 
hollow, there is a further problem with assumptions about responsibility in activation: 
these often involve the imposition of “one and the same conception of activation on all 
beneficiaries” (2008, 370). 
While a concern with the distribution of capabilities seems relevant, it does not quite 
address situations where it is not formulaic or insincere promises of activity that require 
examination, but where the very conditions that make social problems appear amenable 
to activity need to be examined. The imagination of ‘the social’ as a space and a 
configuration of social forces – in line with concerns outlined in the previous chapter – 
clearly needs to be of interest in how society, in its alleged ‘complexity’ and 
‘fragmentation’, has been perceived in the governance of activation. Considering the 
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‘activity turn’ as an instance of the ‘reinvention of the social’ (Neuerfindung des 
Sozialen), Stephan Lessenich (2008, 38) sees a reconfiguration of social relationships on 
three levels: “between individual and society, in the relationship between individual, 
collective and corporate actors, as well as in the way subjects relate to themselves”. 
Lessenich (2008, 17) notes how the activity idea takes up “subjective values of social 
conduct – activity and mobility, productivity and autonomy” and develops these into 
“formulas for political steering”.  
In their political deployments, Lessenich (2008, 76) suggests, activity, mobility and 
movement are not valued as such, but only if the according orientations are “considered 
to be beneficial to the social good, if they are exercised with a social intention”. “In the 
activating, preventive welfare state … the subjectivity of citizens is socialized, 
channelled for social aims and purposes, programmed in the spirit of the social” (2008, 
122). In how activity is exercised, a social point of view needs to be adopted and 
internalized. Unchanneled activity is considered problematic, and populations that are 
portrayed as work-averse or activation-resistant are targeted, and, more than this, 
considered as a threat to social cohesion (2008, 95). Practices of exemplary 
visualization play a significant role: ideally adapted individuals that master the 
vicissitudes of multiple activity requirements and cope with pressures even under 
adverse circumstances are introduced as the role models of the active society (2008, 
126). Their example underpins the reiteration of requirements of flexibility and 
adaptability in political rhetoric, in strategies of political marketing and in the media 
representation of desirable forms of social life. Significantly for Lessenich, the activity 
requirement is substantiated by new social imaginaries – by a ‘reinvention of the 
social’.  
A related perspective to Lessenich’s suggestion that a ‘reinvention of the social’ 
predisposes government in new ways, has been put forward by the French social 
theorist Luc Boltanski, working with Eve Chiapello, on the ‘projective city’ (or Project-
oriented Cité): 
In the Project-oriented Cité the general standard, with respect to which all 
persons’ and things’ greatness is evaluated, is activity. Contrary to what happens 
in the Industrial Cité—where activity means ‘work’ and being active means 
‘holding a steady and wage-earning position’—in the Project-oriented Cité, 
activity overcomes the oppositions between work and no-work, steady and 
unsteady, paid and unpaid, profit-sharing and volunteer work, and between that 
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which can be measured in terms of productivity and that which cannot be 
assessed in terms of accountable performances. Life is conceived as a series of 
projects, all the more valuable when different from one another. What is relevant 
is to be always pursuing some sort of activity, never to be without a project, 
without ideas, to be always looking forward to, and preparing for, something 
along with other persons whose encounter is the result of being always driven by 
the impulse of activity. (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005b, 169) 
Boltanski and Chiapello see the projective city in the context of a new spatial ordering 
of society. Where the conception of society as a system of needs and of welfare 
intervention envisaged ‘the social’ as a demarcated territory, the new conception is one 
of society as an open network in which points are variously connected. Individuals, in a 
networked space, are situated, move and relate to one another in a different way than 
how it was envisaged in the old spatial ordering of the post-war social economy and its 
“industrial city”. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005a, 105) suggest that the new social 
spatiality foregrounds the project as the aim of individual activity and as the organizing 
principle for the construction of networks. Projects are not individual endeavours; they 
are socially constituted. They are taken on relationally and their successful pursuit 
depends on one’s networked location in social spaces and on one’s ability to 
advantageously relate to others. Boltanski and Chiapello (2005a, 57) consider in 
particular the diffusion of management discourses that have been systematically 
extended in the last third of the 20th century and have been introduced as templates for 
social activity and the pursuit of individual lives.  
New maxims of success accompany the establishment of such a world and a new 
system of values is constructed on which people can rely to make judgments; to 
discriminate between behaviour that is satisfactory and behaviour that leads to 
exclusion; to put a value on qualities and attitudes that had not hitherto been 
identified as distinctive; to legitimate new positions of power; and to select those 
who are to enjoy them. (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005a, 105) 
The establishment of new hierarchies of social characters types, and new taxonomies for 
advantageous and detrimental dispositions in the pursuit of social activity, may, then, 
constitute a point of departure for the critique of the ‘projective city’ as well as of the 
governance of activation. In fact, Bonvin’s remark on differential capabilities for 
activity, and how these are frequently ignored in activation discourse, can be understood 
as a critique of how, with Boltanski and Chiapello, the generalization of the ‘projective 
city’ leads to unjust outcomes and creates new hierarchies. 
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Two critical orientations – one concerned with the biased nature of political practices of 
activation, the other with the social imaginary that makes activity appear plausible in the 
first place – are available, and the following will develop these in a brief and general 
discussion of critical perspectives. 
Luc Boltanski (2011) in On Critique has recently made suggestions that are particularly 
suitable for our purposes. If it intends to be more than an instantiation of normative 
ideals – more than discovery or invention as Michael Walzer (1987) has famously 
suggested in his Tanner Lectures on Interpretation and Social Criticism – the question 
for any critical practice is how to position itself vis-à-vis the practices it criticizes. In the 
pragmatic orientation that Boltanski advocates, it is justifications and the critical work 
that actors themselves engage in that has to provide this point of departure. Boltanski 
(2011, 16-7) suggests that the  
processes through which the actors in social life constitute the wholes of which 
they form part, and cause them to last or subvert them, are themselves 
articulated, in large measure, with the possibility of critique, not only when they 
challenge existing orders, but also when they are led to justify them.  
This means “making use of the point of view of the actors” for a critical position that is 
based on “their moral sense and, in particular, on their ordinary sense of justice, to 
expose the discrepancy between the social world as it is and as it should be in order to 
satisfy people’s moral expectations” (2011, 30). This position “fully acknowledges 
actors’ critical capacities and the creativity with which they engage in interpretation and 
action en situation” (2011, 43). This reliance on the critical capacities of actors would of 
course be open to the objection that it is not more than a simple reflection, an exercise 
of summarizing opinions and preferences. Boltanski’s position, however, is built on the 
rejection of the idea that there is an “implicit agreement, which would somehow be 
immanent in the functioning of social life” (2011, 6). He suggests putting ‘dispute’ and, 
with it, the divergence of points of view, interpretations and usages at the heart 
of social bonds, so as to return from this position to the issue of agreement, to 
examine its problematic, fragile and possibly exceptional character. (2011, 61) 
Disputes over meaning, the indeterminacy of understandings (such as of activity, 
cohesion, or society) and the interpretive work that actors themselves undertake, mean 
that critique remains challenging and in a position of ‘complex exteriority’ to its object 
(2011, 6). It does not formulate absolutes but makes propositions that resonate with the 
critical positions that are available in society. It takes seriously the fact that these 
84 
positions reflect indeterminate understandings and emerge themselves as interpretations. 
In this sense, Boltanski presents a more sociologically grounded formulation of ideas 
that Laclau (1990) and others working within the agonistic or radical democracy 
tradition have put forward (see Shapiro 2007): hegemonic meaning and fixed 
understandings, such as of society, require particular critical attention. 
From this pragmatically grounded position Boltanski makes suggestions on possible 
starting points for social critique. A sense of injustice, ordinarily available among social 
actors, appears to be based on the intuition that “it is always the same people who pass 
all or more tests, whatever their nature, and, on the other hand, … it is always the same 
people who, confronted with all tests (or virtually all), prove mediocre” (2011, 38, 
emphases in original).42
For the purpose of the following, this intuition will not be developed into a full-fledged 
framework. It merely serves to highlight that activity, as it becomes a general 
expectation and informs a framework for measuring individual worth, is open to be 
criticized for its injustice. The grounding of this intuition and the foundation for this 
understanding of justice are of less concern here. It may be based on attitudes among 
actors in response to their subjection to activation measures (though the thesis does not 
engage with such responses); on a mismatch between the promises of empowerment 
and a reality of coercion (though, arguably, this mismatch is present wherever social 
 For Boltanski (2011, 29), “a test is regarded as unjust by people 
when it takes account, invariably in implicit or hidden from, of forces that do not pertain 
to the kind of city in which the test is, in principle, inscribed”. The kinds of tests 
envisaged in the ‘projective city’ measure the capacity to network and connect. Such 
tests have become increasingly generalized and requirements of adaptation, creativity, 
networking and flexibility now apply to domains where other measurements of success 
and worth were previously inscribed. The hierarchies that this expansion creates, 
Boltanksi suggests, are reflected in the fact that it is always the same people that tend to 
assume inferior positions in the projective city’s hierarchy of worth. The critical 
intuition of injustice is, hence, based on the observation that new logics of social 
interaction, behaviour and conduct have become widespread.  
                                                 
42  Boltanski and Chiapello (2005a, 31) conceive of tests as contests of strength that occur within 
frameworks of “justificatory constraints”. Measurements of success or of fair play thus vary 
according to established rules governing the contest, and such frameworks differ, such as between 
the ‘industrial’ and the ‘projective city’. When “protagonists judge that these constraints are being 
genuinely respected, the test of strength will be regarded as legitimate.” (ibid., 32-3).  
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policy is made); or it may come from an engagement with how the politics of cohesion 
claims to be inevitable and activation the logical response to material social problems 
(though unmasking these pretensions does not mean repudiating them). In some form, 
such perspectives may provide some limited foundations for social critique, but none is 
without problems and aporias that are impossible to address within the scope of the 
following discussion.43
Conclusion 
 A more limited intuition may be sufficient. Stephan Lessenich 
(2005, 28) suggests that “who preaches activation and integration but practices 
precarisation and compulsion should be subjected, if not to political critique, then at 
least of social analysis.” In the politics of cohesion, biases of activation need to be 
examined, and social imaginaries that underpin measures of activation need to be 
exposed.  
The chapter has suggested that activation, beyond its role in labour market and welfare 
reform, informs new understandings of social regulation across issue areas and domains 
of social life. In relation to the turn towards governance in political science and in the 
public policy world, the idea is that social disintegration, or fragmentation and social 
complexity as the social imaginaries of ‘new governance’, need to be countered by 
heightened activity.  
The following analyses of prescriptions towards activity in the politics of cohesion will 
not be entirely straightforward. We should expect to find disjunctures and ambiguities 
among political initiatives that envisage the activation of populations. In fact, it will be 
necessary to consider the significance of activity as a rhetorical device that works not 
despite but because of such ambiguities. For example, the exhortation of populations to 
become active does not need to be – though it often is – accompanied by tangible and 
coherent policy measures to have an effect on the political debate and on the range of 
options that are available for addressing social problems. Significantly, the efficacy of 
activation measures in the politics of cohesion should also be considered for how it 
invalidates competing perspectives and objectives. With community cohesion, 
significant urban problems in Britain were conceived as requiring the remedy of 
                                                 
43   The overall conclusion offers some additional suggestions on the possibility of a social critique of 
the politics of cohesion. 
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flexibility, social contact and ‘vibrancy’. The plausibility of such prescriptions meant 
that different ideas and different analyses were considered implausible or impractical.  
A different aspect of this ambiguity is that activation often seems contradictory for how 
it simultaneously embodies an ideal that, in practice, is found to be lacking. Activation 
works with a certain anthropological circularity in how individuals are already 
conceived as those active subjects that measures are intended to produce. This 
circularity is mirrored in the social imaginary of cohesion and its characteristic 
coincidence of lack and fullness, or disintegration and unity. The ever-present 
possibility for society to disintegrate coincides with equally present potentialities for 
cohesiveness. Post-immigration groups in Britain are said to be deeply fragmented, 
separated from majority society and inward-looking. Simultaneously, they are also seen 
to be already exhibiting all the necessary ingredients for becoming vibrant and cohesive. 
Political apathy in Germany puts social and civic solidarity at risk but citizens are not 
just apathetic, they are also always already profoundly engaged and responsive to the 
Bürgergesellschaft idea. The moral crisis that Jacques Chirac invoked in 1995 contrasts 
with humane and moral potentials that were consistently invoked in his rhetoric of 
fracture sociale. In how these contrasts are drawn, activation is inserted as the plausible 
remedy to avert disintegration and achieve social cohesion. 
The following chapters trace the development of cohesion in these three instances and 
examine how ideas of social activity were linked to cohesion in the formation of 
political agendas. This means that we are largely unconcerned with the precise content 
of public policy measures towards social activity that were introduced. Instead, the 
focus of the following is on how, when cohesion came into the picture, social problems 
were considered as caused by insufficient activity. Subsequent chapters critically 
engage with how – where social cohesion was seen to be at risk – activity was 
introduced as a remedy.  
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Chapter 3: Exclusion and Cohésion Sociale  
Introduction 
By early 1995, the campaign for the succession of François Mitterand had taken a 
surprising turn. Against earlier expectations the President of the European Commission, 
Jacques Delors, had been hesitant to be drawn into its partisan quarrels. Lionel Jospin 
was widely regarded as the second-best choice for the candidacy to follow Mitterand for 
the Parti Socialiste (PS).44
With the vote divided on the centre right, both candidates played to their strengths. For 
Balladur this was the posture of the competent moderniser (Plenel 1994). Jacques 
Chirac, by contrast, would emphasise the ‘humane touch’, his particular concern not 
only for the material but also for the emotional well-being of the French. It was 
frequently repeated in Chirac’s campaign that this concern could not be expressed in the 
form of technocratic policy commitments but required a sense of compassion and 
proximity (Jarreau 1994). Chirac’s display of humane concern served to draw a contrast 
between his proximity to the people and Balladur’s distance (Chirac 1994; 2007).
 On the centre-right, the ambitions of Jacques Chirac, two-
time Prime Minister of 1974-76 and 1986-88 and then-mayor of Paris, had been 
frustrated by the candidacy of the sitting Prime Minister Édouard Balladur whose 
decision to run contradicted earlier assurances. In the beginning of 1995, Balladur was 
widely seen to be in a far better position than Chirac to claim the presidency for the 
RPR (Rassemblement pour la république) (Bernard 2005, 94).  
45
Already before the first round of the presidential election, Chirac, Balladur and Jospin 
had committed themselves to new political measures in the fight against exclusion 
sociale.
  
46
                                                 
44  In November 1994 Jospin himself acknowledged that Delors would be the ‘most efficient 
candidate for the left’ (Le Monde 1994b) 
 While Jospin had made the most far-reaching and tangible policy 
45  This was despite Chirac’s conventional biography that included the usual career steps of members 
of the French administrative elite and, more significantly, a liberal reformist record as a Prime 
Minister in the 1980s. 
46  Although notions such as exclusion and cohesion are shared, there are considerable difficulties in 
translating social policy concepts from French into English without loosing some of the meaning 
particular to the French traditions of social policy language or falsely implying its continuity with 
English discourses (Révauger 2001). Jean-Paul Révauger remarks that “[p]roblems start when the 
concepts are expected to bear some relationship with nations in which they neither do not exist, or 
have a totally meaning altogether” (Révauger 1998, 37). Unless otherwise indicated, this chapter 
acknowledges the French original and does not rely on the assumption of a one-to-one fit between 
the two languages.  
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commitments, such as on “ending homelessness” within two years (Le Monde 1995a), 
the two candidates on the right had also promised to move rapidly ahead with plans, 
laws and policies to tackle exclusion sociale (Le Monde 1994a; Castaing 1995). With 
Balladur narrowly eliminated in the first round, the debate between Chirac and Jospin 
continued to be concerned with exclusion. Jean-Marie Le Pen, the right-wing populist, 
had achieved an unprecedented 15% in the first round of the election. The disaffection 
of the French electorate, alleged to have been the cause for the far right’s success, was 
drawn into the debate and connected to diagnoses of social exclusion. Chirac, in a 
televised debate with Jospin, thus claimed that a 
very large number of French people find themselves in an uncomfortable 
situation. They are unhappy for various reasons. They feel a little bit excluded 
(un peu exclus). This is a diagnosis that I have put forward for some time now 
and that translates itself into a social rift (fracture sociale) that puts into question 
the cohesion of our country and thus its strength. Reducing this rift, this is the 
essential problem. This means considering people’s everyday difficulties: let’s 
get back to this, and offer them solutions.  (Chirac cited in Le Monde 1995b) 
In the programmatic manifesto for his campaign, La France pour tous, Chirac (1994, 9-
11) elaborated on this idea of a social rift: 
France suffers from more profound ill than political actors, those responsible for 
the economy, the intellectuals that are en vogue or media celebrities can 
imagine. The people have lost confidence. Their uncertainty (désarroi) leads to 
resignation; it risks inciting anger. All the indicators reveal the symptoms but no 
therapy has been prescribed because too many of those who are responsible 
concern themselves with indicators and forget about the people. But numbers 
themselves do not express the gravity of the social rift (fracture sociale) that 
menaces – I choose my words carefully – our national unity. More than half of 
the French population has neither been listened to nor defended.  
Those themes, the rejection of conventional, ‘technocratic’ means for addressing social 
problems, and the offer of an alternative politics that would provide for certainty and 
security, emotional understanding and proximity to the people, ran through the rhetoric 
of Chirac’s campaign.  
In the context of the debate in 1994 and 1995, Chirac had embraced the notion of social 
exclusion, effectively captured a particular understanding when he made fracture 
sociale the guiding theme of his campaign and outmanoeuvred both Balladur and 
Jospin.47
                                                 
47  The philosopher Marcel Gauchet (1990) had prominently coined fracture sociale in relation to the 
success of the far right Front National. Emmanuel Todd, a sociologist, then popularized the term 
 Balladur had to commit himself to an objective that seemed implausible for 
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him, since it sat uneasily with his persona and his liberal-reformist policy record as 
Prime Minister (Plenel 1994). Jospin faced a different problem, summed up by Bertrand 
Delanoë, leader of the Socialists in the Parisian assembly:  
It is difficult to effectively oppose a mayor [Chirac] who has taken such a turn to 
the left (se gauchise). We need to explain to Parisians the difference between 
one set of decisions, some of which correspond to our demands, and others that 
are mere tactical manoeuvres that correspond to provisional measures (coups 
corespondant à des mesures provisoires). (Bertrand Delanoë cited in Chirot 
1994)48
Faced with Chirac’s gauchisme, Jospin responded defensively. He argued that “the fight 
against exclusion is not only a priority for the right; it is also one for me. I have always 
stood for the values of justice, equality, solidarity, we have not seen Jacques Chirac 
identify with these kinds of things in his political career” (cited in Le Monde 1995b).  
 
In the context of political debate in 1995, the attempt to reclaim exclusion for the left 
turned out to be difficult. The earlier slogan of Jospin’s campaign, la France unie 
(France united), was substituted for une France plus juste (a fairer France) (Emmanuelli 
and Frémontier 2002). Jospin’s definition of exclusion as injustice had to compete with 
Chirac’s more encompassing definition of exclusion as insecurity and as notion that 
could be related to various dimensions of a perceived malaise in French society and its 
psychological dimensions.49
In French political discourse of 1995, the concept of social exclusion was both 
pervasive and exceedingly ambiguous. It had been multiply defined, in relation to 
tangible social problems, unemployment, homelessness, the situation in the banlieues, 
the agglomerates on the urban margins, but also with a view to anxieties over social 
disintegration, downward mobility and national decline (Lenoir 1974; Barbier 2005). 
Jacques Chirac, while gesturing to the first dimension of the concept, effectively 
 Chirac’s offer was one of proximity and emotional 
understanding. Jospin’s solution, by contrast, was to adopt new social policy measures, 
which Chirac had already denounced – with his critique of the ‘technocratic’ orientation 
in French politics – as insufficient to address the problem at hand. 
                                                                                                                                               
and it is presumably from Todd that Jacques Chirac borrowed the concept. Todd, however, was 
critical of Chirac’s reference to fracture sociale (Ferenczi 1995) 
48  The occasion was Chirac’s suggestion to introduce a set of progressive housing measures in favour 
of homeless people, such as the requisition of unoccupied properties.  
49 This was at a time when there was considerable anxiety on the French Left on the orientation of 
welfare policies. Martine Aubry, for example, suggested that the Parti Socialiste needed to 
rediscover “proximity” in the provision of social services  (Le Monde 1994a). 
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captured the second, such as when he suggested that “the loss of hope constitutes the 
greatest social risk” (Chirac cited in Le Monde 1994) or that the “relative and precarious 
calm of today is a mere result of the fear of tomorrow” (Chirac 1994, 47). Chirac’s 
adoption of the concept of fracture sociale effectively defined idea of social exclusion 
in relation to widespread anxieties, which he alleged to be characteristic of the French 
condition in the 1990s.  
This chapter is concerned with the discursive and legislative aftermath of these 
exchanges. The year 1995 marked the beginning of a series of efforts to legislate 
against exclusion and for a theme that had not been central in course of the election, 
cohésion sociale. In the following years, social cohesion became the headline title of 
social policy initiatives. The formation of these initiatives is traced here with particular 
reference to discourses among prominent politicians that accompanied two legislative 
efforts in 1997 and 2004/5. The suggestion is that these initiatives reflect changing 
concerns about the meaning of social solidarity in France. The re-interpretation of 
exclusion sociale and the introduction of cohésion sociale were part of a shift of 
concerns towards the reliance on social activity and indicative of a “trend towards social 
activation” (Palier 2005, 139). Republican solidarity is increasingly seen to entail the 
emphasis on generalized individual responsibility, mobility and social activity. 
In relation to these changes, which this chapter explores only in a cursory fashion, there 
are three features that are of particular interest. First, and in line with the core theme of 
the thesis, the commitment to cohésion sociale can be understood as a commitment to 
solve social problems through activation. While the mobilisation for social cohesion 
was frequently seen to require “social investment” (Emmanuelli 1997; Chirac 2004b), it 
increasingly refers to attitudinal changes on the part of problematic populations: the 
unemployed who need to make themselves employable; welfare recipients who need to 
be activated; young people who need to pull their act together; and the inhabitants of the 
banlieues who – such as in the debate about the causes of urban unrest in 2005 – were 
asked to become more French, less Muslim, more productive and less violent. 
Second, new ideas about the capacity and scope of policy-making became evident. The 
time between 1995 and 2005, that is between Chirac’s marketing of fracture sociale and 
the urban unrest of 2005, can be seen to exemplify for France what Jürgen Habermas 
(1989, 68) has referred to as the “departure of the utopian contents of the laboring 
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society”. Commentators suggest that with the declining significance and increasing 
precariousness of the salaried, industrial workforce, the promise of social improvement 
through labour or through the mechanisms of the welfare state has become hollow. 
Jacques Donzelot (2006) suggest that progrès social (social progress) has been replaced 
by cohésion sociale, and the aspiration to improve society has been substituted by 
measures that target and mobilize marginalized populations. The preservation of social 
cohesion is what is left as other, more demanding projects came to be seen as outdated. 
We explore this shift and how it relates to new definitions of political objectives in a 
review of the French literature on the so-called nouvelle question sociale (Donzelot 
1994; Castel 1995; Rosanvallon 1995). 
Third, while the understanding of social inclusion (or, frequently, insertion in French 
policy language) often continues to be considered as a matter of solidarity and legal 
entitlement, there are conspicuous changes in how the nature of such solidarities is 
conceived. The mediating discourse for identifying who belongs within a French model 
of collective solidarity appears to have shifted. In the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, 
the predominant domain where such discourses are carried out has become national 
identity (Besson 2009; Sarkozy 2009). The notion of cohésion sociale, it will be 
claimed in this chapter, has proven to be a vehicle for moving the debate in these 
directions. This became particularly palpable in how the account of exclusion sociale 
was not applied to understand episodes of urban unrest in 2005 or, more generally, 
social problems in the French banlieues.  
While the following chapters explore the problematic nature of civil society in the 
German discourse of Bürgergesellschaft and aspects of the debate about the social 
integration of ethnic minority groups in Britain, this chapter is concerned with French 
discourses of social marginality and solidarity. In contrast to the other two cases, the 
following investigates the policy discourse of a centre-right president 1995-2005.50
                                                 
50  It effectively brackets the contribution of a socialist government in the Troisième Cohabitation of 
1997-2002.  
 
While this may seem somewhat peculiar, it is our suggestion that Jacques Chirac falls 
squarely in a field also occupied by Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair. Chirac’s (1994, 
19-29) presentation of his persona and his policies as ‘beyond left and right’ coincides 
with and resembles the discovery of the middle ground in the Third Way or the Neue 
Mitte.  
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In relation to the policy priorities of fracture sociale, Chirac positioned himself 
accordingly: “I don’t know if these are left- or right-wing objectives. In any case, they 
are mine” (quoted in Emmanuelli and Frémontier 2002, para. 2). While on social policy 
grounds there was little programmatic overlap between Jospin’s PS government 1997-
2002 and Tony Blair’s New Labour, Chirac’s political and rhetorical commitments 
resonated across the Channel (Lawday 2002). In addition to a similar rhetoric, it is the 
creative work on new social imaginaries to underpin and market political proposals that 
point to how Jacques Chirac and his administrations should be of interest in comparison 
to the agendas explored in the following chapters. Such imaginaries, as their 
counterparts in Germany and Britain, are introduced as a departure from traditional 
conceptions of social solidarity towards notions of social activation and responsibility.  
This chapter provides a selective account and little more than a snapshot of a moving 
picture of shifting political commitments. Indeed, the cap social, the social orientation 
of French governments and the social course of action in French public policy-making, 
continue to be debated.51
traditional dirigiste strategy of directing capital while excluding and neglecting 
labor has been abandoned. State authorities are striving instead to facilitate 
market-led adjustment while pacifying and demobilizing potential victims in this 
process. In a sense, the dirigiste state has become the social anesthesia state. 
 Political analysts point to profound transformations, such as 
Jonah D. Levy (2005, 104), who suggests that the 
While such transformations seem important to consider, they depend on political 
initiatives to be articulated in practice. Despite their fluidity, it is significant to examine 
such debates and how the conceptual repertories of social policy are re-framed for the 
simple reason, as Révauger (1998, 30) puts it for France, that “concepts convey 
meanings, they organize reality in our minds and eventually lead to a restricted set of 
political options. Understanding concepts should help citizens keep their options open.” 
This is particularly the case for France, which has been an incubator for ideas of social 
exclusion and social cohesion. In fact, a new terminology of social marginality, 
precarité, marginalité and exclusion, was coined in France since the 1970s. The 
                                                 
51  Such as when the former Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin in the context of wide-spread 
protests against pension reform in October 2010 prompts Sarkozy to consider a ‘social relaunch’ 
(un plan de relance sociale) and when the speculation is that Jean-Louis Borloo, the current 
Secretary for the Environment, might be the right person to instantiate this nouveau cap social 
(Agence France Presse 2010). Borloo, as minister for social cohesion, had been the leading 
protagonist of Jacques Chirac’s social relaunch in 2004/5 and his role is examined in some more 
detail below.  
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identification of new forms of poverty, its articulation in a new language and the pursuit 
of policies of insertion make France an international frontrunner in the pursuit of a 
politics of social cohesion.52
Social policy-making, however, is imperfectly understood if the concern is only with 
terminological change. Social imaginaries may provide for projections of society as 
endangered and facilitate the propositions of political remedies that are introduced as 
salvaging operations. The changing meaning of social exclusion and new political 
priorities towards social cohesion are discussed here with an interest in how they 
coincide with and support a reinterpretation of republican solidarity and a turn towards 
social activation. 
 
A new social question 
Changing conceptions of society have in recent years been of significant historical 
interest in France, and the following briefly reviews a literature that attempts to 
historically reconstruct the beginnings of social concerns, of a social question, in the 
19th century. In this literature, in particular in the work of Jacques Donzelot (1980; 
1994), Robert Castel (1995; 2003) and Pierre Rosanvallon (1995), it is usually 
suggested that what we witness today, since the beginning of the fourth quarter of the 
20th century, is a reformulation of an old question and the emergence of new social 
concerns. It is necessary here to briefly consider this historical account and its relevance 
for social debates in the 1990s. However, while the shift that Donzelot and others bring 
out corresponds to our concerns, we suggest that a more thorough emphasis is needed 
on how the new social question is formulated and becomes effective in political 
discourse. 
Jacques Donzelot traces the beginnings of a modern idea of ‘the social’, as something 
that requires management (faire du social), in the context of France’s post-revolutionary 
democratic enfranchisement. The poverty of the masses, pauperism, became an issue 
not merely with industrialization but with the emergence of new social subjects, whose 
needs it was necessary to administer in a coherent system of social management - not 
least as those subjects had become voters (Donzelot 1980, 54). Robert Castel (1995), 
who is more interested in the role of labour, traces in rich genealogical detail how 
                                                 
52  More than a decade before the British government would reconsider its social policy-making to 
combat 'social exclusion' (Levitas 1998), exclusion sociale was a key motif in French social policy. 
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conceptions of social problems corresponded to the kinds of discoveries that Donzelot 
describes. The emergence of a large-scale salaried workforce in the 19th century, he 
suggests, meant that social problems were conceived in relation to the conditions of this 
workforce, the salariat. The ‘old social question’ was thus about the pauperism of the 
salaried and strategies of social improvement made use of a system of professional 
solidarity to gradually improve the condition of labour in society. For their civic status 
and their social needs, Donzelot and Castel suggest, the condition of the industrial 
workforces provided the starting point of the formulation of social concerns, in fact for 
the invention of society (see Chapter 1), and for how these concerns were encapsulated  
in the institutions of the welfare state. 
The ‘crumbling’ of the salaried workforce (l’effritement de la condition salarielle) 
(Castel 1995a, 621, 704) since the 1970s has changed the picture. Castel identifies three 
features of the transitions that throw up a ‘new social question’: the destabilisation of 
previously stable modes of work and life (déstabilisation des stables), the emergence of 
precarious forms of employment, and the lack of available social positions for those that 
have been excluded and marginalized. This, Castel suggests, is not merely a process that 
affects those on the margins, but leads to more general transformations in society. 
In the same manner that the pauperism of the 19th century was written into the 
heart of dynamics of the first industrialisation, the new precarious condition of 
work is a central process, driven by new exigencies of techno-economic 
evolution of modern capitalism. (Castel 1995, 661-2) 
This change is accompanied by “the passage from politics conducted in the name of 
integration towards politics in the name of insertion” (Castel 1995, 675). Integration 
was about the establishment of a social equilibrium by offering “universal access to 
public services and education, reduction of social inequality and an improved 
distribution of opportunities, the development of social protection and the consolidation 
of the salaried condition” (Castel 1995a, 676). Insertion, by contrast, is targeted at 
“particular populations in particular zones” (ibid).53
                                                 
53  Hilary Silver (1994, 542) states that integration and insertion are used “synonymously” in French 
social policy discourse. Daniel Béland suggests, by contrast, that insertion refers to a 
“participatory model of ‘activation’” (Béland 2007, 129). The meaning of the concept of insertion 
itself, for how it responds to changing conceptions of social exclusion, has shifted over time, and 
so have policy measures against exclusion and towards insertion. In English, inclusion, rather than 
social integration, would probably be a more appropriate translation of insertion. 
 Particular populations have become 
the focus of new governmental attention and new objects of a type of concern that 
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considers their insertion as a task that requires perpetual efforts. Castel (1995, 699) 
identifies these populations as follows: 
What is a permanently inserted? Someone who is not completely abandoned, 
who is being accompanied in his or her present situation by a net of activities, 
initiatives, projects that is woven around him/her. … For many of such people, 
insertion is not a stage but a permanent condition.  
The new social question considers how to incorporate socially marginalized populations 
in a society that lacks old avenues of upward mobility through wage labour.  This new 
social question, Castel suggests, is answered with activity. Activation, under the 
conditions outlined by Castel, consists not merely of a one-off push but, as he puts it, in 
the meticulous “construction of a set of projects and initiatives” (ibid.) around the 
marginalized. Insertion in this sense is no longer a temporary stage but a permanent 
condition (l'insertion n'est plus une étape, elle est un état) (ibid.). The following 
suggests that in the political debate of the 1990s, not beginning with, but certainly 
reinforced by Chirac’s 1995 campaign, the turn towards this understanding of insertion 
was accelerated.54
Castel’s critique of the politics of insertion has not been met with general agreement. 
Pierre Rosanvallon, for example, has pointed to similar structural transformations but 
has offered a more positive evaluation of the politics of insertion. For Rosanvallon 
(1995, 222), the ‘new social question’ arises in a situation where the “classic opposition 
between individual and collective is no longer workable. We can no longer distinguish 
between the reform of mentalities and of structures, between individual morality and 
political imperatives”. His suggestion is that politics needs to take account of and be 
concerned with the shaping of “mentalities”. For Rosanvallon, the appeal to individual 
responsibility needs to become part of new political strategies. 
  
Rosanvallon argues that this implies a reconsideration of the idea of social rights and to 
a perspective on exclusion that is different from the rights-based, republican one. 
The obligation that accompanies them [social rights] is not a form of the 
restriction of liberty, but a moment of the reconstruction of the social. We can 
                                                 
54  The ‘new social question’ certainly corresponds to the analysis of Boltanski and Chiapello (2005b, 
169) of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ and how its defining feature has become “the impulse of 
activity”, that is to “never to be without a project, without ideas, to be always looking forward to, 
and preparing for” (ibid.).  
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see here that the notion of insertion makes us radically reconsider the 
organisational principles of individualist society. (Rosanvallon 1995, 181)55
The influential contributions by Rosanvallon and Castel are characteristic of the state of 
French academic debate in 1995 for how they identify structural changes that are seen to 
have occurred over the last decades. Their suggestion is that the breakdown of 
conventional models of social welfare – as they had been devised in response to the 
‘first social question’ – reveals a new social question, which is met by a turn towards 
insertion understood as social activation. Castel criticizes the corresponding measures, 
in particular for how they systematically fail to consider that inclusion into the 
workforce has little to offer since the industrial base for this workforce has been 
dismantled and, accordingly, since the promise of upward social mobility through 
inclusion into the salariat has disappeared. Rosanvallon acknowledges these 
transformations but, in contrast to Castel, embraces the new measures of insertion that 
have been devised in response.  
 
Before we proceed with a discussion of how the ‘new social question’ was portrayed in 
political discourse of the 1990s, it is important to point out that both Rosanvallon and 
Castel paid little attention to one of the core concerns of this thesis. Both consider the 
failure of the old social model as empirically given. However, it seems that the 
experience of this failure is not exclusively sustained by a neutral consideration of 
changing material conditions. It is a discursive phenomenon, where the breakdown of 
an old order is invoked and connected to the promises that new social imaginaries are 
said to hold. For example, Chirac’s diagnosis of fracture sociale drew strongly on the 
construction of an experience of crises that was sustained, as we suggest in the 
following, by the reference to the trente glorieuses. Although this reference pointed to 
structural transformations in the French economy, the idea of a crisis in the aftermath of 
these thirty years of post-war prosperity was constructed in a particular way. It allowed 
for the introduction of new visions of social solidarity as a counterpoint. The following 
section explores these connections and how they informed discourses of social 
exclusion. 
                                                 
55  The need to rethink principles of social solidarity and social cohesion, as suggested by 
Rosanvallon, mirrors the rhetoric of the Third Way. It predates for example Gidddens’ suggestion 
that lives need to be lived “in a more active way” and “individual and collective responsibilities” 
rebalanced (Giddens 1998, 37). In fact, Rosanvallon’s interpretation mirrors how community 
cohesion was introduced, such as when he speaks of the need to “reconstruct the social bond” 
(Rosanvallon 1995, 187). 
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Social exclusion in the republican context 
The fit of the French social model to conventional classifications of welfare state 
regimes, such as to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential conception of ‘welfare 
worlds’, is not our concern here. Neither are we primarily interested in the French 
trajectory, its particular brand of liberalism, neoliberalism or social democracy (see 
Prasad 2005 for a comprehensive discussion). Not even the republican self-conception, 
it has been suggested, is necessarily a useful conceptual tool for a precise understanding 
of French social policy. Republican ideals, however, serve as a point of reference with 
“nearly magical functions” (Révauger 2006, 117). They provide a frame of reference in 
political debate not despite of but for their very ambiguity. This section considers some 
elements of how republican principles have shaped perceptions of social solidarity and 
have been deployed in French presidential politics. 
Ambiguities of solidarity 
As an ideal, the republican self-conception contains the commitment to universalism 
that partially underpinned social exclusion discourse in the 1980s and 90s. Understood 
as instances of exclusion sociale, poverty or homelessness were portrayed as a scandal 
not just for how they caused human suffering, but for how they constituted a breach of 
the universalist promise. These conceptions are sustained by the idea of the republic as a 
particular space of connectedness, notably one where the state and its institutions are in 
charge of redeeming the promises of republican citizenship. In principle, the state has to 
make empirical realities, which usually involve a good deal of poverty or homelessness, 
live up to the rhetoric of republican universality (Silver 1994). Significantly, however, 
this commitment does not need to correspond to programmes of redistribution, welfare, 
or the material alleviation of poverty. Jacque Chirac’s commitment to fighting exclusion 
sociale also fit a description of republican solidarity. It put emphasis on ideals of 
togetherness but suggested psychological and moral remedies. Republican solidarity 
constitutes an argumentative resource with considerable force, but one that is open to 
interpretation and allows for various prescriptions as to how ambiguous ideals should 
inform political practice.  
The ambiguity of republican solidarity applies not only to positive conceptions of 
French solidarity, but also to its various problematisations. The binding ties of French 
society, its liens sociaux, have been seen to be at risk in different ways in French 
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political history. For example, where these ties were seen to be at risk, it is difficult, as 
Révauger (2006, 117) suggests, to separate an ethos of civic solidarity from cultural or 
ethno-national sentiments. In times of national crises, such as in 1871 or in the Dreyfus 
affair, definitions of republican belonging are usually difficult to distinguish for whether 
they rely on republican universalism or on ethno-cultural nationalism. Recent attempts 
to give French national identity a firmer grounding exemplify how the two themes 
intermingle, such as when Nicolas Sarkozy introduced a grand débat on French national 
identity and spoke of a “profound unity in our culture, and I dare say, in our 
civilization” (Sarkozy 2009). The potentials of national solidarity are open to be 
appropriated in different ways, by ethno-national parochialists, by moralizing Gaullists, 
by liberal reformists, as well as by the left.  
Historically, this ambiguity informed the terms of French constitutions and provided a 
context for how political institutions, such as the office of the President of the Republic, 
have been defined. The constitution of the 4th Republic provided a strong commitment 
to the “solidarity and equality of all French people” notably by embracing a right to 
employment, strong representative rights for workers, and far-ranging social rights 
(Pickles 1955). Its interpretation of the requirements of republican solidarity mirrored 
widespread sentiments of post-war reconstruction in Europe. They could at this 
particular moment draw on a confluence of republican and socialist themes, where the 
collective appropriation of the political and economic centres of society became a 
priority. The Gaullist tradition in the 5th Republic, by contrast, proved more flexible in 
how it conceived of the unity the Republic. Rather than basing solidarity on 
redistribution and social rights, it focused on a moral unity of purpose. Chirac’s appeal 
to fracture sociale can be understood within this tradition. 
Presidential concerns 
These understandings of republican solidarity have not meant that particular notions of 
social integration or cohesion were codified in the beginnings of the 5th Republic. Such 
concerns, we suggest, emerged in how political actors defined their roles in the political 
system. The concepts of social cohesion and social exclusion are both absent from the 
1958 constitution. Here, France is defined as an “indivisible, secular, democratic and 
social republic” (Conseil Constitutionnel 1958). Article 5 defines the role of the 
President as being concerned with the “continuity of the state” the guarantee of 
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“national independence, of the integrity of the territory and of respect for treaties”. 
Article 16 reaffirms the significance of “territorial integrity” and gives the President 
extraordinary powers for its safeguard in emergency situations. Securité sociale is 
written into various articles. Beyond this broad commitment, the concern for social 
affairs, however, remains an administrative and technical task that does not fit the 
intended purview of the supercharged presidency as it was introduced in 1958. In fact, 
the constitution does not envisage a significant role for the President of the Republic in 
relation to social matters. His role is to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the French nation, sitting above mundane domestic affairs (Bell 2000).  
This has not kept successive presidents from reinterpreting this role. In his New Year’s 
address for 1961, Charles de Gaulle, for example, accorded a central place to the 
imperative of maintaining cohésion nationale. The occasion was the ultimately 
unsuccessful coup d’état of retired generals, led by Maurice Challe, in Algeria. In light 
of the Algerian war of independence, and recurrent domestic strife that had brought the 
4th Republic to its collapse, de Gaulle stated that in light of  “theoretical preferences, 
particular interests, partisan attachments”, cohésion nationale had never been more 
necessary (De Gaulle 1960). It is not only the indivisibility of the territory, as it was 
introduced as a presidential concern in 1958, that Charles de Gaulle tried to capture, but 
the factionism and partisanship in French society. The addressees for his speech were 
most conspicuously the pieds noir, French-Algerian colonials and their political and 
military leadership and supporters in the army, who in the late 50s and early 60s fought 
a disruptive rearguard action against decolonialisation. In 1960/61, with the Fifth 
Republic in place, de Gaulle faced little problems quelling the right wing-insurrection 
against Algerian independence. However, in a situation where the ‘indivisibility of the 
territory’ was seen to depend on the resolution of internal strife, the domain of 
presidential concern could be extended from the preservation of national sovereignty 
towards that of national unity and social peace. 
De Gaulle’s interventions in the early 5th Republic illustrate how institutional 
ambiguities, as well as ambiguous understandings of national cohesion and social peace, 
facilitated new interpretations of political roles. This extension would proceed and take 
on new forms in the course of the 1970s and 80s. In 1986, faced with an opposing 
majority in the Assemblée Nationale, François Mitterand directly claimed presidential 
responsibility for the guarantee of cohésion sociale (David 2004). This was at a time 
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when a supra-national rhetoric of cohésion, not least under the influence of French 
officials in Strasbourg and Brussels, had emerged and when the Single European Act 
introduced the notion of social cohesion as a European objective (see Atkinson 2008). 
Clearly, social concerns had become more salient in political debate (Cole 2006, 100). 
Faced with the unprecedented situation of cohabitation, Mitterand’s claim of 
responsibility for cohesion was not least a symbolic sign of his unwillingness to yield 
the domain of social concerns to the Gaullist majority in the National Assembly and to 
the liberal Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (Cole 1997, 41-2). Mitterand publicly 
received railway workers that were on strike against the reformist economic policies of 
Chirac, who had not discovered his moralizing inclinations at this point (Noblecourt 
1995).56
The office of the president, Mitterand’s intervention implied, needed to be concerned 
with more than the sovereign indivisibility of the French territory that was 
constitutionally mandated, but also with the indivisibility of its social fabric. This 
extension of the domain of presidential concern from sovereignty to social solidarity 
proved to be of significance. At the moment when, due to cohabitation, the president’s 
control over social matters decreased dramatically, Mitterand’s intervention had the 
effect of creating a symbolic counterpoint to the alleged irresponsibility of Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac’s legislative agenda of liberal economic reform. Its 
destructiveness could be contrasted with the impartial concern of the president watching 
over and working towards social unity. The introduction of cohésion sociale as a 
political and presidential concern in the 1980s thus owes to the peculiar distribution of 
governmental roles and powers. In this manner, Mitterand had introduced a template 
that Chirac would follow in the period that is of concern in this chapter.
  
57
                                                 
56 Chirac showed some appreciation of this episode and later suggested that in 1986 he started to 
understand the possibilities of the presidency (Gurrey 2007). 
 
57  The similarity of the president’s role in safeguarding the ‘continuity of the state’ and the new 
rhetoric vis-à-vis social affairs is instructive. Jean-Baptiste de Foucauld, head of the Commissariat 
Général du Plan (CGP) (cited in Colombani 1993) remarked that exclusion “has to be considered 
as a veritable internal threat and treated with the same mobilization of forces as external threats.” 
Not just as an emergency response vis-à-vis threats, but also regarding ‘softer’ remedies, there is 
an interesting convergence between international and domestic concerns. This is conspicuous, for 
example, in the “urgent humanitarian action” that was seen to be required in the fight against 
exclusion sociale as well as in the role of experts of international aid (Xavier Emmanuelli of 
Médecins sans frontières for example) in the formulation of social policy programmes.  
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Two dimensions of exclusion 
Around the time of the first cohabitation (1986-8) social exclusion had not been 
operationalized in a way that would make fracture sociale appear a convincing response 
to the problems at hand. The two discourses of social exclusion that Chirac artfully 
connected in 1995, one based on and concerned with material social problems, the other 
psychologistic, emotive and moralizing, would only be developed in the late 1980s and 
early 90s. In the following, we consider and reconstruct those two understandings of 
exclusion sociale.  
Exclusion and the psychic disposition of the French  
Structural transformations in the French economy since the mid-1970s, we have 
suggested, were seen to have brought about a new social question. Such transformations 
have also been captured with the notion of the trente glorieuses, the thirty years of 
growth and prosperity after the Second World War, that, with the economic crisis in the 
early 1970s, were seen to have come to an end.  
The notion of Thirty Glorious Years has become somewhat of a commonplace in 
French political discourse. It was coined by Jean Fourastié (1979) in his Les Trente 
Glorieuses ou la révolution invisible. Fourastié’s account went beyond a description of 
socio-economic change. He was concerned with the adverse effects of this change on 
the psychic dispositions of the French population. In particular, Fourastié pointed to the 
sense of entitlement that had allegedly emerged in a situation of post-war prosperity. 
This sense was expressed by Fourastié called morosité, an emotional and psychological 
dislocation that was seen to have occurred as a result of frustrated expectations. Such 
frustrations are expressed in a sense of uncertainty: “People today, and in particular 
adolescents, are characterized by an instability that leads them to pass from vague and 
undefined hopes … to the fear of a world that is immense and brutal” (Fourastié 1979, 
246).  
These emotional and psychological disruptions had led to an inability to cope with 
structural change. The problem with the trente glorieuses is not merely that the “easy 
times are over” (Fourastié 1979, 255), but that they have left a fatal and immobilizing 
imprint on the French collective psyche. Fourastié (1979, 268-9) suggested as much, 
namely that “we have slowly neglected and then forgotten the real conditions of 
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happiness: individual efforts, a coherent, realistic and friendly (chaleureuse) conception 
of the world, of life and of the human condition.”   
To some extent, this diagnosis corresponds to a more general discourse of declining 
national standing that resembles the “post-colonial melancholia” that Paul Gilroy (2004) 
sees at work in Britain.58
In 1995, this recollection of the trente glorieuses informed the rhetoric of Chirac’s 
campaign. With regard to the security and prosperity of the 1960s and 70s, he suggested 
that  
 Whether it is the structural transformation of the French 
economy and pressures on the welfare state, or a sense of cultural or moral decline: 
problems are considered to be the result of a psychological blockade and this feeling of 
immobilisme is introduced as a result of collective delusions in face of changing global 
realities.  
this society doesn’t exist anymore. The one of the 90s is moving, fractioned. It 
needs to be managed by letting go of old reflexes (en faisant table rase des vieux 
reflexes). The intellectual effort that is needed for this renewal is considerable: it 
doesn’t come from technicians. It is the role of the political power to bring it 
about without ignoring the burdens of entrenched habits and psychological 
resistance. (Chirac 1994, 41) 
Chirac’s appeal to exclusion sociale thus channelled a sense of loss that was expressed 
in the recollection of post-war prosperity. Chirac captured this loss with his reference to 
fracture sociale and defined this social rift in relation to a sense of uncertainty and 
confusion allegedly pervading the French population. This loss, he suggested, had 
debilitating consequences and led to uncertainty and immobilisme, a prominent motif of 
Chirac’s rhetoric (1994; 2007, 81, 219, 230, 272, etc.). Exclusion, defined in relation to 
this sense of uncertainty, differed considerably from an understanding that drew 
attention to tangible situations of social marginalization, poverty or homelessness. For 
Chirac, feeling “un peu exclus” (Chirac cited in Le Monde 1995) was a characteristic 
condition of all French people, whether they were socially marginalized or not. It 
manifested itself, he suggested, in a resistance to embrace social change and in general 
social inactivity.  
                                                 
58  Gilroy suggests that elusive ideas about national grandeur are channeled into a regressive 
parochialism. This analysis can to seen to apply to the recent grand débat on French national 
identity, prominently driven by Nicolas Sarkozy (2009) and Eric Besson (2009), who pointed to 
reinvigorated patriotism as a remedy to a widespread sentiment of national decline. 
103 
Exclusion and ‘urgent humanitarian action’ 
A second discourse of social exclusion dates back to the 1970s when it was defined, 
largely, in conjunction with the discovery of a ‘new social question’ (Paugam 1996; 
Goguel d'Allondans 2003). Its introduction was marked by a certain surprise about how, 
even in situations of full employment, unprecedented wealth, expansive welfare 
programmes and new entitlements, parts of the population remained on the social 
margins. Different from the more encompassing definition propagated by Chirac, les 
exclus are conceived as those within remaining ‘pockets’ of poverty. This is, for 
example, the suggestion of René Lenoir who pioneered this perspective of the concept 
in relation to variously marginalized people (inadaptés) who were for various reasons 
unable to make use of the benefits of majority society (Lenoir 1974). While this 
perspective thus conceived of exclusion sociale in terms of certain deficits, and 
frequently pointed to the chronic misadaptation of the excluded, those deficits were 
largely considered to be beyond their control and did not invite ascriptions of guilt; in 
any case, the Republican ideal of solidarity was seen to require a collective effort 
towards bringing them into the fold of the welfare state.  
This perspective on exclusion was thus conceived in the 1970s (Lenoir 1974; Stoleru 
1974) and, in the 1980s, become a wide-spread frame of reference for various human 
consequences of unemployment and poverty (Milano 1988; Boitte 1989). Within this 
tradition, the concern with new constellations of social problems also underpinned the 
development of a new vocabulary of social marginality, including exclusion sociale, 
grande exclusion, grande pauvreté, nouveau pauvreté or précarité (Barbier 2005).59
Non-governmental organizations proposed similar understandings of social exclusion 
and defined a new vocabulary of social marginality to pressure governments into 
considering the situation of the ‘new poor’. Joseph Wresinski, founder of ATD Quart 
 
Various policy reports, such as by the government’s policy planning unit, the 
Commissariat general du plan (e.g, 1992), defined such notions for political use. Policy 
initiatives in the 1980s and early 1990s were introduced as a response to this 
perspective on exclusion, most significantly the 1988 Revenue mimimum d’insertion 
(RMI), an income aimed at those of working age without access to unemployment 
benefits.  
                                                 
59  The prefix grande generally refers to the persistent and irreversible condition of the situation. 
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Monde (ATD Fourth World), a Catholic priest with a record of social work in areas of 
extreme poverty, was particularly significant and influential.60
Précarité is the absence of one of several securities, notably that of employment, 
which allows person and families to assume their professional, social or familial 
obligations and to enjoy their fundamental rights. The resultant insecurity can be 
more or less extensive and can have more or less severe or definitive 
consequences. It leads to grande pauvreté when it affects multiple dimensions of 
existence, becomes persistent, and compromises the chances to reassume 
responsibilities and to reacquire one’s rights in the foreseeable future. (Conseil 
Économique et Social 1987, 6) 
 Wresinski authored a 
report for the Conseil Économique et Social (Economic and Social Council), entitled 
Grande pauvreté et précarité économique et sociale that defined terms as follows: 
Wresinski was particularly concerned with what can be considered as the 
‘empowerment’ of socially marginalized populations. His proposition was that policies 
should not merely be targeted at groups or individuals, but that in order to avoid 
disenfranchisement and paternalism, excluded populations should be included, not only 
materially through policies towards their insertion but also by drawing on their 
contribution to the political consultation on measures directed at them. Moreover, 
Wresinski made the case that inclusion must not be understood as beneficence but as the 
redemption of a fundamental obligation owed, within a republican framework and 
beyond, to fellow citizens as a fundamental human right: “French society must progress 
towards a society of human rights where civil and political rights but also economic, 
social and cultural rights are more and more respected” (Conseil Économique et Social 
1987, 8). 
Wresinski’s report became a significant frame of reference for a particular 
understanding that conceived of social exclusion as a scandal in relation to a republican 
notion of solidarity and that envisaged initiatives towards a rights-based access to full 
participation. Commentators have pointed to some problems in ATD’s approach 
towards exclusion. Jean-Paul Révauger (1998, 35) suggests that: “Thanks to ATD, the 
excluded speak out but they do not say very much, and especially nothing terribly 
political, which brings us back to the old 19th century debate on the role of intellectuals, 
or at least articulate people in popular organizations.” Despite such inconsistencies in 
the ATD account, the idea that exclusion required urgent mobilization of various social 
                                                 
60   ATD stands for Aide à toute détresse, translatable as ‘aid against destitution’, though it is 
sometimes anglicised as ‘all together for dignity’. 
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actors, that it cast a shadow on ideals of republican solidarity, and that remedies had to 
‘empower’ disadvantaged populations turned out to be influential accounts in the 1980s 
and 1990s. 61
We have identified two understandings of social exclusion that were both conspicuous 
around the time of the presidential campaign of 1995. On the one hand, a psychological 
and moral crisis was seen to require a humane touch and the provision of moral 
orientation and proximity. The crisis of social marginality, on the other hand, was seen 
to require urgent humanitarian action. While Chirac’s definition of fracture sociale 
drew strongly on elements of the first understanding, he remained open to the second 
and committed himself in the campaign to a struggle against various dimensions of 
social deprivation. The minister that was put in charge of the development of the first 
public policy imitative that was intended to counter the social rift was Xavier 
Emmanuelli, one of the co-founders of Médicins sans frontières and an executive of 
SAMU Sociale, an emergency service for homeless people. As part of his portfolio, 
Emmanuelli was to be concerned with “urgent humanitarian action” (l'action 
humanitaire d'urgence). He and various representatives of ATD contributed to the 
consultation on the political response to social exclusion in between 1995 and 1997.  
  
The politics of fracture sociale  
We have already suggested that, in Chirac’s usage, fracture sociale allegedly 
manifested itself as a crisis that went beyond empirically discernible constellations of 
social problems. It was experienced as a loss of certainty and, in particular among 
young people, as disorientation. Uncertainty and disorientation were said to precipitate 
anger and, potentially, violence. Lack of confidence and disorientation, in turn, led to  
“immobility” (Chirac quoted in Biffaud and Mauduit 1995). All this, finally, put social 
cohesion at risk. Established recipes of social reform, as they had been proposed by the 
technocratic elites, hadn’t worked. Chirac suggested that “we face a social emergency 
(état d’urgence sociale); we need a different logic to counter such tendencies and to put 
France back on a path towards the future. This is a question of political willpower” 
(Chirac 1994).  
                                                 
61  While Wresinski died in 1988, his successor, Geneviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz participated in the 
consultation on ‘social cohesion law’ of 1997, where she attempted to focus the debate on these 
dimensions (de Gaulle-Anthonioz 1997).  
 
 
106 
The reference to a social state of emergency and to a moral crisis became guiding 
themes of Chirac’s electoral rhetoric. In the following section, we consider the attempts 
of 1995-97 to devise a social policy agenda in response to the concept of fracture 
sociale.  
The Loi Cohésion Sociale in 1997 
In May 1995, Chirac’s Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, proclaimed a “new republican 
pact” for the fight against exclusion in the National Assembly (Ferenczi 1995). 
Authorized to develop social policies in response to fracture social, Juppé highlighted 
four dimensions that had to be addressed: unemployment, homelessness, problems in 
the banlieues, and improvements in the quality of life for elderly people (Juppé 1995). 
The adoption of the law was envisaged for October 1995, and Bertrand Fragonard, the 
civil servant that had been in charge of the introduction of the Revenu minimum 
d'insertion was assigned with its development. 
However, the initiative occurred against the background of changing priorities. In 
particular a new concern with the national debt, as a result of the convergence criteria 
for entry into the European Monetary Union, interfered with the priority of tackling 
fracture sociale. Moreover, the Plan Juppé, the reform of social welfare and pensions 
envisaged a reduction of expenditure levels, was met by widespread opposition and 
became the occasion for the single largest strike action since May 1968 (Bezat and de 
Montvalon 1996; Bernard 2005, 99). In his campaign, Chirac had accused Édouard 
Balladur of blindly pushing through economic reforms without considering their impact 
on the “emotional” state of society (Jarreau 1996). This now seemed to apply to his own 
government. 
These concomitant circumstances marked the context of deliberations on the law against 
exclusion. It became clear that little additional funding would be available and this was 
seen to put a doubt on costly measures, such as in relation to homelessness and housing, 
Before propositions were tabled in the National Assembly and the French Senate, the 
measures were debated within the administration. In difficult circumstances, the 
ambiguity of social exclusion was revealed when different actors began to struggle over 
the scope of the intended remedies. Bertrand Fragonard was instructed to develop the 
law for the Minster of Labour and Social Affairs, Jacques Barrot. In addition, however, 
Xavier Emmannuelli was instructed to develop a more holistic approach in line with his 
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portfolio of ‘urgent humanitarian action’. He considered the propositions by Fragonard 
and Barrot to be too half-hearted, technocratic, and not quite in line with the scale of the 
problem. Emmanuelli benefited from a direct rapport with Jacques Chirac and 
eventually went public in mid-1996, when he revealed that two distinct approaches 
existed. This caused considerable embarrassment to Barrot, who was portrayed as 
uncommitted in the fight against exclusion (Fenoglio and Garin 1997). Barrot favoured 
a perspective that would not emphasize humanitarian concerns but entail a limited set of 
policy measures to address issues of unemployment and homelessness (Le Monde 
1996). Emmanuelli, by contrast, considered his objective as to work towards the re-
definition of social solidarity and, taking Juppé’s proclamation seriously, towards a 
“new republican pact” (Castaing 1996a). The initiatives that would have to be 
developed, he suggested, should not only address individual concerns but work towards 
a reinvigoration of cohésion sociale (Castaing 1996b). 
Pierre-André Périssol, the minister for housing, spelt out this position. The problem, as 
he put it in a way that was reminiscent of Chirac’s rhetoric in 1995, was “fear of the 
future” and a “collective lack of self-confidence”:  
What we want is a communal project that reconstitutes social cohesion, which 
has been threatened, and to rekindle the republican state. Without strong social 
cohesion, there will be no trust in our society… Our sense of equality makes us 
refuse an Anglo-Saxon model where prosperity for some means poverty 
(précarisation) for others. Our sense of liberty leads us to reject a situation 
where the potential of men and women goes wasted. Our ideal of fraternity 
means that we cannot accept that men and women are not at the centre of our 
politics. … For this politics towards reinforced social cohesion, the state needs 
to be the guarantor. But [it needs to be] a reformed state (état rehabilitée) that 
draws its authority from  its determination to act, its legitimacy from its capacity 
to pursue reforms, its recognition of the nature of its interventions from dialogue 
and the heart (coeur). (Perissol 1996) 
This commitment to the human touch, to an état humaniste, was restated in an 
environment where the perceived necessity for fiscal austerity did not permit expansive 
welfare politics. In particular in Perissol’s own department, ambitious measures were 
quickly off the table in the consultation process about the intended initiatives (Fenoglio 
1996). In this light, Emmanuelli himself began to revise earlier commitments: “I don’t 
think that the state can continue to attend to everything. The struggle against exclusion 
depends on initiatives by everybody. … If the people continue to turn exclusively 
towards the state nothing will change” (quoted in Fernoglio 1996). The concern with 
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“urgent humanitarian action” and the objective to establish a “new republican pact” 
were being amended with notions of activation and self-reliance. Accordingly, when in 
1997 a set of measures were tabled at the National Assembly, Xavier Emmanuelli 
(1997) introduced the initiative: “All actors of social life need to collaborate to give our 
society a sense of humanity that it has lost so often.” The motivation was to “tackle the 
problem of exclusion in its entirety” (Emmanuelli 1997). This, however, meant that “the 
state cannot and should not do everything. It is the actors of social life that need to work 
together to give our society the sense of humanity that it has lost so often” (ibid.).  
Coinciding with the reinterpretation of humanitarian concern as requiring collective 
social activity, the headline title for the initiative was changed. Exclusion sociale 
disappeared and was substituted by a loi d’orientation relatif au renforcement de la 
cohésion sociale (Fenoglio and Garin 1997). The law, however, remained caught up in 
ambiguities of the concept of social exclusion. It remained unclear whether it was 
intended as a limited effort to improve the situation of some marginalised people, or a 
more wide-ranging attempt to build a more inclusive society (Fernoglio, Garin and 
Monnot 1997).  
Towards the final days of the consultation and immediately before the law was due to 
be tabled for a vote, Genviève de Gaulle-Anthonioz of ATD Quatre Monde spoke at the 
National Assembly. De Gaulle-Anthonioz commanded considerable authority for her 
own biography, as a niece of the General de Gaulle and a survivor of Ravensbrück 
where she had been imprisoned for her role in the resistance. She argued that it was 
necessary “to conceive of this struggle against poverty (grande pauvreté) as a struggle 
for human rights” (de Gaulle-Anthonioz 1997). This also meant that, in response to a 
frequent criticism, not legislating on behalf of les exclus but to consider the experiences 
of the excluded, to hear them express themselves “how they live and what they want for 
themselves and for society” (ibid.). De Gaulle-Anthonioz remarked that little in the 
present legislation matched these priorities. 
While a significant number of amendments to the social cohesion law had not even been 
debated in parliament, Jacques Chirac’s dissolution of the National Assembly on 21 
April 1997 put an end to the legislative process and effectively killed off the law 
(Monnot 1997; Monnot and De Montvalon 1997). In his speech justifying the 
dissolution, Chirac reverted to issues that he had raised in 1995. In preparation for the 
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accession to the European Monetary Union, a new élan was needed: “Together we need 
to reaffirm our values and … and our moral points of reference. Together we need to 
say clearly what society we want to live in.” He sought to locate this project in the 
context of a third way between “laisser-faire” and “reliance on the state”.  
I suggest that we follow a different path. What I suggest is the ideal of our 
Republic. Rights that are adamantly defended, and first of all the right to dignity 
and [social] protection for every man, women and child. Duties and 
responsibilities that are being assumed that correspond to these rights. A 
reinforced social cohesion. That is the defence of our republican order. That is a 
more peaceful society (une société appaisée), that anticipates problems and 
surmounts them through dialogue and communication. This is the recovery of a 
moral politics with leaders that provide an example. (Chirac 1997) 
Chirac’s RPR lost the subsequent election. The incoming Socialist government of 
Lionel Jospin adopted a far-ranging social policy programme that included measures in 
the area of employment, housing, against indebtedness and for a minimum wage (Fabre, 
Fenoglio and Garin 1998; Clift 2001). This grande loi reverted back to a language of 
exclusion sociale. Commenting retrospectively, Xavier Emmanuelli remarked that this 
conceptual change had been indicative of a profoundly different emphasis. The 
Socialist’s ‘law against exclusion’, he suggested, had been targeted at economic 
processes, unemployment and welfare. Emmanuelli suggested that it had nothing to 
offer to address the more immaterial uncertainty and disorientation that Chirac had 
invoked and that his initiatives towards cohésion sociale had intended to provide 
(Emmanuelli and Frémontier 2002, para. 10). 
In the botched ‘social cohesion law’ of 1997, the ambiguities of the concept of social 
exclusion and its various horizons of meaning, became conspicuous. Funding 
constraints stood in the way of adopting costly measures of social reform. However, a 
more minimalist approach that would have entailed policy measures to address isolated 
problems was considered inadequate, in particular when compared to the expectations 
that Chirac’s rhetoric of fracture sociale had raised. A certain adaptation that was made 
to the established concern with ‘proximity’ and ‘humane concern’ offered a way out of 
this double bind. The conceptual change from exclusion towards cohésion sociale was 
accompanied by a new emphasis on the need for collective activity to achieve cohesion. 
The ‘actors of social life’, Emmanuelli suggested, needed to come together to create a 
more humane society. Whereas, earlier, immobilisme had been considered to result from 
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disorientation and anxiety, this equation was now amended so that mobility and 
collective activity appeared as necessary remedies to achieve social cohesion. 
The Plan Borloo in 2004/5 
Lionel Jospin’s term as Prime Minister came to an end with the presidential elections of 
2002.  Jean-Marie Le Pen eliminated Jospin in the first round, and Chirac, benefiting 
from the rallying of all parties except for the Front National behind his candidacy, 
carried the second round with 82% of the vote. The subsequent elections to the National 
Assembly yielded a majority for the newly founded Union pour la majorité 
presidentielle (UMP), which in name and by design was meant to prevent a repetition of 
cohabitation. Jean-Pierre Raffarin, who had already held the office of Prime Minister 
(Raffarin I) in the aftermath of Jospin’s defeat, was confirmed.  
In the regional elections of 2004, the UMP lost control of all French regions except 
Alsace and Corsica. Jacques Chirac reshuffled portfolios and ministers (from Raffarin II 
to Raffarin III) and proclaimed a new emphasis on social affairs. He stated that: 
I have heard what the French have said. That is why I have asked the 
government to suspend the reform of ASS (mesure relative à l’ASS). A law for 
the mobilisation to work is being prepared by the minister of social cohesion, 
Jean-Louis Borloo, and allows us to take up the issues in their logical form. And 
that with a principal objective that it is to better help, to better accompany the 
unemployed in their return to work and to find work again, an activity. (Chirac 
2004a) 
ASS, Allocation spécifique de solidarité, was a measure that made available funds for 
unemployed whose eligibility for benefits had expired. In 2003, Raffarin II had 
introduced cost-cutting measures in this area, amounting to roughly 400 million Euros. 
These propositions, as well as other social reform measures introduced to cut social 
funding, had turned out to be vastly unpopular (Cahuc and Kramarz 2004; Sterdyniak 
2004). In 2004, the political agenda of the government seemed caught up in between 
priorities towards economic liberalisation and social priorities, cap liberal and cap 
sociale (Beuve-Mérz and Delhommais 2004; Le Figaro 2004). Chirac’s speech was 
significant for how it seemed to indicate a new emphasis on the latter, which appeared 
as a return to erstwhile concerns with fracture sociale. In the speech, Chirac (2004b) 
thus introduced a new “absolute priority’ of working towards cohésion sociale. 
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Social cohesion had been less and less defined in relation to grande pauvreté. 
Compared to the mid-1990s, marginality, impoverishment or homelessness had lost 
some of their urgency, and seemed to be less present as social concerns that required 
legislative efforts. In 2004, social cohesion and questions of republican solidarity were 
discussed in particular in relation to unemployment, and with an emphasis on assisting 
the unemployed in the transition to work (Ministère de l'emploi 2004). This was the 
concern of the Plan Borloo, or loi de programmation pour la cohésion sociale, that was 
adopted in 2005 (Ministère de l'emploi 2005a). As part of the “absolute priority” that 
Chirac envisaged for this relaunch of a social agenda cohésion sociale was defined in 
relation to unemployment.  It was suggested that “working towards cohésion sociale, 
also means working to assure the dynamism and the economic competitiveness of our 
country in the coming years” (Chirac 2004b). Jean-Louis Borloo was put in charge of 
this social programme.  
Similarly to Xavier Emmanuelli, Jean-Louis Borloo was perceived as a political 
outsider with a practitioner’s background (Loré 1993). He had a distinguished career as 
a corporate lawyer, as president of Valenciennes Football Club and, building on this 
achievement, as mayor of Valenciennes, a transitional town in the North of France 
facing deindustrialization (Guélaud 2004a). He was widely credited with having 
distinguished himself in supporting the commercial development of the city. 
In 2003, while he was still president of the wider Valenciennes agglomération, he 
accompanied Chirac on a visit to town (Guiral 2003). Borloo, who became minister for 
Housing in Raffarin II, was particularly eager to attach himself to Chirac’s humanitarian 
commitments. Upon his visit to Valenciennes, Chirac had spoken about “making cities 
more human” (rendre la ville plus humaine) (Hassoux 2003). Chirac, who had largely 
abandoned fracture sociale as a theme, picked it up again in Valenciennes: “These 
dramatic difficulties, this social rift (fracture sociale) that threatens to expand into a 
urban, ethnic and sometimes even religious rift (fracture urbaine, ethnique, religieuse) 
are not inevitable” (Chirac 2007, 137). Concerted action – not necessarily “urgent 
humanitarian action” – could prevent fracture social. The idea of this rift, however, was 
no longer loosely connected to ambiguous understandings of social exclusion but to the 
disintegrative effects of unemployment. Unemployment, as Chirac (2007, 131) put it in 
Valenciennes, was seen to endanger cohésion nationale. 
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Preventive action and the mobilisation of society to avert this threat were introduced as 
a priority, and Borloo was presented as the man for the job (Jakubyszyn 2004). His 
perspective seemed to be in tune with the social relaunch, and Borloo benefited from the 
reshuffle of the cabinet and from its renewed focus on social affairs. On 1 April 2004, 
he was appointed head of a grand ministère, a superministry for social cohesion, 
including the Ministry of Labour (Gurrey 2004). Spelling out his agenda, Borloo 
announced a grand juillet social (de Montvalon 2004), a month of social mobilization. 
He introduced his plans as follows: 
We do not need to change our focus; we simply need to follow the roadmap set 
out by the President. He has reaffirmed the absolute necessity of the mobilisation 
for social cohesion. … Our mission today is clear: restore social and republican 
cohesion. (cited in Tabard 2004) 
This “battle to restore social cohesion” (ibid.) evoked some of the same ambiguities that 
had characterised the propositions of 1997. The policies at stake were largely piecemeal 
and targeted at labour market and welfare reform (Dorival 2008). While some actors 
downplayed the scope of these initiatives and raised concerns regarding budgetary 
constraints, others were eager to raise expectations and to portray the policies as a 
fundamental shift in the French social model. Borloo was in particular pitted against the 
Finance Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy and Bernard Accoyer, president of the parliamentary 
UMP group (Guélaud and Jakubyszyn 2004). Accoyer contradicted Borloo: there was 
“no social turn” and the new measures provided “continuity of governmental action”, a 
continuity that consisted in how the new measures were guided by the objective of a 
“return to activity” (de Montvalon 2004).  
Jean-Louis Borloo, by contrast, introduced his measures as a fundamental departure 
from existing notions of social solidarity. He pointed to the anachronism of the French 
social model and in particular to the notion that the state could intervene to enforce 
social cohesion. This was no longer an option, he suggested, and a “radical change of 
approach and method” (cited in Baudet and Marti 2004) was needed (Borloo 2004a; 
2004b). The Plan Borloo was unveiled on 30 June 2004. Its measures were particularly 
concerned with employment, equality of opportunities and housing (Le Monde 2004). 
The plan made available one billion Euros in 2005, and more than three billion until 
2007. 
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The priority of cohésion sociale in the Plan Borloo was put in a conditional relationship 
to economic growth: “no durable growth without national and social cohesion” (Borloo 
cited in Guélaud 2004a). A more flexible labour market, more movement and activity 
were introduced as priorities not only for the achievement of more social mobility but 
also to boost the French economy (Rollot 2004). These priorities also meant that 
cohésion sociale became further decoupled from social marginality and grande pauvreté 
and more linked to the dualism of competitiveness and cohesion, as it had also 
increasingly informed European Union priorities with the Lisbon Agenda (Daly 2006).  
The Plan Borloo was met with some criticism. In an editorial, Le Monde embraced the 
plan but criticized its limited scale that was not seen to correspond to high expectations 
that had been raised in the rhetoric of a “social relaunch” (Le Monde 2004). The 
Socialists accused Borloo of “window-dressing” (Fabius 2004). Even from within the 
UMP, there were complaints on how the plan disregarded local interests and local 
expertise and generally paid scant attention to the actual and protracted social problems 
in urban France that had been characteristic of previous efforts to address, for example, 
exclusion sociale (Grossmann and Keller 2004). A further criticism was that it 
envisaged the institutionalization of a low-wage sector: it provided a cover for measures 
with “profoundly unequal” (Rousseau and Devetter 2005) results. 
What distinguished the more recent initiatives were new motives, in particular the 
reference to the economically positive effects of heightened cohesion. Where the failed 
initiatives of 1997 had maintained a connection to an understanding of social exclusion 
that pointed towards social marginalization, this link had been severed. Activation was 
not understood to be about social enfranchisement, as it had been advocated by ATD 
Quart Monde. The new initiatives envisaged in particular to facilitate and accelerate the 
transition from unemployment towards employment. As it was put in the new ‘social 
cohesion law’, there was an “absolute priority of the return to activity, the best recipe 
against social implosion and the key for individual dignity” (Ministère de l'emploi 2004, 
3). The need to turn from social assistance towards activity was highlighted (ibid., 4). 
While measures envisaged were still introduced as part of a more fundamental 
reorientation, such as by “redesigning social relations” (Ministère de l'emploi 2005b, 2), 
the new concern with cohésion sociale was, mostly, to outline and implement activation 
in labour market policies.  
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Émeutes 2005 
The movement of debate from ‘urgent humanitarian action’ towards labour market 
measures represents a conspicuous development among social policy objectives and 
how they were couched in French political discourse. A language of exclusion and 
cohesion in 1997, and of cohesion in 2004/5, allowed for the proposition of disparate 
political objectives. Ambitions that were pursued with elements of the same kind of 
conceptual framework had clearly changed. Jacques Donzelot (2006, 3) has made a 
suggestion for how these changes can be understood. He has argued that cohésion 
sociale supplanted previously prominent political objectives, notably a commitment to 
progrès social (social progress). While the state was considered “as the guarantor or 
custodian of social progress”, its political role now is “to incite civil society to produce 
cohesion in a competitive environment” (2006, 11). This observation is corroborated by 
the response of Jacques Chirac and the Raffarin government to the unrest in the 
banlieues in 2005, which we briefly consider in this section.  
When he defined fracture sociale in 1994 and 95, Jacques Chirac had addressed the 
situation in the banlieues, and how the uncertainty and disorientation that he identified 
had the potential to lead to particularly troubling conflict there: 
In the disadvantaged banlieues a soft terror reigns (terreur molle). When too 
many young people cannot see any future beyond unemployment or permanent 
internships, they end up revolting. Up to now, the state struggles to maintain 
order and the social mitigation of unemployment prevents the worst. But until 
when? (Chirac 1994, 47) 
The beginning of the implementation of the Plan Borloo in 2005 coincided with a spate 
of urban unrest, starting on 27 October in Clichy-sous-Bois, Seine-Saint-Denis, and 
spreading throughout France. Three teenagers, two of whom died subsequently, were 
electrocuted in a transformer while on the run from police. The allegation was that they 
were driven into the facility and offered neither help nor rescue by pursuing police 
officers. The unrest that unfolded over the following weeks occurred against the 
background of a concern with policing in the banlieues, which was considered to be 
heavy-handed and militarized (see Schneider 2008). The unrest further seemed to 
highlight the scale of the problems faced in urban agglomerations on the outskirts of 
French city centres, where large numbers of French citizens of North African or Sub-
Saharan descent were experiencing high levels of unemployment and poor access to the 
benefits enjoyed by majority society (Wacquant 2006). Grande exclusion, in the 
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meaning that Joseph Wresinski had given to the term and that had been a prominent 
concern of the 1990s, had been seen to refer in particular to the conditions faced by the 
inhabitants of the banlieues. Clichy-sous-Bois remains the most deprived area within 
the Seine-Saint-Denis department, with high levels of unemployment, poverty and lack 
of public infrastructure (Giblin 2006, 79). 
The unrest proved to be an occasion for some of the protagonists of the recently adopted 
social cohesion initiatives to provide their respective accounts of the events. Nicolas 
Sarkozy, Minister of the Interior in 2005, followed a line of law and order populism. 
Sarkozy had not been part of the cap social or a supporter of the Plan Borloo. 
Uncommitted to Chirac’s social agenda, he had little stake in explaining the events in a 
way that would fit the presidential social policy paradigm. Already before the unrest, he 
had found himself in various situations where his statements had caused offence, but 
had also garnered considerable support. In June 2005, Sarkozy had proposed to ‘steam-
clean’ (nettoyer au Kärcher) a neighbourhood with recurrent disorder in the 
neighbourhood La Courneuve, north-eastern Paris. A few days before the incidents in 
Clichy-sous-Bois, in Argenteuil, north-western Paris, Sarkozy referred to a group of 
local people as ‘scum’ (racaille) (Le Guen 2005). In the immediate response to the 
unrest in October and early November, he spoke of the need to bring the force of the 
law to bear on the banlieues and of zéro tolerance (Sarkozy 2005).  
Jean-Louis Borloo, by contrast, followed a line that Jacques Chirac would later adopt in 
his delayed effort to put the events into perspective (Chirac 2005a). Borloo highlighted 
the need for ‘respect’ and for a proper investigation of the situation leading to the 
violence and, more broadly, of the conditions in the disadvantaged banlieues: “we need 
patience, tenacity, not to be discouraged, even in the face of such crises. That’s why the 
plan de cohésion sociale is a five year plan” (Borloo 2005). Chirac, whom it took more 
than two weeks to make a statement on the émeutes, equally pointed to the social policy 
record of his governments: “an important effort [to improve the situation in the 
banlieues] has been adopted over the last three years. Before too, but especially in the 
last three years” (Chirac 2005a). Presumably, Chirac pointed to the policy initiatives of 
Raffarin I-III, and not to fracture sociale 1995-1997. In fact, the appeal to fracture 
sociale or the concept of cohésion sociale remained largely absent in how 
representatives of government referred to the 2005 unrest.  
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Sarkozy’s response in particular appeared to be at odds with earlier accounts of grande 
exclusion or pauvreté. He portrayed the causes of the unrest as lying in the thuggishness 
of the rioters. Problems in the banlieues, it was his suggestion, were not problematic for 
how they challenged republican ideals of solidarity. Émeutes should be suppressed with 
a police and criminal justice response. His reference to racaille seemed to imply that 
those labelled should be considered as outside of the fold of republican citizenship; their 
exclusion would not need to be understood as a challenge to republican ideas of 
solidarity (Sarkozy 2005).  
Chirac, less than two years before the end of his second term, characteristically 
straddled between two orientations and two understandings of what republican 
solidarity required. He seemed to rebuke Sarkozy by suggesting that in “politics the 
choice of words is obviously essential”, and that “in France all citizens are sons and 
daughters of the republic.” However, he supported his Minister of the Interior when he 
suggested that “if someone commits an offence or a crime, this is an offender or a 
criminal. This is what the law says. These are the terms that we need to use. This is the 
republic” (Chirac 2005b).  
The theme of republican solidarity, as it had been deployed in response to earlier 
understandings of the scandal of social exclusion, was thus considered to be, at most, 
only partially applicable to the conditions in the banlieues. What remained for Chirac, it 
seems, was an expression of humane concern (“sons and daughters of the republic”), an 
expression that neither in 1995 nor in 2005 needed to be accompanied by practical 
measures towards addressing material inequalities, social dislocations, poverty or 
homelessness. Emmanuel Todd (2005), by contrast, who was widely credited with 
having coined fracture sociale, commented that he did not “see anything in the events 
themselves that separates the children of immigrants from the rest of society. I see the 
exact opposite. I interpret the events as a refusal of marginalisation.”62
                                                 
62  Some right-wing commentators now consider fracture sociale as the concept with which “the left, 
but not only the left, has sought to understand the causes of this violence [of the 2005 émeutes]” 
(Giblin 2006, 84). Clearly, the notion can be traced to Jacques Chirac, and the government of 
Lionel Jospin and Martine Aubry 1997-2002 presented its social objectives by drawing on the 
concept of exclusion and not on fracture sociale. However, there is a discontinuity between Chirac 
and Sarkozy, for how the latter has been more prepared to point to cultures of violence, the 
misadaptation of young blacks and North Africans and their religious identities to explain the 
émeutes. 
 
 
117 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have considered aspects of recent French political history. Changing 
conceptions of the integrity of the nation and its territory, the role of the presidency in 
safeguarding national cohesion and the extension of its purview towards the domestic 
inside are significant developments. Rather than offering an encompassing account, this 
chapter has provided snapshots of changing priorities. It has explored conceptions of 
social exclusion and social cohesion and how these changed over time and informed 
political initiatives. 
We have suggested that ambiguities of exclusion sociale, as they were evident in the 
rhetoric of the 1994/5 election, allowed for this concept to be defined in various ways. 
One the one hand, it was seen to entail concerns with social justice and material 
inequality. It corresponded, on the other hand, to the perception of a moral crisis and to 
the suggestion that a lack of social proximity and humane connectedness constituted a 
social malaise. Jacques Chirac made strategic use of these ambiguities. Moreover, in the 
development of the social agendas of his governments, and with the introduction of 
cohésion sociale, earlier concerns with “urgent humanitarian action” were reinterpreted. 
New orientations put emphasis on social activity. In 2004/5, the concept of cohésion 
sociale was used to substantiate policy instruments towards activation in the labour 
market. Previous objectives, such as those that suggested addressing exclusion as a 
matter of “humanitarian concern”, became more marginal. Conspicuously, we have 
suggested that such understandings of exclusion sociale were not drawn on to provide 
an explanation of the unrest in 2005 or of the experience of socio-economic marginality 
that is characteristic of some of the banlieues.  
These conceptual changes signal a shift of political objectives. Reinterpretations of 
social exclusion coincided with a new understanding of the requirements of republican 
solidarity. The shift was away from urgent humanitarian action and towards social 
cohesion. Where the goal of policy making with reference to the former understanding 
of social exclusion was to reduce inequality and to provide marginalized people with a 
voice, the concern with the concept of cohésion sociale has been to heighten individual 
activity in particular in the labour market.63
                                                 
63  Xavier Emmanuelli, Chirac’s minister for ‘urgent humanitarian action’ 1995-7, recently 
announced that he would leave his post as an executive of SAMU Sociale - the support 
 Whereas the former put emphasis on the 
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need to restructure the economy and to make public services accessible, the latter 
considered individual capacities and how they impacted on employability. Where 
capacities are seen lacking, this does not necessitate a response of solidarity, but the 
appeal to activity and a push. 
                                                                                                                                               
organisation for homeless people – as its funding had increasingly dried up and his work had 
become increasingly unsustainable (Libération 2011). 
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Chapter 4: Bürgergesellschaft 
Introduction 
Notions of social disintegration, we have suggested, provide for a repertory of themes 
and images that can be put to use for a variety of purposes. These images work, are 
invoked and mapped onto empirical processes to provide explanations of crises. Such 
projections correspond to understandings that are particular to political, cultural and 
historical contexts. One such context was characterized by discontent over democratic-
pluralist settlements and allowed in particular far-right groups to appeal to anxiety over 
the complexity of modern social relations.  
In Germany, this anxiety was appealed to in relation to the alleged fragmentation of the 
body politic, characterised as a romantically idealized community of history, culture and 
blood. Social and political fragmentation, Zersplitterung, was one of the rhetorical 
hallmarks of anti-democratic movements of the 1920s. The concept was directed, for 
example, against modernism in the arts and against the parliamentary institutions of the 
Weimar Republic. It resonated strongly in the works of Konservative Revolution 
philosophers, such as in Oswald Spengler’s (1934) and Carl Schmitt’s (1979) writings. 
Social disintegration, in a tradition that proved to be in tune with the rising Nazi party, 
was to be averted by introducing strong principles of social stratification and in a cult of 
political leadership. Volksgemeinschaft, the ultimate vision of historical, cultural and 
biological unity, provided this horizon (Stolleis 1972).  
In contemporary Germany, this anti-pluralist deployment of fragmentation has lost most 
of its impetus. It has been largely absent from acceptable intellectual exchange in the 
Federal Republic. The Weimar Republic was open to be attacked by movements from 
both sides of the political spectrum that could draw on alternative social utopias, which 
were fundamentally at odds with the realities of the republic. These contrasts, however, 
have largely been absent in post-war Germany, where the social utopias that remained 
in circulation turned out to be unsuccessful in mobilizing political movements.64
                                                 
64  This may not merely be a result of an anti-totalitarian consensus, but also of how power was 
dispersed and diverse interests calibrated and institutionally represented in the Federal Republic’s 
corporatist model (Czada 1994). 
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The critical standards that are used to judge the social realities of the Federal Republic 
lie most frequently not outside, but rather within the foundational traditions and myths 
of German post-war democracy. While racialized notions of belonging and 
homogeneous nationhood persist (Mandel 2008), Zersplitterung and Volksgemeinschaft 
have become strikingly nonsensical ideas outside of marginalized positions on the far 
right. The Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) of the 1950s, the 1954 World Cup 
victory, the experience of crises such as of the Rote Armee Fraktion’s campaign in 
1977, reunification and the democratic opposition in the East, as well as the collective 
response to the flooding of the River Oder in 1997, provide for idealized moments in 
the collective memory that can be deployed to point to contemporary shortcomings. But 
these ideals are located within democratic post-war history. Regarding the social 
realities of the Federal Republic, experiences of crisis and the spirit of solidarity that is 
perceived in their resolution are most frequently drawn to illustrate and define collective 
aspirations.  
Where there is an experience of decline and disintegration, the projections that underpin 
such diagnoses are most frequently located within idealized accounts of recent German 
history. Among these, a type of economic nationalism and the Wirtschaftswunder as the 
foundational myth of post-war nation building, with the D-Mark as the corresponding 
“object of libido” (Habermas 1991, 84), provide for such contrasts. The reference to 
idealized accounts, as well as to high points of German post-war history, is frequently 
made in political debate in a way that provides for gripping and evocative contrasts with 
contemporary realities. 
In contemporary political debate, however, ideas of social or political disintegration and 
moral decline continue to be articulated and to be met with considerable interest. The 
existential anxiety over Zersplitterung has been replaced by less radical references to 
defects in the moral consensus of contemporary Germany. Ulrich Wickert’s (1994) 
book Der Ehrliche ist der Dumme. Über den Verlust der Werte (The Honest one is the 
fool. On the loss of values) was exceedingly well received. More recently, accounts that 
point to the decline of discipline amongst young people have been received with equal 
interest (Bueb 2006). Thilo Sarrazin’s (2010) Deutschland schafft sich ab is yet another 
example for how controversial diagnoses of catastrophic national decline can achieve 
significant commercial success (Garton Ash 2011). 
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Diverse stories and images can be drawn on to craft the according narratives. The 
principles that account for the relative civility and conditions underpinning prosperity 
and economic development, for example, have been considered to be at risk (Kahn and 
Redepenning 1982). Globalization, as much a buzzword as it is in France or Britain, is 
seen to challenge the German social model (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1997). The 
fracturing of a moral consensus, as it is allegedly evidenced by various forms of 
‘outrageous’ behaviour, is a theme of consistent popularity. In the course of recent 
revelations about widespread tax evasion among members of the German business elite, 
Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück (2009) remarked that the according offences posed a 
threat to the Zusammenhalt der Gesellschaft.65
Such notions of breakdown and decline are addressed in conceptualizations of positive 
visions of society that are introduced as a counterpoint. One of the more sustained 
attempts to develop a positive political agenda in response to various shortcomings 
drew on the idea of Bürgergesellschaft. A prominent actor in the definition of this idea, 
Wolfgang Thierse (2002), pointed out that “the relationship between individuals, state 
and society has become unclear, requires revision” in light of the experience of 
“dissolution, breakdown of social ties, new social polarization” (ibid). 
 His successor, Wolfgang Schäuble  
recently consistently expresses similar concerns (BMI 2008; Schäuble 2009). Just as the 
‘outrageous’ behaviour of tax-dodgers and bankers, violent crime, in particular by 
adolescents, is equally open to be seen and explained in the light of the declining force 
of a moral consensus. An incident in the Munich underground system that led to the 
death of man who had tried to intervene in an altercation served as the foil for editorial 
exchanges on the decline of social cohesion and civilizational standards (Knipping 
2008). The incident became the focus of the 2008 election in the Land of Hesse where 
the conservative government, led by Roland Koch, sought to mobilize voters in a 
regional election by drawing on themes of social disintegration, moral decline and 
crime, in particular when it was committed by young Germans of immigrant 
background (Die Welt 2008). This recent campaign illustrates the continued salience of 
the political rhetoric of social disintegration, in particular of allegations about the 
loosening of moral bonds and the widespread experience of incivility in the public 
sphere.  
                                                 
65  Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt is arguably the closest approximation to the English 
understanding of social cohesion. 
122 
Bürgergesellschaft, Thierse suggested, responds to this need for revision. It is frequently 
employed synonymously with Zivilgesellschaft (civil society) and has been brought to 
bear on a variety of phenomena. It experienced the height of its political prominence in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s when it emerged as a frame of reference for public 
debate and in discussions about social policy reform. The concept invoked the positive 
role of civil society movements in the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. Over 
the 1990s, it was gradually redefined beyond concerns with democracy and towards a 
more general emphasis on social reform. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
Bürgergesellschaft was specified and variously adapted as a template for the 
remodelling of German society (Klein 2001).  
The reformist ideas pursued with Bürgergesellschaft are characterized by some 
diversity. The concept was used to point towards the need to foster practices of active 
citizenship. It was prominently developed to support claims for an enhanced role of 
foundations and third sector organisations. It informed the debate about the reform of 
welfare provision and the German social insurance models (Opielka, 2002, Lessenich, 
2008). These definitions, moreover, coincided with a significant re-orientation of 
Gerhard Schröder’s Social Democrats (SPD) towards the welfare state (Schröder 2003). 
The need to question traditional ways of service provision and to adopt the idea of an 
“enabling” or “activating” welfare state appeared prominently in programmatic 
statements on Bürgergesellschaft (Schröder, 2000, Deutscher Bundestag, 2002). In this 
context, the idea was seen to provide a corrective to the perceived sclerosis of the 
German social model. The invocation of risk and insecurity, the impotence of the 
welfare state, and political disaffiliation (Politikverdrossenheit) were seen as adding up 
to threatening scenarios. Bürgergesellschaft responded to this, and invoked a new sense 
of direction. As an imaginary horizon, it has channelled public policy making towards 
an increasing reliance on civic activation and individual responsibility. Its 
attractiveness, Helmut Dubiel (1994, 67) suggests, is not least a result of its “intuitive 
fit” and “the way it wraps confusing problem configurations into a condensed formula.”  
This chapter considers how Bürgergesellschaft became a concern and was defined in 
German political debate. It suggests that Bürgergesellschaft is underpinned by a social 
imaginary that conceives of society as in need of activation and that made activation 
appear as a compelling response to widely acknowledged problems. As was the case 
with exclusion sociale, this analytical concern is complicated by the lack of coherence 
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among different understandings of the concept. Bürgergesellschaft points to and 
channels a variety of ideals and corresponding anxieties. While it is frequently invoked 
to suggest the presence of a consolidated and unambiguous idea, we suggest in this 
chapter that usages and interpretations that circulated in the 1990s and early 2000s are 
characterized by considerable diversity.66
Despite the emphasis on discontinuity, this chapter suggests that various voices share a 
purpose for how they subscribe to and substantiate notions of individual responsibility 
and the need for heightened social activity. Undoubtedly, this idea of activity is 
ambiguous in its own right. In the case of Bürgergesellschaft, it entails notions of 
activity citizenship and political participation, of local self-help help, mutuality and 
subsidiary principles, as well as of a socio-economic self-reliance, which is presented as 
a departure from principles that were seen to have been enshrined in the German 
welfare state. Bürgergesellschaft appears to be a diverse container of problem 
descriptions and social visions that are minimally united by how they pay tribute to a 
particular socio-political tradition of German Bürgerlichkeit and for they use the 
resources of this tradition to propose turn towards civic and socio-economic activity.  
 Additionally, while Bürgergesellschaft is 
frequently used in order to define a general orientation towards social or political 
reform, it rarely provides a precise understanding regarding the measures and policies 
envisaged. Rather, a variety of ideals, concerns and political propositions are expressed 
with reference to the concept. This means that the unity of the concept, and how it is 
sustained despite such ambiguities, has to be of interest as well as the variety of voices 
within the German Bürgergesellschaft debate.  
First, the chapter investigates conceptual traditions of Bürgergesellschaft. It considers 
precedents of Bürgergesellschaft in the history of ideas, in the history of German 
Bürgerlichkeit, and in recent political history leading up to the fall of European 
communism. Secondly, it reviews the transition of the concept from obscurity to 
prominence in the course of the 1990s and, thirdly, identifies three different types of 
understanding that are characteristic of how it has been defined and deployed. Fourthly, 
the chapter investigates a synthesis of these types that informed political debate and was 
                                                 
66  Despite ambiguity, particular understandings of Bürgergesellschaft are often vigorously defended 
by their exponents (e.g., Gohl 1998).  
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used to substantiate ideas the idea of Fordern und Fördern (‘demand and support’), 
which were prominently introduced as part of the Hartz reform agenda.67
Bürgergesellschaft: Origins and Influences 
 
In the following we identify three main tendencies in the development of 
Bürgergesellschaft. Firstly, we consider how it is understood to reflect traditions of 
German bourgeois culture and life; secondly, its relations to civil society ideas in 
political thought; and, thirdly, its inspiration by civil society practice as it was seen to 
have been at work in the democratic transformations of Eastern Europe. This cannot be 
more than a highly selective survey of themes. It seeks to establish the main currents 
that characterize the definition and deployment of Bürgergesellschaft in the political 
discourse of the 1990s. 
Dimensions of Bürgerlichkeit 
A peculiarity of the German language is its unfamiliarity with the distinction between 
citoyen and bourgeois (Riedel 1971). Bürger – usually translated as citizen – can thus 
denote the politically active subject that partakes in a public sphere, as well as the bearer 
of certain cultural attributes of middle-classness, most often a subject that is conceived 
in apolitical terms. This conflation has complicated the usage of the term and the 
reference to the subject position, Bürger, and its attributes, bürgerlich. It has meant that 
terminological choices have been politically laden and subject to variegated 
appreciations that relate to concepts in different ways, positive or negative. It meant that 
for the Left, at least since Karl Marx, notions of Bürgerlichkeit became coextensive 
with a type of possessive individualism that was seen to be the super-structural 
expression of culture and morality of capitalist modes of production (see for example 
Marx 1974[1843]). Subsequent histories of German Bürgerlichkeit have often followed 
this critical perspective and offered neo-Marxist (Sombart 1913) or non-Marxist 
                                                 
67  The concept under investigation might as well have been Zivilgesellschaft. Zivilgesellschaft is 
frequently used synonymously with Bürgergesellschaft and lends itself more readily for translation 
into ‘civil society’. Bürgergesellschaft, by contrasts, points more immediately to terminological 
peculiarities of the German language and to a specific cultural and historical background. While 
the discourse of Bürgergesellschaft draws on the civil society tradition in the history of political 
ideas, it equally partakes in the socio-cultural legacy of German Bürgerlichkeit, bourgeois culture, 
politics and life. The way society Bürgergesellschaft was deployed in recent political debate is not 
sufficiently understood by considering it as a mere instantiation of civil society ideas (e.g., Cohen 
and Arato 1992). It reflects the commemoration of a specifically German socio-cultural model, 
too. For a valuable overview of the development of Zivilgesellschaft in political theory and 
German political discourse (though with less emphasis on the polyvalence of the concept), see 
Klein (2001). 
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(Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt) rejections of the value horizon of bürgerliches 
Leben (bourgeois life). 20th century historians, social theorists and politicians – often in 
contradistinction to the leftist rejection – have been concerned to salvage what they 
considered to be the potentials of Bürgerlichkeit and to reconstruct the idea for the 
purposes of a positive political project (Conze 2004). While in more recent decades the 
conflict over this meaning seems to have lost some of its urgency, the adjective 
bürgerlich continues to have a certain derogatory ring.68
The social form of Bürgergesellschaft, too, is difficult to define for its historical 
significations and for how this is seen to correspond to contemporary formations of 
social life. Commentators point to the local self-organisation of German Bürger, 
conceived as either civic-minded or inwardly-oriented towards private life or 
commercial production and exchange. Bürgergesellschaften, in the plural, are seen to 
have emerged in the 18th and 19th century when they were institutionally tied to local 
chambers of commerce, guilds and associations of local craftsmen. These associations 
formed circles of respectable civic and commercial interest notably in small-scale urban 
settings (Jessen, Reichardt and Klein 2004). This origin of the notion is most clearly 
preserved in specifically South German contributions to the definition of the 
Bürgergesellschaft concept in the 1990s and 2000s (Ueltzhöffer and Ascheberg 1996). 
These perspectives point to potentials for local self help and mutuality that can be traced 
to historical formations of bourgeois life (Gall and Langewiesche 1995).
 Hence, while the concept of 
Bürgergesellschaft has been embraced by exponents of the German left, notably where 
they are interested in increasing the scope of democratic participation, it partakes in a 
tradition of contested political meaning. 
69
                                                 
68  Oskar Lafontaine (1982), former Social Democrat and later leader of Die Linke (Left Party), 
famously referred to bourgeois Sekundärtugenden (secondary virtues) such as cleanliness, duty or 
discipline as the kinds of values needed to run a concentration camp.  
 An additional 
localist undercurrent of the concept is due to its place in the history of industrialization 
where Bürgergesellschaften frequently stood in opposition to the interests of the 
emerging classes of industrial entrepreneurs (Gall 1975). Moreover, the concept needs 
to be distinguished from the 19th century self-organisation of the workers movement in 
69  Historically, such potentials were not necessarily considered to be generalizable as a template for 
national reform. They refer to local social formations that preceded the Prussian unification of 
Germany in the second half of the 19th century and that were even considered to be impediments 
to objectives towards modernisation. Moreover, in particular the defeat of the democratic 
revolution in 1848 meant that the political content of bourgeois associational life remained largely 
dormant (Lipp and Kaschuba 1984). 
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Arbeitervereinen (Mommsen 1978; Schmidt 2004). Altogether, the empirical reality of 
Bürgergesellschaften in 19th century Germany appears to offer some elements of a 
template for the construction of local circles of self-help. This template hardly presents 
itself, at least not in a straightforward way, as a model to recast the social relations of 
advanced capitalist societies. Its introduction in German public discourse in the 1990s 
required additional specifications and a new impetus that is not necessarily well 
understood as the continuation of historical practices or concerns. 
In this regard, the German social historian Ulrich Wehler draws some useful distinctions 
between different modes of bourgeois life. Bürgergesellschaft, Wehler (2001, 620) 
points out, refers to “the concrete and empirically specifiable ensembles of bourgeois 
classes defined by possession, commerce and employment”. In German social history, 
he suggests, these classes always constituted a minority. These concrete social 
formations, in turn, can be contrasted with Bürgerlichkeit, which refers to cultural 
attributes of bourgeois life and the according conventions, norms and expectations. 
Bürgerliche Gesellschaft, moreover, indicates neither a discernible social configuration 
nor a set of available attitudes, but an aspiration towards the generalization of bourgeois 
conduct and politics. Following Wehler’s suggestion, it should be the latter, bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft, that offers itself most readily as a political project towards generalized 
civility and towards the extension of liberty and prosperity. 
A second social historian of considerable reputation, Werner Conze (2004), slightly 
departs from Wehler’s distinctions, in particular on the meaning of Bürgerlichkeit. 
While the fragmentation of culturally bourgeois milieus in German social history and 
the dislocating effects of wars and dictatorships on forms of social life have meant that 
concrete cultural repertories of 19th century attitudes were unavailable, Bürgerlichkeit 
retains a twofold significance. It can refer to the generalization of a form of bourgeois 
life that denotes economic activity, is regarded to be socially integrative and grounded 
on a commitment to liberal values (2004, 527); or it can refer to the civic generalization 
of Bürgerlichkeit as “citizenship and, further, as civility for the purpose of socio-
political and socio-cultural liberalization” (2004, 528). Conze argues that both 
understandings have been at hand in the history of the Federal Republic. Bürgerlichkeit, 
as an ideal of generalized bourgeois attitudes, can function as a template for social 
integration, economic success and political liberty. This model, however, has not been 
static and does not draw in a clear-cut fashion on the attitudinal repertories and ways of 
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life seen to be characteristic of 19th century bourgeoisie. Both Wehler and Conze, while 
arguing for potentials of Bürgerlichkeit to be rehabilitated in order to sustain liberal 
politics and an ethos of civic engagement, point to the need for interpretation in how 
such potentials are open to be mobilized, not just as a straightforward continuation of 
historical precedents, but as part of contemporary political efforts. 
Their distinctions, though not usually reflected in how the relevant notions are used in 
political rhetoric, point to certain paradoxes. The concept of Bürgergesellschaft that is 
of concern in this chapter indicates a vision of social organization, backed up by an 
appeal to historical precedents, which has been adopted in proposals towards social 
reform, notably that of the welfare state. A significant part of this reformist appeal 
towards Bürgergesellschaft is concerned with how attitudes of self-reliance, activity and 
responsibility can be generalized. This proposition, however, carries the name of a 
social formation that has been lost and is clearly– maybe with the exception of South 
German conservatives that we consider below – not characteristic of what most 
contemporary exponents of the idea of Bürgergesellschaft seek to revitalise.  
Historical precedents and the subtleties of conceptual distinctions have neither primarily 
motivated the adoption of the term, nor influenced and predisposed its use in 
contemporary political debate. Rather, current interest seems to result from the way the 
concept can be brought to bear on a number of perceived challenges, not least – as yet 
another eminent historian of the German bourgeoisie puts it – regarding the “experience 
that the state can become overextended in its position as an interventionist social 
welfare state” (Kocka 2004, 72). This, in turn, should not obscure that the struggle over 
the meaning of Bürgerlichkeit is politically significant, for example when mainstream 
parties attempt to appeal to centre-ground voters (such as when the concept of 'Neue 
Mitte' (new middle) was introduced, see Blair and Schröder 2003[1999]).  
Civil Society Traditions 
Similar to ambiguities in German Bürgerlichkeit, the idea of civil society looks back on 
a protracted history of conceptual advances with Aristotle’s koinonia politike or 
Cicero’s societas civiliis conventionally seen at its origins (Cohen and Arato 1992). The 
appearance of continuity, however, may deceive. Aristotle’s civil society marks a sphere 
in which high politics is not yet separated from other types of civic activity. Similarly, 
the further conceptual development in political theory is frequently at odds with more 
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contemporary understandings of civil society as an intermediary sphere between the 
economy and the state. For Adam Smith and John Locke, civil society is not least 
positively distinguished by commercial activity, while Adam Ferguson (1980) 
maintains this connection but points to the corrupting consequences of gain-seeking and 
luxury. Hegel conceives of civil society, indebted to Scottish Enlightenment thinking,  
as an intermediate step from privatized individualism towards the realization of morally 
purposeful life in the state (Hegel 1942[1842]: § 182 ff.; Waszek 1988). In the Marxist 
tradition, as suggested previously, bürgerliche Gesellschaft is the cultural configuration 
that reflects capitalist modes of production and is seen to be characterized by the 
valorisation of individualism and profiteering. This negative connotation of bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft has been carried forward and, we have suggested, still blemishes the 
German term. Only the differently charged Anglo-American notion of civil society, 
germanised as Zivilgesellschaft, appeared as an opening to redeem an equivalent, in 
Bürgergesellschaft (rather than in Marx’s bürgerliche Gesellschaft). 
It seems then that there is no unitary civil society tradition that could draw on more than 
a very limited degree of continuity between Greek, Roman, Christian and early modern 
thinking and link these to contemporary theorizations and uses in political discourse. 
The central concern of modern civil society ideas, the attempt to delineate activities and 
forms of collective life in between the state and the privacy of individual citizens, does 
not clearly correspond to previous uses of the concept, such as in antiquity. Neither is 
the definition of civil society as a social sphere of civic interaction, distinct from the 
economic sphere, a common feature of a theoretical tradition. 
In relation to the former, the distinction between spheres of political interaction, Charles 
Taylor suggests that it is the differentiation between society and its political 
organization, as expressed in the distinction between Church and state in Medieval 
political thought, that provided the origins of a politically autonomous conception of 
civil society (Taylor 1990). While civil society today often speaks to an “anti-
corporatist aspiration” (Taylor 1995, 207), there have been a variety of ways in which 
civil society has been related, distinguished or separated from the state. For Hobbes 
(1994), for example, status civilis emerges from the consensus that empowers the 
Leviathan: it is functionally tied to the state. Only the beginning of political liberalism, 
Taylor (1990, 51) suggests, provided civil society with the meaning that still resonates 
today – as an “extra-political reality” and as a sphere of legitimacy and collective action 
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in opposition to state power. While modern conceptions of civil society are frequently 
seen to be in opposition to the state, this oppositionality has not been shared historically.  
Taylor (1995) usefully distinguishes between what he considers the L- and the M-
stream of civil society. The former, as characterised by the work of John Locke, posits 
the separation of society and state. It subscribes to “the idea that society has its own 
prepolitical life and unity which the political structure must serve. Society has the right 
and power to make and unmake political authority” (Taylor 1995, 219). This idea has 
been powerful in the development of conceptions of popular sovereignty, where claims 
towards self-determination and democracy were inferred from rights invested in a social 
sphere whose authority was seen to trump those of monarchs, for example. Equally, it 
has been the underlying vision of recent revival of civil society ideas since the 1980s, 
maybe best characterised in György Konrád’s (1984) Antipolitics.  
By contrast, the M-stream - as characterized by Montesquieu’s writings – assumes an 
interlocking and mutual dependence of state and society. “Society is not defined 
independently of its political constitution. On the contrary, the free society is identified 
with a certain such constitution” (Taylor 1995, 214). As with the L-stream, such ideas 
can take different shapes and have been proposed in support of divergent political 
projects. Society is not extra- or apolitical; rather, both state and society are constitutive 
parts of what collectively makes for a balanced and well-governed body politic. Such 
ideas have been part of various ideas that infer functional benefits of a vibrant, 
associational society for collective life, including the functioning of political 
institutions. Alexis de Tocqueville (1970) and recent social capital theorists, such as 
Robert Putnam (2000), fall in this category.  
Regarding the second moment of rupture in the tradition – the relationship between civil 
and economic sphere – it is striking that ideas that are most familiar today have only 
recently been purged of their economic constituents. Traditionally, commerce and 
commodity exchange were seen as significant attributes of civil society activity. De 
Mandeville (1740) famously highlighted the civilizing and rationalizing force of 
capitalist exchange. For Hegel, civil society is the sphere of “private persons whose end 
is their own interest” (Hegel 1942[1842], § 187). Marx’s bürgerliche Gesellschaft, as 
we have seen, was primarily defined in economic terms, with its modes of political 
interaction a mere reflection of economic determinants. Clearly, these perspectives on 
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civil society stand in contrast to what has recently become a much more familiar 
picture. Here, distinctions are drawn, on the one hand, between logics of action that 
characterise civil society, and, on the other hand, the self-interest or market rationality 
that pervades the economic sphere (Seligman 1993). In public sphere-models of civil 
society this opposition between fundamentally opposing logics is reinforced and 
highlights an opposition of fundamentally opposing logics (Habermas 1962). These 
contemporary understandings may point towards certain ideals but can hardly be 
considered to be an invariable feature a unitary civil society tradition.  
Civil society has thus been re-interpreted in line with political exigencies and in 
response to intellectual currents. In the way it is available today, multiple layers of 
meaning are preserved and facilitate the deployment of civil society ideas. In fact, the 
resurgence of civil society since the 1980s, Krishan Kumar (1993, 375-6) suggests, does 
not evidence the power of unbroken traditions, but rather appears as “a self-conscious 
exercise in remembering and retrieval”. This retrieval is in equal measure about the 
identification of positive reservoirs as it is about contention and critique. Civil society 
has been cast in opposition to a range of foes, against an overbearing state, but equally 
against out-of-control market forces; against civic apathy and as a remedy to political 
disaffiliation, but equally against intrusive political projects, republicanism and an 
overemphasis on civic virtues (see Seligman 1995).70
Civil society encapsulates a number of perspectives on and a variety of normative 
visions of society. Depending on what currents are activated, different normative 
visions can be invoked. The politics that is proposed with an emphasis on the co-
dependence between state and society may differ significantly from what propositions 
that emphasize a more or less radical separation of spheres.   
 
Civil Society and the Democratic Movements in the East 
A political vision of civil society became the rallying cry of democratic and anti-
dictatorial politics in the 1980s. Not only did the notion gain some significance for 
activists within democratic movements, but it became the analytical focus for the study 
                                                 
70  Ideological projects and political programmes are thus difficult to separate from the various 
elaborations of civil society in political theory. Civil society is a notion with strong emotional 
undercurrents, as exemplified by the more recent wave of civil society enthusiasm or by the long-
standing negative appeal of the German bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Analytical, sentimental and 
normative concerns appear to be intertwined.  
 
131 
of a wide range of variegated processes and transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. Civil society was seen to be the primary driver of the so-called “third wave” 
of democratic transitions (Huntington 1991). 
In particular the Polish Solidarity movement has been considered as an influential 
example for the potentials of civil society and how these may challenge sclerotic and 
authoritarian state institutions. Solidarity conceived of civil society not primarily in 
order to arrive at new forms of state-society relationships, but rather to achieve a de-
coupling of the two and to carve out spheres outside of state control (Kumar 1993, 386). 
Leszek Kolakowski (1978) emphasized this impetus, pointed towards the significance 
of circles of friends and the family as places where ‘dignity’ and ‘truth’ reside, and 
which needed to be the starting point for social renewal (see Arato 1981). Similarly, 
Vaclav Havel highlighted the “independent spiritual, social and political life of society” 
(Vaclav Havel [1978] in Hall and Trentmann 2005, 200). In this sphere, “living within 
the truth” (ibid.) is a possibility that remains foreclosed in the wider political and social 
system. György Konrád’s Antipolitics – with antipolitics as the “ethos of civil society” 
(1984) – put similar emphasis on extra-political spheres. Following this logic, building 
civil society means the construction of alternative public spheres with their own 
channels of information and alternative value systems. Under the conditions of 
communism such spheres would, if not contribute to the destabilisation of the regime, at 
least allow for a modicum of personal and private dignity. Dubiel (1994, 76) captures 
the impetus of such movements which, in line with Taylor’s L-model, are “not about the 
dissolution of the state into society but about the institutionalisation of difference 
between state and society”. While the broader historical context and different 
conceptions  of civil society ideas in the transformations in Eastern Europe are beyond 
our scope (see however Thaa 1996; Glaser 2005), it is clear that a prominent 
understanding within these movements was close to Taylor’s L-stream of mutual 
autonomy. Even where the aim was not the radical separation of state and society, the 
assumption often seemed to be that civil society could be the sphere where persons can 
experience a sense of integrity and self-worth – experiences that state intervention 
would disrupt.  
As with the historical forms of German Bürgerlichkeit or with the precedents of civil 
society in political theory, the relevance of ideas of civil society in the democratisation 
of Eastern Europe does not immediately present itself for application in different 
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contexts. The oppositional force of civil society, fundamentally at odds with the state 
and its institutions, required an adaptation where it was to be applied in order to achieve 
not the dissolution of the state or the creation of separate spheres of undistorted social 
life, but the realisation of certain social goods that liberal democracies are seen to 
require.  
From East to West 
The reception of civil society ideas in Germany in the 1990s was inspired by the 
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe and, of course, in East Germany in particular. 
A certain enthusiasm about civil society as a panacea for various problems became 
evident, and the concept was adopted, it has been suggested, as shorthand for “all that is 
desired in the making of a democratic society” (Kumar 1993, 388). Once the spirit of 
civil society had been instilled, the suggestion seemed to be, it would break up 
authoritarian structures and set in motion a transition not just towards democracy but 
more generally towards a better society. 
There is one evident discontinuity in the westward journey of civil society ideas. In 
democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, the ideal had contained a vision of decoupled 
or independent spheres of social life. In the way these transitions were perceived from 
the West, it was the oppositional and unsettling qualities of civil society activity and 
notably its subversion of regime structures that were emphasized. With regard to 
possible applications of these ideas in the west, such properties needed to be qualified, 
the oppositionality directed away from the state in order to be targeted not at the 
‘system’, but at specific social conditions that were considered undesirable.  
Moreover, new purposes emerged that were not present in how civil society had been 
conceived in Poland and other places, such as the relevance of civil society activity for 
social integration. The way the concept was seen to provide for production of social 
glue, however, is usually closed linked to a discussion about the role of the state. Rather 
than with the autonomy of social self-organisation, it was now concerned with the 
“economic, socio-structural and cultural preconditions of political systems of the 
western type” (Thaa 1996, 159-60) and, notably, employed in political debates, such as 
on the welfare state in the 1980s and 90s (von Beyme 2000, 42). The idea of decoupling 
between state and society thus seemed to be replaced by an understanding of civil 
society as a corrective and supplement to state activity. In recent debates, nonetheless, 
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oppositional impulses, as well as a good measure of anti-state resentment, remain. 
Significantly, it not just its conceptual nuances that determine the way the idea of civil 
society can be used in current political debate. As Chris Hann (1995, 159, emphasis in 
original) suggests, since the early 1990s civil society was “no longer the preserve of an 
elite of political philosophers and historians. It was regularly used to add a certain 
gravitas to the prose of politicians and journalists in a bewildering variety of 
circumstances.” Accordingly, Alvin Gouldner’s account of 1980 misses something of 
the more multifaceted contemporary usage. Civil society, Gouldner (1980, 370) 
suggested, is about 
seeking an alternative, third way, to the atomization of a competitive market 
society, on the one side, and to a state dominated existence, on the other. 
Sociology conceives of civil society as a haven and support for individual 
persons, i.e., as de-atomizing; as a medium through which they can pursue their 
own projects in the course of their everyday lives; and as ways of avoiding 
dependence on the domination by the state.  
While the in-between quality of civil society remains, its functional benefits are no 
longer confined to the production of spheres of autonomy, as was predominantly the 
case in the East. Civil society is increasingly drawn on to point to the co-production of 
collective goods, a vibrant political sphere, social integration, a well-functioning market 
economy, the thriving of democratic institutions and a system of self-help and 
cooperation that supplements centralized welfare provision. Belonging to the state and 
belonging to civil society, contrary to what Gouldner would seem to argue, are 
generally not considered opposites. In fact, as Michael Walzer (1999, 63) has argued 
“the members of civil society must do what the citizens of the state can’t do – even 
though these are the same people”. The more recent purpose of civil society discourse is 
not least concerned with the definition of civic attitudes, activities and forms of 
responsible conduct.  
The relative prominence of the M-stream in civil society thinking, however, does not 
mean that earlier horizons of meaning have been lost, or that the revolutionary 
emotionalism that was part of how civil society activity was conceived of in the context 
of democratization has been completely abandoned. Civil society ideas, notably in their 
Bürgergesellschaft version, have been attached to an agenda of socio-economic reform 
that is strongly interested in the scaling back the welfare state. In this form, the older, 
separatist horizon remains retrievable, such as when civil society is introduced as a 
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substitute to state activity. Oppositionality towards the state is one of the strategic 
resources that a civil society rhetoric supplies. In the following we explore how such 
argumentative resources – as well as the particularities of the cultural tradition of 
Bürgerlichkeit – played a role in German political debate.  
Bürgergesellschaft and political debate 
The following sections consider the role of Bürgergesellschaft in German social reform 
debates. The concept is traced within pertinent discourses, speeches and political 
campaigns. We have established some of the influences that had played a role in such 
debates: civil society ideas, the international appeal that such ideas developed in the 
understanding of democratic transformations in the East, and notions of German 
Bürgerlichkeit. Despite this variety of influences, the following suggests that the 
introduction of Bürgergesellschaft in German reform discourse shows a certain degree 
of uniformity for how it has changed the contours of public debate on social issues. The 
introduction of the concept coincided with, and to some extent paved the way for, a turn 
to notions of individual responsibility and social activation.  
While occasional references to Bürgergesellschaft preceded the 1990s, it was only in the 
beginning of the 90s that the concept was regularly invoked with the social conditions 
of the Federal Republic in mind. The practical role of Bürgergesellschaft in German 
social reform debates can be traced back to the contribution of a few prominent policy 
entrepreneurs, public intellectuals and commentators. Warnfried Dettling (1993; 1995; 
1998; 2001) used the term in his criticism of the interventionist welfare state and in 
order to delineate alternative visions of social solidarity. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher 
(1992; 1993; 2000; 2003) employed the concept in her criticism of party politics and of 
how state institutions failed to allow for the direct democratic input of citizens. Alois 
Glück (2007) and others drew on the term to express ideas about active citizenship, 
social capital and to put emphasis on structures of local self-help and associational life. 
Only a fraction of its invocations provide a thorough theoretical underpinning or a 
sustained discussion of meaning and significance of the concept, and the following is 
primarily interested in conscious efforts of application and definition. These 
deployments of Bürgergesellschaft occurred against the backdrop of a particular 
understanding of social crisis that widely circulated in German political debate of the 
1990s. 
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The crisis of the German social model 
Helmut Dubiel (1994, 67) notes how the intuitive fit of civil society ideas is telling, not 
so much for how these respond to practical social challenges, but inasmuch as the 
notion condenses complex problem configurations into a compact formula. Indeed, the 
efficacy of Bürgergesellschaft can be understood against the background of such 
configurations that are diffuse, unspecific and difficult to disentangle with much 
precision. Any specific bundling of problems might draw on a number of widely 
accepted but previously unrelated challenges. Similar to ‘vehicular ideas’ that we have 
considered in Chapter 1, problem bundles may provide a convincing account as to why 
individual problems interrelate and pose an overarching challenge. For problems to 
‘bundle’, it needs to be illustrated why they do not merely account for individual 
challenges but culminate in a broader national one. The perception in France that the 
trente glorieuses had come to an end, as we have considered in the previous chapter,  
accounts for similar understanding of cumulative problems that may amount to the 
perception of a social crisis.  
In the early 1990s, a variety of problems presented themselves to be connected 
accordingly. German unification had turned out to be significantly more challenging 
than had been promised in its run-up. As the industrial sector in the East ceased to exist, 
with jobs virtually disappearing over night, the promise of effortless prosperity 
(blühende Landschaften) was quickly shown to be hollow (Müller 2006). This sense of 
crisis in the East was compounded by an increasing uncertainty about the viability of 
the West German model to cope with the conditions of reunification, globalization and 
international economic competition. The sclerosis of the Standort Deutschland 
(‘Germany plc’) became a recurrent theme in the economic and political debates of the 
day. The idea of a Reformstau (backlog of reforms) connected to what social scientists 
had previously established as the Unregierbarkeit (‘ungovernability’) of the federal 
system and its corporatist social model (see Offe 1980). 
As German post-war identification had drawn significantly on a sense of economic 
superiority, the saliency of economic motifs in this debate, and their weight as 
significant markers of German sensibilities, should not be underestimated (see for 
example Habermas 1990; 1991). The understanding that the country was falling behind, 
136 
and that the post-war settlement proved inadequate for catching up, became a recurrent 
and powerfully as well as prominently articulated theme in political debate.  
Roman Herzog, Germany’s Federal President 1994-1999, channelled this sentiment in 
his so-called Ruck speech on 26 April 1997.71
Stephan Lessenich (2006a, 336) offers an analysis of Herzog’s intervention. 
 “A sense of paralysis has gripped our 
society”, Herzog (1997) observed. “Germany faces the threat of falling behind,” he 
suggested and pointed to entrenched and inflexible interests that made it difficult to 
“keep up”. However, it was not merely the entrenched interests and inflexibility of 
powerful social actors, trade unions for example, that he identified as at the core of the 
German dilemma. The attitudes of a population that had lost its drive and spirit needed 
to be reconstructed. Accordingly, “paralysis” was central to Herzog’s diagnosis of the 
problem: the inflexibility and irresponsibility of the social collective made it difficult 
for Germany to compete with the dynamic economies of Asia and of the Anglo-
American world. He suggested that this collective sclerosis had to be understood as a 
manifestation of individual inflexibility and irresponsibility. The target audience of 
Herzog’s address was the German social collective as well as individual citizens. In 
fact, he suggested that the way persons related to the social collective was at the core of 
the problem: “Should it not be our goal to strive for a society of solidarity – not in the 
sense of maximized social transfer, but based on the trust put into the responsible 
conduct of every single person for him- or herself and for the community?” (Herzog 
1997). Traditional models of social transfer, in fact, had begun to coincide with a 
“dangerous loss of a sense of community (Gemeinsinn).” A “new social contract” 
needed to be put in place, and, Herzog suggested, “vested rights and possessions need to 
be up for grabs. Everybody needs to move.” 
The institutionalized incentives of the German social model … have shaped 
psychic structures and attitudinal disposition in such a passivating way that only 
a broadly targeted and deep-reaching change of mentality directed at social 
activation can pull the German cart out of a morass of deficient economic 
competitiveness, unpreparedness for political reform and excessive levels of 
demands.  
                                                 
71  The most memorable line of the speech was Durch Deutschland muss ein Ruck gehen (Germany 
needs to pull itself together). Ruck refers to the act of pulling together, or, alternatively, to a leap or 
sudden movement.  
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This change of mentality could only be achieved, according to Herzog, where social 
relations were redefined. The way the welfare state mediated the relationship between 
individuals and society, he suggested, had led to passivity. A revision of this 
pathological relationship would roll back the distorting impact of the state and, drawing 
on the rediscovery of individual responsibility, lead to an increased social dynamism to 
address significant problems – notably Germany’s comparative loss of economic 
standing. In contrast to interventions in the United Kingdom, where – as we will see 
later – community cohesion would only implicitly be grounded on a new social 
imaginary, in Herzog’s case the reinvention of the social was introduced as an open and 
conscious effort. In fact, the construction of a new social imaginary was the essence of 
Herzog’s political intervention, which was concerned with the remodelling of society, 
and with the creation of subjectivities and character dispositions that were suitable to 
the society thus remodelled.  
Herzog’s speech was exceedingly well received and resonated in political debate for a 
considerable amount of time. The reference to a social sclerosis corresponded to 
widespread problem descriptions. The appeal to individual responsibility coincided with 
a strongly articulated scepticism about the viability of the welfare state and its alleged 
shortcomings, seen to epitomize the paralysis of society as a whole. Moreover, the 
intervention was woven into an emotional call-to-arms that introduced individual 
flexibility and the required posture of activity as the fulfilment of a patriotic duty. Such 
types of appeal that would tie the duty to responsibility and individual activity to the 
well-being of the nation proved to be influential for subsequent interventions in reform 
debates. In two public campaigns, funded by employer’s associations, that explicitly 
worked with rhetorical elements of Herzog’s speech – Du bist Deutschland (‘You are 
Germany’) and Deutschland packt’s an (‘Germany tackles it’) – the according themes 
were put to use.  Herzog’s prescription of individual activation – “everybody needs to 
move” – was in tune with the zeitgeist and available to be translated for the purpose of 
the social reform debates of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Herzog’s problem account 
was conspicuously connected to contributions in these debates that called for a revision 
of the welfare state and, in particular, for a retreat from previous levels of service 
provision. His speech established problems, articulated solutions and wrapped both in 
an attractive language of both collective and individual responsibility.  
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Although not all of its different exponents subscribed to the core ideas of Herzog’s 
speech, the idea of Bürgergesellschaft was connected to some of such ideas, in 
particular to the significance of ‘activity’ and ‘activation’ as an antidote to significant 
social problems. Definitions of the Bürgergesellschaft concept incorporated themes that 
preceded Herzog’s intervention, such as of civic disaffiliation (Politikverdrossenheit) 
and of the need to establish channels for civic participation in an otherwise 
unresponsive political system. The interest in Bürgergesellschaft and democracy, its 
relationship with socio-economic questions and welfare reform, and a conservative-
localist understanding that used the potentials Bürgerlichkeit are our concern in the 
following.  
 Bürgergesellschaft and the welfare state 
The idea that shortcomings of the German socio-economic model could be attributed to 
flaws in its welfare state arrangements became one of the guiding themes in the reform 
debates of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The intention of a variety of contributions, 
and an idea that was propagated in a number of well-funded campaigns, was to outline 
an alternative social model to address such shortcomings. Bürgergesellschaft, in these 
interventions, was considered shorthand for such alternatives and was directed at 
repertories of responsibility that needed to be mobilized as an antidote to German 
sclerosis. 
In 1999, Rolf-E. Breuer, chief executive officer of Deutsche Bank, spelt out this idea in 
an editorial for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “While the world economy 
integrates, society is drifting apart”, Breuer (1999, 9) diagnosed. Pressures of 
globalization had limited the ability of the nation state to act and maintain national 
models of social transfer that could safeguard social cohesion. Bürgergesellschaft, in 
Breuer’s account, points to alternative resources. For him, it provided a horizon for the 
reinvention of society in order to be able to successfully cope with international 
pressures and with their repercussions for national solidarity.  
Among the problems Breuer identifies is the rigidity of the German labour market, 
economic protectionism, the sclerosis of state bureaucracies and of the corporatist 
model. An alternative would need to draw on a renewed appreciation of the 
independence of the civic sphere, predominantly defined in terms of free 
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entrepreneurship. Bürgergesellschaft, Breuer argued, offered itself as an alternative to 
the overweening state. He asked 
what about social policy? Whoever intends to adjust it to the tradition of 
Bürgergesellschaft, while also responding to the requirements of the global 
economy, needs to be primarily concerned with strengthening individual 
responsibility for oneself and for society [...]. In the globalized economy, there is 
a place for the state and its institutions, but it’s no longer the same. If it wants to 
safeguard the modernity of institutions and norms while simultaneously 
guaranteeing and maintaining social cohesion, it needs to be a true Bürgerstaat. 
(Breuer 1999, 9) 
This Bürgerstaat (Bürger-state), Breuer suggested, required a sense of responsibility: 
“lives need to be lived responsibly” (ibid.). Individual rights had to correlate with 
obligations: freedom of choice in relation to employment meant, according to his 
intervention, the responsibility to “constantly work on one’s qualifications”; free access 
to information and the absence of censorship come with the obligation “to stay 
informed”. The vision of Bürgergesellschaft, in Breuer’s contribution, was not spelt out 
in great precision. It served as an alternative but vague framework of social solidarity 
absent from the welfare state, whose provisions would not hold in the face of 
international competition. 
Outlining similar objectives, a well-funded public relations campaign was initiated in 
the early 2000s and deployed the idea of Bürgergesellschaft along similar lines. The 
BürgerKonvent was set up by Meinhard Miegel, a political scientist with close relations 
to the German Christian Democrats (CDU). Miegel (2002) had been a critic of welfare 
state arrangements for some time and had advanced a line of critique by accusing its 
regime of producing immature and other-directed subjects. The welfare state, it was 
argued in an positive review of book by Miegel (The Deformed Society), “with its 
bizarre and implausible mechanisms of redistribution degrades individuals in a 
paternalistic manner to babbling children” (Deckstein 2002). In fact, “the welfare state 
of German coinage is rooted in a pre-democratic tradition and has long stood in the way 
of the development of Bürgergesellschaft” (Miegel quoted in Deckstein 2002). Invoking 
the Wirtschaftswunder and the post-war social settlement, Miegel (2002, 210) suggested  
that  
the natural cohesion (natürlicher Zusammenhang) between individuals which 
had been weakened through the socio-political interventions by the [Nazi] state, 
had to be revived, social connections had to be rebuilt. Fundamentally it was 
140 
about nothing else than our contemporary controversy: Bürgergesellschaft or 
Staatsgesellschaft?”  
Miegel also put emphasis on how the welfare state had led to severe psychological 
dislocations, “split personalities”, where citizens were “grown-up men and women, and 
yet babbling children. One hundred years of the welfare state have led to split 
personalities” (2002, 229). Against this negative backdrop, Miegel defined the positive 
ideal of Bürgergesellschaft. Defenders of the old system of state-sponsored social 
solidarity, he suggested, had no grasp of its alternative potentials: 
The Bürgergesellschaft that is characterized by the idea that individuals and their 
surrounding communities carry as much responsibility as possible and thus grow 
and are empowered, is foreign [to their deformed conception of social 
solidarity]. As long as these forces rule, it will be difficult for Germany to 
develop into a confident, responsible and dynamic Bürgergesellschaft. (2002, 
284-5) 
This reformist project was introduced not just as a desirable political objective but in the 
terms of an existential struggle. If challenges remained unmet, Miegel pointed to the 
likelihood of revolutionary countermovement (ibid., 285), though it remained unclear 
whether these would be in favour of Bürgergesellschaft or some other ideal. 
Positions by Breuer or Miegel could be rejected as idiosyncratic and particular, were 
they not profoundly in tune with the currents of public debate as outlined by Herzog and 
successfully appealed to in political mobilisations, such as by the BürgerKonvent. The 
BürgerKonvent used the third person standpoint of a collective ‘we’, thus claiming for 
itself the vantage point of a disaffected citizenry. It applied the language and symbolism 
of a social movement that would articulate widespread discontent on the part of the 
population (BürgerKonvent 2003). “We Germans are at an impasse. If we do not change 
our course we will collide with fundamentally changed realities” (BürgerKonvent 2003, 
3). Those who were “willing to change face those who stick to vested rights and 
interests” (BürgerKonvent 2003, 4). Accordingly, a struggle (Ringen) was about to 
break out over the “structures of power that have arisen from a misguided welfare state” 
(BürgerKonvent 2003, 4). The aim, in turn, is “to create a free and active 
Bürgergesellschaft. The BürgerKonvent takes charge of this development, offers itself 
as a platform and calls on citizens to participate in the social-political future of this 
country” (BürgerKonvent no date). Against this background, a number of different 
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claims were articulated, among them freedom of choice in the welfare state or 
“competition from Kindergarten to university”.  
Such claims by the BürgerKonvent, proposed by using the language of an emotional 
appeal that Herzog had established, were presented in a series of television spots on 
private channels. The spots drew on the imagery of rescue efforts and the outpouring of 
expressions of solidarity in the aftermath of the flooding of the River Oder in 1997. 
They invoked a sense of national purpose by comparing the perceived national 
challenge with this particular example of collective self-help. Rudolf Speth (2003, 3) 
remarked that this strategy of the BürgerKonvent “skilfully connects the semantic-
symbolic content of the debate on Bürgergesellschaft with a programme of radical 
social reform” (ibid.). The means for these representations were provided by the 
imagery of the “foundational myth of the Federal Republic, national symbols and 
communal sentiments” (ibid.).  
The interventions of Breuer and the BürgerKonvent provide an illustration of how 
Bürgergesellschaft was invoked to substantiate socio-economic reform proposals. Such 
contributions were predominantly concerned with reducing the scale of the welfare state 
and with promoting alternative visions of solidarity to replace those embodied in the 
welfare state regime. The concrete nature and institutional underpinnings of this 
solidarity remained largely elusive, but strong emphasis was put on the self-organisation 
of an autonomous sphere of citizens, conceived as mobile, flexible, and active subjects. 
This understanding of Bürgergesellschaft is characterized, though not to its detriment in 
the political debate of the time, by a certain paradox: it either describes potentials for 
activity as always already or as not yet existing. It remains unclear whether the spirit of 
activity that underpins the new solidarity needs to be fostered or imposed.  
Bürgergesellschaft and local self-help 
Already in the interventions by Herzog and Breuer, a certain complaint about the moral 
decline of German society was evident. For Breuer (1999, 9), a “fragmentation of moral 
signposts” was part of the problem that puts the Standort Deutschland into question. 
Herzog pointed to the decline and to the rediscovery of duty as a virtue, and thus paid at 
least passing reference to solidly conservative positions. Moreover, in these 
understandings Bürgergesellschaft was considered to be at least partially synonymous 
with virtues of self-reliance and economic activity, and such virtues, it was suggested, 
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had a tradition in Bürgerlichkeit. The welfare state, with its alien and socialist 
influences, it was argued, had done its part to distort the foundations of such virtues. 
However, there are additional ideational and cultural markers present in different 
conceptualizations of Bürgergesellschaft, which exceed the problematisation of the 
welfare state. Rather, some commentators pointed towards broader processes of social 
and cultural modernization. Following this line, it was the decline of cultural attributes 
of bourgeois life that was at the core of the predicament. Bürgergesellschaft was 
introduced as a counterpoint to the decline not only of a socio-economic configuration, 
but of the cultural repertory of attitudes underpinning such forms of life, of 
Bürgerlichkeit, understood with Wehler (2001) as cultural attributes, conventions and 
norms.  
A significant number of contributions towards Bürgergesellschaft were worked out in 
the German South and bore marks of its more solidly conservative political culture 
(Ministerium für Arbeit und Soziales 2004; Glück 2007). It is in particular a certain type 
of civic localism that was at the core of such propositions, pointing to the associational 
life in towns and villages, with their structures of reciprocity and mutual assistance. 
While the generalization of Bürgergesellschaft for the purposes of social reform in the 
national context was often considered in such contributions, too, the concept remained 
frequently connected to the local context and, specifically, to the political project of 
fostering local structures of self-help (Ueltzhöffer and Ascheberg 1996). 
In a second perspective on Bürgergesellschaft, a certain cultural conservatism was even 
more evident. Bürgerlichkeit was introduced as a repertory that was at risk due to 
processes of socio-cultural modernization. It was the generalization of cultural attitudes 
of Bürgerlichkeit that had provided for post-war civility and for the success of the 
Federal Republic. Such attitudinal repertories, it was suggested, were at risk. The 
permissiveness of the alternative left, the generalization of their disdain for more 
traditional values, and, very broadly, the cultural liberalization since the 1970s were 
captured with the notion of Wertverlust (loss of values) (e.g., Wickert 1994; see 
Duncker 2000 for a study of the theme of Wertverlust in German public discourse). 
Undersocialized groups on the margins of society were invoked to illustrate the 
consequences of this experience of loss. Crime and incivility were considered to be 
symptoms of the loosening of a valued-based consensus.  
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In a contribution to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Klaus Schroeder 
articulated this account and pointed to increasingly uncivil attitudes among young 
people. It is the “destruction of moral norms,” the “ethical vacuum” and the “disoriented 
individualism” that had been precipitated by social and cultural liberalization. The 
declining force of such a value consensus has had disastrous consequences. The article 
was entitled: “Young offenders – neither right-wing radicals nor victims of 
individualization. Whether German or immigrants: they hate Bürgergesellschaft” 
(Schroeder 2004). The concept thus captured the desire for the preservation of a moral 
and cultural consensus. It was put in opposition in particular to the project of the 
Achtundsechziger, the movement towards social and cultural liberties that had emerged 
in the 60s and 70s. The Bürgerlichkeit of the post-war Federal Republic had provided 
for its success and relative civility (Schmid 2001); the dissolution of such cultural 
repertories accounted for a loss of values and personal disorientation. The Premier of 
the Land Baden-Württemberg, Lothar Späth (1999, 101) made a similar case for 
Bürgergesellschaft:  
The people look for a place of belonging (Beheimatung) in the social space…. 
This points to the desire of the people to step beyond anonymity and again into 
neighbourhood. This can be used to develop forms of devotion that fit to the 
circumstances of contemporary life. 
Against the sense of disorientation that was considered to be a result of modernisation, 
the Kommune, a local sphere of self-help and reciprocity, was seen to provide for the 
alternative values and networks of interaction. Bürgergesellschaft at the local level was 
introduced as an alternative model of solidarity and consensual values that allowed for a 
sense of belonging, civility and effective problem-solving. 
Although the conservative use of Bürgergesellschaft related, sometimes even closely, to 
a welfare-reformist counterpart, there was a significant disjuncture between what the 
two understandings were seen to require. For Rolf-E. Breuer (1999, 9), 
Bürgergesellschaft was about flexibility and the breaking up of ossified structures that 
impeded individual activity. The conservative understanding, by contrast, suggested that 
this vibrancy was already present in existing spheres of local self-help in the rural south. 
Bürgergesellschaft and active citizenship 
The self-help localism that characterised the conservative version of the 
Bürgergesellschaft concept connects to a third perspective that was prominently 
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articulated by liberal politicians, such as Hildegard Hamm-Brücher (1992; 1993; 2000; 
2003). This version drew significantly on two positions that had emerged in preceding 
decades: first, an appreciation of the positive inputs of social movements (Neue Soziale 
Bewegungen) (Roth and Rucht 1991; Rucht 1994), and, second, the critique of the 
German political system for its alleged anti-democratic sclerosis and its inhospitability 
to direct democratic input (Schiller 2002). 
Regarding the former, the position of social movements vis-à-vis German state 
structures had historically been ambiguous. The initial thrust of activity in the 1970s 
had been to provide for an alternative sphere of activity in opposition to an 
unaccommodating state, in some sense not unlike the intentions of the Polish Solidarity 
movement. The idea of an außerparlamentarische Opposition (extraparliamentary 
opposition) had been coined in relation to the political opposition of the student-led 
movement of the time and seemingly put high value on the refusal to integrate into 
established channels within the political system (Richter 1998). Its partial success was 
accompanied by an increasing entanglement of its representatives in the political 
institutions of the Federal Republic, most notably through the electoral success of the 
Green Party from the early 1980s onwards (Klein and Falter 2003). 
Accordingly, ideas of Bürgergesellschaft that have been worked out from this 
perspective were – despite initially having separatist inclinations – not so much 
following Taylor’s L-stream, an idea of autonomy and separation from the state, but 
were concerned to develop a notion of active citizenship that would underline the 
significance of self-organised social activity as a vital supplement to the state. Such 
ideas were frequently found in political initiatives aimed at encouraging active 
citizenship (Engagementpolitik). In an all-party parliamentary commission that was 
concerned with such ideas, Bürgergesellschaft was seen to indicate a system “in which 
citizens […] may substantially impact on the polity’s fate through the involvement in 
self-organised associations and by using available avenues of participation” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002, 59). While not entirely dissimilar to the conservative tradition of local 
reciprocity, such interventions were directed more explicitly at goals of democratic 
reform, direct democracy, and the encouragement of citizens to participate in national 
politics. 
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The second perspective that loosely falls into this area is rooted in a traditional critique 
of the alleged party-political usurpation of the German state. The complaint is that, even 
though the basic law (Grundgesetz) had little to say about political parties, German 
realities were thoroughly party-political (von Beyme 1993). Occasionally, prominent 
representatives, such as the Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker (1992), had 
introduced similar suggestions into political debate. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, a liberal 
politician, introduced a version of Bürgergesellschaft to underpin a similar criticism. 
According to Hamm Brücher (1993), a dissonance between “the letters and the spirit of 
our constitution” and political realities had deformed the political system to a situation 
of “party supremacy” (Parteienherrschaft). A “democracy of bystanders” 
(Zuschauerdemokratie) had emerged and citizens were actively discouraged from 
seeking to contribute to politics. Hamm-Brücher defined Bürgergesellschaft as a 
democratic project in opposition to this entrenched supremacy of political parties. It 
presented itself as a solution to a particular diagnosis of the reasons for political 
disaffection (see Arzheimer 2002 for a discussion of the concept of 
Politikverdrossenheit) and sought to transform the political system so that the direct 
input of citizens could be accommodated. This type of Bürgergesellschaft focused, in 
particular, on active citizenship as an essential addition to the political process and as a 
contributing factor for a vibrant democracy. It remains most closely associated with 
concerns that are articulated by the Green Party.  
The kind of activity that was envisaged following this understanding of the concept was 
not primarily meant to provide the solution to problems of socio-economic inactivity 
caused by the ‘passivating influences’ of the welfare state. It related, however, to 
propositions towards civic solidarity. This understanding offered a response to 
situations where too much emphasis was seen to have been put on institutions, and too 
little on the civic self-organization of Bürgergesellschaft. 
Uneasy syntheses: the social policy of Bürgergesellschaft 
We have identified three understandings of Bürgergesellschaft, each of which 
responded to a particular account of social problems. Each of these perspectives also 
proposed notions of activity, either understood as social self-reliance, local mutuality or 
civic participation. These three accounts were not mutually exclusive and often 
coincided in political rhetoric. The horizon of active citizenship was drawn on in 
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contributions that sought to promote welfare reform. Following this line, examples of 
civic self-organization could be extended to provide for an alternative understanding of 
solidarity and as a substitute to the top-down workings of the welfare state. There were 
also overlaps between the conservative and the welfare-reformist perspective, both of 
which shared a focus on economic vibrancy. 
Furthermore, the three accounts coincided for how they attributed problems to an 
overbearing state and its ossified institutions. Positions on how to solve such problems, 
however, differed inasmuch as they foregrounded either ideas of social and economic 
self-reliance, reinforced structures of local self-help that were underpinned by 
generalized Bürgerlichkeit or the reinvigoration of democratic potentials and active 
citizenship. What seemed to unite various versions of Bürgergesellschaft was the theme 
of activity and responsibility. Before turning to how these themes were developed and 
substantiated for policy-making purposes, we consider the adoption of 
Bürgergesellschaft by policy makers, most significantly by the then governing Social 
Democrats (SPD). 
As was the case in a variety of European political contexts, the reconfiguration of social 
milieus has made German parties reflect on their constituencies (Bremer and Lange-
Vester 2005). For the SPD it is in particular the dissolution of a reliably social-
democratic working class, which had traditionally accounted for the core of its support, 
that precipitated attempts to redefine its target voters. The conventional self-description 
of the two large parties of the Federal Republic had been that of Volksparteien, parties 
whose claim, despite their respective accentuation of working and middle classes, was 
to represent the entirety of the electorate beyond narrow socio-economic interests. We 
have already noted that Neue Mitte – introduced and promoted as a German version of 
the Third Way – became the slogan for a more centrist reorientation of the Social 
Democrats.  
Schröder’s Zivile Bürgergesellschaft 
This reorientation was perhaps most clearly discernible in a programmatic statement by 
Gerhard Schröder and Tony Blair, published in June 1999, that brought together the two 
notions (Neue Mitte and Third Way). Social justice, it was suggested, should not be 
“confused with the imposition of equality of outcome” (Blair and Schröder 2003, 111). 
Rather, new notions of solidarity needed to proceed by “rekindling a spirit of 
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community and solidarity, strengthening partnership and dialogue between all groups in 
society and developing a new consensus for change and reform” (2003, 112), not least 
in order to maintain “social cohesion in the face of real and perceived uncertainty” 
(2003, 112). As with the British Labour Party, this reorientation towards a middle 
ground meant that older programmatic tenets were adapted, ideas of redistributive 
justice reconsidered, and visions of social solidarity introduced as potential 
replacements to older, state-centred paradigms (Wehrhöfer 1999; Blair and Schröder 
2003). In the case of the SPD, it was suggested that “Schröder’s candidate for the 
ideological void is Bürgergesellschaft” (Heuser and Von Randow 2000). 
Schröder presented his definition of Bürgergesellschaft in 2000. It thus preceded the 
social reform agenda that was launched after his re-election in 2002, the so-called 
Agenda 2010. Schröder’s suggestions on Bürgergesellschaft mirrored a wide range of 
themes that had been established previously. The major threat that Schröder (2000a) 
identified was frustration (Verdrossenheit), fuelled by globalization, unemployment, 
right wing extremism. Such threats added up to a sense of insecurity as “society feels, 
more than it knows, that the certainties of the political and social geography are no 
longer solid” (Schröder 2000b, 19). In light of such challenges “a general feeling of 
uncertainty about what politics can do” (ibid.) prevailed. Responding to this situation, 
Schröder argued that it was necessary to develop a political project, zivile 
Bürgergesellschaft. This idea “is about a civilization of change through political 
integration and a new civic spirit (Bürgerbewußtsein). About increased self-reliance 
leading to the common good.” This project would require a “better, an active and 
activating state” (ibid.) and types of welfare provision that replace effortless 
alimentation for a system that combines “support and demand” (Fordern und Fördern). 
It was introduced as a departure from the priorities of equality of outcome and towards 
equality of opportunities. “Under these conditions Zivilgesellschaft becomes an 
important space of social participation. Here the sense of identification needs to be 
created that ties the individual to the values and goals of society” (ibid.). As a new 
programme for the SPD, “it follows the principle of a return to small units” (ibid.). The 
support structures and the activity that could be engendered in such units were seen to 
allow, in turn, for the departure from traditional tenets on the welfare state without 
jeopardising social solidarity. 
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Schröder’s version of Zivile Bürgergesellschaft drew on elements that were present in 
the streams of Bürgergesellschaft that we have identified previously. Political 
disaffiliation and the frustration of citizens vis-à-vis the lack of participatory avenues 
was equally part of this notion as was a certain type of self-help localism (“the return to 
small units”). While such ideas were not as pronounced as in the contributions from 
southern conservatives, they amounted to an interesting departure from social-
democratic perspectives that traditionally proceeded from a more centralized 
perspective. Most conspicuously, it was the alleged sclerosis of the welfare state that 
permeated Schröder’s contribution. The welfare state was said to be unviable in light of 
global pressures. In addition, it was also introduced as undesirable – a fairly radical 
position to come from within the SPD – as it was seen to be an obstacle towards 
individual initiative and self-reliance. Pressures of globalization had put not only 
principles of redistribution in doubt, they had also disrupted individual senses of 
security and belonging. Accordingly, zivile Bürgergesellschaft was introduced not just 
in response the dilemmas of the welfare state. It coincidentally was seen to offer – 
reminiscent of remedies against fracture sociale proposed by Jacques Chirac – an 
alternative sense of security and belonging that the welfare state could no longer 
provide.72
Agenda 2010 
  
The re-election of Schröder’s coalition government with the Green party coincided with 
the build-up to the Iraq War. In line with public opinion, the Chancellor came out 
strongly against the American-led invasion plans. Once re-elected, in 2003 Schröder 
reiterated reasons for the refusal to join the invasion in a major policy statement to 
parliament (‘Courage for Peace, Courage for Change’), and connected this idea of a 
principled and courageous abstention to the courage required in the area of social 
reform (Schröder 2003): “Today, the restructuring the welfare state, its modernization, 
has become unavoidable.” The diagnosis was strikingly similar to Herzog’s intervention 
in 1997. He suggested that German economic performance was lagging behind; its 
welfare regime had become unaffordable and sclerotic thus thwarting individual 
                                                 
72  In relation to the concept of Bürgergesellschaft and, more particularly, to Schröder’s definition of 
Zivile Bürgergesellschaft, Elisabeth Niejahr (2000) – drawing on survey data – pointed out that 
they were widely misunderstood. Zivilgesellschaft would regularly be mistaken for Zivildienst, the 
non-military part of Germany’s previously compulsory national service scheme. The notion of the 
‘activating state’, quite contrary to its intended meaning, would be mistaken for the desire to make 
the state more active in society. 
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responsibility and self-reliance. Accordingly, “ending welfare as we know it” became a 
slogan for the reform as sketched out in Parliament: “We will cut provisions, support 
self-reliance and demand more personal contributions.” “Nobody will be permitted to 
lean back and do nothing at the expense of the community: who refuses to do 
reasonable work can count on sanctions.” The policy statement marked the beginning of 
the most significant welfare reform effort in German post-war history (Meyer 2004). 
The various measures that have been introduced in its course have proved lasting and 
have changed the nature of the welfare state (Brütt 2003). Self-reliance and individual 
responsibility became the guiding themes in the re-organisation of health services, 
employment and pensions. Notably, such measures were introduced by pointing to the 
resources of Bürgergesellschaft as substitute to state-focused conceptions of social 
solidarity.  
Activation in the Labour Market 
The idea of the ‘activating’ or ‘enabling’ state in the area of employment preceded the 
Agenda 2010. Activation, we have suggested in Chapter 2, became a transnational 
paradigm in the 1980s and 90s that was adopted in a variety of domestic policy 
contexts. The OECD, for example, advocated such positions in the area of employment. 
It was suggested that the “realisation of the full human potential of the population 
involves the employment not only of the unemployed, but of all those who wish to 
participate – whether working full-time, part-time, or in casual employment” (OECD, 
Employment Outlook 1989, quoted in Walters 1997, 225). In a 1997 document with the 
title Societal Cohesion and the Globalising Economy, it was further suggested that in 
the “aggressive pursuit of active labour market policies” (OECD 1997, 14)  
“disincentives to work” (ibid.) had to be eliminated: 
The perverse consequences of ‘centralised solidarity’ are becoming clearer to all. 
In spite of the gargantuan sums which are claimed by these systems, they are 
constantly proving their inability to deal with problems of poverty and 
marginalisation for which they were – in theory – created. (OECD 1997, 74) 
Civil society, the OECD argued, provided an antidote of activity to the pathological 
sclerosis of traditional welfare provision and assistance schemes. European policy 
positions on employment were similarly revised in the 1990s. The European 
Employment Strategy (EES) put a strong focus on insertion into the labour market and, 
more generally, on targeting the potential of all those parts of the population – welfare 
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recipients, pensioners, housewives – whose inactivity was seen to be problematic 
(Ludwig-Mayerhofer and Wroblewski 2004). A trans-national trend towards activation 
had been established (Taylor-Gooby 2005). In the case of Germany, it was the relatively 
high level of unemployment and the inability of its “conservative” welfare regime 
(Esping-Andersen 1990) to absorb the unemployed and otherwise economically inactive 
that made it particularly receptive to such ideas. Already the first coalition agreement 
between the Social Democrats and the Green Party followed the transnational trend: our 
“guiding principle (Leitbild) is the activating state” (Koalitionsvereinbarung 1998, para. 
11). While such ideas remained largely rhetorical, there were clear advances towards the 
adoption of measures of activation from 2003 onwards. The reform of the welfare state 
became part of the government’s programme (SPD/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2002, 52). 
In the area of employment and social assistance, it was various legislative initiatives – 
following the name of Peter Hartz an executive of Volkswagen who in 2002 had chaired 
a commission on the future of the welfare state – that brought major changes. The 
paradigm for these reforms was activation (Brütt 2003; Lessenich 2005). Hartz II and 
III brought about a new institutional structure for job centres and the establishment of 
the so-called Ich-AG (Me, Inc.) that provided monetary incentives for the unemployed 
to become self-employed and, as an alternative to unemployment, various measures 
geared towards the creation of a low-wage sector. Hartz IV initiated the combination of 
social assistance and unemployment benefit on a level below old social assistance 
provisions. The restructured job centres were instructed to facilitate and pressure the 
recipients of the new benefit scheme to transition back to work, to offer training and to 
penalize those who showed insufficient readiness for taking up work (Brütt 2003).   
Conclusion 
Regarding the connection between Bürgergesellschaft and the reform initiatives of the 
early 2000s, we have suggested that society had been reinvented in political discourse 
so that its ‘activation’ seemed a compelling response to widely acknowledged problems. 
The imaginary work invested into the idea of Bürgergesellschaft had anchored a new 
account of pertinent social problems in public discourse and had established its 
connection to a vision of generalized social activity. A contrast was established between 
pertinent problem images, social sclerosis and general social immobility on the one 
hand, and, on the other, an idea of activated sociability that would address various social 
problems. This idea of activation was introduced across different policy areas, for active 
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citizenship (Deutscher Bundestag 2002), pensions (the so-called Riester reforms), or 
labour market reform and changes to social assistance schemes (Hartz et al. 2002).  
Various definitions of Bürgergesellschaft drew contrasts between scenarios of social 
disintegration, variously conceived in terms social collapse, moral decline or ‘lagging 
behind’, and the positive scenarios of new solidarity and generalized social activity that 
would account for a more desirable society. These contrasts are evident in the various 
public-relations campaigns, usually funded by employers’ associations, that appealed 
directly to individual responsibility for the collective good. The Du bist Deutschland 
(You are Germany) campaign (Cords, Hoffjann and Schuettler 2006) or the public 
relations work of the Intiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft (Speth 2004) or of the 
BürgerKonvent contrasted what was presented as a sclerotic, undesirable status quo 
with a more positive future ahead. They pointed to examples of self-help and to various 
instances of where ‘ordinary citizens’, faced with experiences of crisis, had assumed 
responsibility for the collective good. By assuming responsibility for one’s own 
conduct, the message was, one would aspire to standards of excellence and fulfil one’s 
patriotic duty. The nature of this responsibility and the direction of the required activity 
were usually unclear, thus supporting our suggestion that what is invoked in such 
campaigns, just as in the discourse of Bürgergesellschaft, is a sense of generalized 
activity. The implication was that whoever does not aspire to such standards, betrayed 
his or her patriotic duty.  
Sephan Lessenich (2006b, 614) has suggested that the introduction of activation 
strategies is accompanied by the “re-interpretation of socio-structural into behavioural-
psychological problems, the systematic inversion of collective and individual 
responsibilities, the rampant remoralisation of questions of social inequality.” 
Bürgergesellschaft discourse, we have suggested, has played a part in this inversion. It 
was substantiated by a variety of traditions that could be mobilized in political debate: 
German Bürgerlichkeit, civil society ideas and how they were considered to have been 
at work the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe. In how the concept reflected 
particular understandings of state-society relationships that were entailed in these 
traditions, it was open to be defined towards a particular vision of political reform. 
Although definitions and deployments of the Bürgergesellschaft concept in political 
debate are not the exclusive site that would need to be considered for a full picture of 
changing trajectories identified in this chapter, it contributed to revisions and to a new 
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valorisation of social activity. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the concept contributed 
to changes in the landscape of debate on social issues. Individual responsibility and self-
reliance, anchored in various conceptualisations of Bürgergesellschaft, informed a new 
social imaginary. 
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Chapter 5: Community Cohesion 
Introduction 
From a position of relative obscurity in conventional political language, the interest in 
cohesion has grown exponentially in British public discourse. Cohesion became the 
term of choice to characterize various social developments that were seen to put in 
doubt the stability of the social or moral fabric of British society. Conservative groups, 
such as Civitas or its offshoot, the Centre for Social Cohesion, use the concept to bring 
into focus the alleged weakness of liberal pluralism facing Islamic extremism.73 But 
cohesion was also widely drawn on to express progressive concerns. The Equality and 
Human Rights Commission (EHRC) referred to cohesion to express an interest in racial 
equality and human rights. Non-governmental organisations and research institutes 
provided guidance on cohesion to local and national policy-makers.74 Advocacy groups 
coined their requests accordingly. Just as in France, ministerial portfolios were changed 
to reflect the theme. While cohesion, as a remedy to social ills, was not on the list of 
older Labour priorities, in the New Labour years it became – and this will be the interest 
of this chapter – a significant concern.75
More significantly than its spread across the political spectrum, cohesion was conceived 
as a plausible perspective to address a variety of public policy issues, from urban 
renewal, immigration, integration, and citizenship, to policing, race relations, economic 
recovery and domestic and international security concerns. In the years after 2001, 
  
                                                 
73  See Conway (2009) and MacEoin (2009) for positions associated with Civitas. Conway (2009, 
127) suggests that “main threats to social cohesion today emanate from two main sources: first, the 
radicalisation of disaffected young British‐born Muslims; second, tensions between newly arrived 
immigrants, especially from Eastern Europe and other parts of the developing world, and those 
British citizens among whom they settle and with whom they compete for public services and 
jobs.” The Centre of Social Cohesion and its director, Douglas Murray, are particularly concerned 
with the ‘radicalisation’ of British Muslims and how extremist views allegedly pervade the 
Muslim mainstream. Their positions are usually couched as expressions of a civilizational struggle 
between Western and non-Western – i.e. illiberal, oppressive – values.   
74   For example the Institute for Community Cohesion (iCoCo), established by Ted Cantle who also 
chaired an influential inquiry that established the notion of community cohesion in British debate 
(Benjamin 2005). In his influential report, Cantle suggested that the “promotion of ‘cohesion’ 
could itself become a desirable and legitimate focus for funding” (Cantle 2001, para. 5.5.9).  
75  The report of the Commission on Social Justice (1994), set up in 1992 by Labour leader John 
Smith, was arguably one of the first instances of how the new concerns with social ties that would 
characterise New Labour were articulated. The commission established that the “moral and social 
reconstruction of our society depends on our willingness to invest in social capital. We badly need 
to mend a social fabric that is so obviously torn apart. Social capital is a good in itself; it makes 
life possible. But social capital is also essential for economic renewal; the two go together” (1994, 
308). 
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community cohesion became a central point of reference for the development of 
political strategies in response to various social problems. 
The use of the past tense in this brief account seems appropriate. More recently, there 
has been a shift away from a language of social cohesion or community cohesion. A 
new concern with material disadvantages suffered by the ‘white working class’ became 
more relevant towards the end of Labour’s third term. This new emphasis seemed to 
signal a departure from what was seen to have been an exaggerated focus on the 
conditions of ethnic minorities (Communities and Local Government 2010). 
Furthermore, the concern with ‘violent extremism’ and the Prevent Violent Extremism 
(PVE) agenda meant that the policy objective of community cohesion – although it had 
been developed under the impression of new concerns with domestic security – had to 
compete with different political agendas.76
This perception is reinforced since the new Coalition government is in place. What will 
replace community cohesion is unclear at this stage. The Big Society concept has so far 
not been operationalized for the kinds of problems that cohesion was supposed to 
address (Pattie and Johnston 2011). Although urban unrest in North London and across 
the country might create some openings for new political paradigms – not dissimilar to 
the juncture that brought about community cohesion – it is unlikely that community 
cohesion will be resuscitated. The Labour formulation of the concept has recently 
invited criticism from Tories for how it was seen to entail “social engineering” (Grieve 
2010); although such objections were largely muted when cohesion was initially 
developed. Indeed, David Cameron (2007a; 2007b) had responded positively to the 
idea. In spite of some resistance towards the imposition of collective standards of 
 Arguably, towards the end of the Labour 
government community cohesion was a policy objective whose appeal had been 
exhausted.  
                                                 
76  The turn to PVE, and in particular its ‘Prevent’ component, can be seen as a critical response to the 
allegedly unfocused nature of community cohesion priorities (Kundnani 2009). Conway (2009, 
127) concludes a  recent book-length treatment of the failures of ‘community cohesion’, by saying 
that “in order for Britain to enjoy social cohesion today” what is needed “for its foreign 
immigrants … and their children, to undergo what has been referred to as their patriotic 
assimilation.” While the Prevent Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda and community cohesion are 
distinct in a number of significant ways, they share a perspective that foregrounds behaviour. 
Community cohesion is at risk due to the attitudes that are causing ‘parallel lives’. PVE’s Prevent 
component puts emphasis on radicalisation. While community cohesion spoke of vibrancy, social 
capital and attitudes, PVE addressed resilience (and continues doing so after its revision in June 
2011). Both locate the problem they intend to address in the collective behaviour of post-
immigration groups and make suggestions on how this behaviours should be changed (Husband 
and Alam 2011). 
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conduct, cohesion also appeared acceptable to liberals.77
The abandonment of community cohesion illustrates the limited shelf life of such 
political concepts, in as much as its adoption and prominence shows that social visions 
have the potential to become widely shared in a fairly short amount of time. The 
development of community cohesion as an account of social problems and as a recipe 
for their remedy was bound up in a new social rhetoric and informed by conceptions 
that had been prominently articulated since beginning in the early 1990s. This chapter 
puts particular emphasis on the development of these ideas, with the formation of New 
Labour’s social imaginary as a starting point. It considers how this imaginary underpins 
the agenda of community cohesion. As in the preceding cases, it examines how 
community cohesion coincides with requirements of social activity that are, in the case 
of Britain, placed on the doorsteps of ethnic minority groups. The notion of self-
segregation influenced understandings of community cohesion and informed political 
remedies of mixing and mingling, communal ‘vibrancy’, flexibility, and the request for 
new attitudes and dispositions. In the report of the Commission on Integration and 
Community Cohesion (CICC 2007), these behavioural characteristics were defined 
further and drawn on to point to desirable types of identification among British post-
immigration groups – “from single identities to multiple identities” (CICC 2007, 34). 
 In fact, the notion seemed 
broadly attractive where certain social ills had to be identified but also where the scope 
of state activity was problematized and political localism considered as a plausible 
response.  
While there is no lack of critical analyses of the agenda of community cohesion that are 
of considerable merit,78
                                                 
77  See, in particular, the Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in a Free Society 
(Dahrendorf, Field and Hayman 1995). Ralf Dahrendorf (1999, 16) later put some distance 
between his perspective on cohesion and New Labour’s version and went on to criticise the 
“authoritarian temptations” in the latter.  
 the role that ideas of social activation have played in its 
development has been of relatively limited interest. The chapter begins with a brief 
discussion of some of the sociological findings that have informed the development of 
the concept of community cohesion and considers some of the suppositions this concept 
entails. Secondly, it steps back some 15 years and considers the formative stages of 
New Labour’s conceptions of society. It retraces, thirdly, how such conceptions were 
deployed and explanatory accounts provided in public exchanges surrounding the 
78  See, for example, David Robinson (2005), Claire Worley (2005), Paul Bagguley and Yasmin 
Hussain (2008) and Jonathan Burnett (2004) and Derek McGhee (2003; 2005) 
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‘urban unrest’ of 2001 and, fourthly, in the various public inquiries and reports into the 
unrest. These reports established community cohesion as a political priority and 
governmental objective. We conclude with a discussion of remedies and their 
suppositions in the report of the Commission on Integration and Community Cohesion 
(CICC 2007).   
The idea of community cohesion 
Community cohesion, David Robinson (2005, 1412) suggests, “had no place in the 
vocabulary of urban theory or public policy prior to the disturbances in 2001”. But even 
this may be an understatement. Community cohesion and cohesion were not merely 
absent from British public debate, but conspicuously so. Up to the early 1990s, 
expressions of concern about social integration in Britain were not very widely couched 
in the according language. While social policy at the European level, such as under the 
auspices of Jacques Delors at the European Commission (Helly 1999; Atkinson 2008), 
developed and deployed the concept of cohesion, its British uptake in the 1980s and 
early 1990s remained relatively negligible. Until the early 1990s, it could have been 
argued that cohesion was part of a different, continental or maybe French tradition of 
conceiving of society. A possible starting point, the republican concern with the dangers 
of political factionalism, would have been considered less pronounced in Britain. The 
conception of society as an organism in need of cohesion, would have seemed more in 
line with German intellectual traditions than with their British counterparts.  
Not merely in terms of intellectual traditions, but within British political rhetoric, the 
concern with social ties and the need for their maintenance had a limited following. As 
is well known, Thatcherite conservatism had little patience for society as a frame of 
reference in political debate.79 In the 1980s, Labour, too, seemed to put scarce emphasis 
on social and communal ties: a fact that Tony Blair would continuously highlight as a 
shortcoming in his concern to ‘modernise’ the party.80
                                                 
79  Although the Thatcherite disavowal of society is often misreported and probably best understood 
as an attempt to rework a social imaginary, notably one where social solidarity resides in relations 
among individuals or within the family (Dean 1999, see Chapter 1).  
 It would be no exaggeration to 
80  There are, however, important intellectual traditions on both sides of the political divide that 
appear more compatible with an interest in ‘social unity’, notably Labour’s Guild Socialist 
orientation or One Nation conservatism, though these have been fairly marginal in British politics 
for some time. While there are few ‘One Nation’ Tories (Walsha 2003; Oborne 2011), Labour’s 
pre-Fabian origins have recently attracted new interest, notably in the discovery of working class 
identities as a salient concern and in the concern with the relative conservatism of Labour’s natural 
constituencies outside of the middle class circles (Cruddas and Rutherford 2008; Glasman 2011).  
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suggest that into the 1990s not only cohesion, but the very problem to which cohesion 
would later be seen to supply a response, were largely unacknowledged in British public 
debate.  
It is only in how the 2001 unrest in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham was analyzed and 
interpreted that community cohesion, or a lack thereof, was introduced in British 
political language. New concerns, new problems and new social visions were articulated 
and contrasted with older perceptions, notably in how the media, politicians and 
commissioned reports provided analyses of the unrest and made suggestions about the 
condition of British society. Finney and Simpson (2009, 93-4) point to how this 
occurred: 
[T]he summaries and the unchallenged media headlines that followed the reports 
changed the language of race relations to talk of ‘self-segregation, ‘parallel 
lives’, lack of ‘meaningful exchanges’, ‘isolationist attitudes’ of community 
leaders, and ‘cities gripped by fear’.  
In 2001, however, community cohesion did not emerge out of nowhere – ‘cohesion’ as 
well as ‘community’, corresponding notions of social responsibility and a social 
imaginary of moral and social decline had been introduced in previous exchanges and as 
part of the New Labour platform. This was in response to changing intellectual currents 
in thinking about society and to a new problematisation of the social integration of 
ethnic minorities in British society. 
Community cohesion is usually introduced to emphasize the significance of “shared 
lives” – as distinguished from “parallel lives” (Cantle 2001, para. 2.1; 2005, 72-3) – for 
the quality of life in British cities and towns and as a resolution to significant social 
problems on a wider, national scale.81
                                                 
81  Ted Cantle (2001; 2005) distinguishes between community cohesion, as specifically about social-
cultural divisions, and social cohesion in relation to socio-economic concerns. Conventionally, 
however, both accounts seem to overlap in media and public policy discourse, and Cantle himself 
tends to connect both in ways that are not always consistent (eg., 2001, paras. 2.12-3; 2005, 52). 
More generally, Cantle’s work on community cohesion seems frequently somewhat disconnected 
from its public policy uses, and Cantle draws on this disjuncture to shield his contribution from 
critique. In a review of their book for the Journal of Social Policy, for example, Cantle (2009) 
takes Finney and Simpson (2009) to task for their alleged distortion of Trevor Phillips’ account 
(‘sleepwalking into segregation’) and of his own work. He is generally defending his own 
conceptual definitions, and not the various ways in which these ideas have been deployed in 
political rhetoric and the practice of a political agenda that he endorsed and furthered. 
 In a widely cited definition by the Local 
Government Association (2002, 6), community cohesion is seen to entail “a common 
vision and a sense of belonging”, the “diversity of people’s backgrounds and 
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circumstances are appreciated and positively valued”, people “from different 
backgrounds have similar life opportunities”, and “[s]trong and positive relationships 
are being developed between people from different backgrounds”. It responds to 
concern with ‘ethnic segregation’ or ‘ethnic self-segregation’ as identified in patterns of 
settlement, education, political mobilization and general social contact. More than an 
empirical finding, community cohesion usually follows a prescription as to how the 
causes of segregation need to be tackled and how ‘parallel lives’ may become shared. In 
contrast to previous political concerns with racism and racial equality, anti-
discrimination, and socio-economic deprivation, it loosely credits attitudes of post-
immigration communities, their inflexibility and inward orientation, as the main causes 
of various social problems and for the conditions of their lives, if such conditions leave 
to be desired.  
In this sense, the diagnosis that community cohesion offers is ambiguous and 
problematic, similar to Bürgergesellschaft and cohésion sociale. ‘Parallel lives’ or 
‘ethnic self-segregation’ are concepts that are metaphorically laden and contested, not 
merely for their political implications but for their very empirical reality. Particularly 
Trevor Phillip’s statement that Britain was ‘sleep-walking into segregation’ has been 
controversial (Finney and Simpson 2009, 45-56; Husband and Alam 2011). 
Undoubtedly, in some British localities there have been changes in the composition of 
populations in recent decades, an increasing diversity in the population mix, and the 
concentration of post-immigration groups in certain urban and sub-urban areas, for 
example in parts of London or conurbations in Yorkshire and the West Midlands. The 
picture, however, is diverse even among adjacent towns and localities. While in some 
areas the trend is towards ethnic homogeneity, there are contravening trends towards 
increasing diversity in others (Burgess, Wilson and Lupton 2005).  
Empirically, the idea of segregation does not seem to present itself for the alarmist 
scenarios of disintegration and separatism that are often evident where it is invoked. If 
segregation is seen to suggest that in some parts of Britain there are high concentrations 
of ethnic minority populations, it makes a valid point. If it is seen to imply, as it often 
does, a trend towards increasing ethnic homogeneity across the board, it offers an 
incomplete picture. Finney and Simpson (2009, 115-139) have recently compiled data 
that suggests that that there is no national trend either way. Simon Burgess and others 
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(Burgess, Wilson et al. 2005; Burgess and Worth 2011) have shown that patterns and 
dynamics of settlement in contemporary Britain are complex. 
However, it is not merely the sociological findings about ‘segregated’ patterns of 
settlement, but behavioural accounts of ‘self-segregation’ that underpin the analysis of 
community cohesion. The alleged inward orientation of ethnic minorities in Britain, 
their reclusiveness or, with Robert Putnam (2007), their ‘hunkering down’ is said to 
account for ethnic segregation and by extension for a variety of social problems in urban 
Britain. In the early 2000s, this analysis was developed and community cohesion was 
defined to address self-segregation, which had become a widely accepted truth in 
British public debate.82
New Labour and Community 
 While this chapter does not contribute to the evaluation of the 
empirical validity of this analysis, or more generally of the sociological assumptions 
and theories underpinning it, it is interested in the conditions that accounted for the 
success and for the influence of this account. 
While such concerns were largely absent in the 1980s, notions of social and political 
unity became a more central feature of British political debate in the 1990s.83
                                                 
82  This is despite the fact that contravening evidence shows that ethnic minority populations 
generally wish to live in diverse and not in mono-cultural surroundings (Peach 2009). Finney and 
Simpson (2009, 100) cite a study about attitudes in Oldham and Rochdale that concludes that 
“housing aspirations and expectations of White and Asian young people are remarkably similar” 
(see Simpson, Phillips and Hussain 2007). The account of ‘self-segregation’, however, underpins 
public policy, notably where, as Kalra and Kappor (2009, 1411) put it, this account “rather than 
representing choice of residence, evolves into a choice in values. These conceptual moves, which 
are also present in the adoption of a social capital framework to enhance community cohesion, 
result in the initial targeting of Muslims, but enable a much wider set of disciplines to encompass 
other ‘problem’ groups.”  
 New 
concerns emerged and were politically articulated across a variety of political fields, 
such as regarding devolution or in relation to British citizenship, frequently considered 
to lack the symbolism required for collective identification (see Kisby 2007). A concern 
with social unity was also articulated in the course of Labour’s realignment in the 1990s 
and not least in order to sketch out a social vision that could be strategically deployed to 
contrast with Conservative priorities. The following retraces aspects of this realignment 
83  The Report of the Commission on Social Justice, set in motion by Blair’s predecessor John Smith 
concluded that “[w]e badly need to mend a social fabric that is so obviously torn apart” 
(Commission on Social Justice 1994, 308). The Report on Wealth Creation and Social Cohesion in 
a Free Society, commissioned by the Liberal Democrats and chaired by Lord Dahrendorf (1995), 
came to similar conclusions. 
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and the articulation of new social visions with a particular emphasis on the rhetoric of 
Tony Blair. 
A moral crisis 
In February 1993, two-year-old James Bulger was abducted in a Merseyside shopping 
district, beaten to death and his body dumped on a railway track. The perpetrators, two 
ten-year-olds, were caught on camera luring the toddler away, were identified and 
subsequently sentenced to a minimum of ten years in prison. The murder triggered some 
soul-searching on the state of British society, its moral foundations and the conduct of 
its young people. Beyond the request for stiffened penalties for young offenders, the 
media reaction reflected a sense of helplessness. “A society ... has suddenly caught its 
image in the mirror and dislikes what it sees”, wrote the head of the Catholic Church in 
England (Hume 1993). Commentators lamented “society’s growing indifference and 
our increasing isolation” (Phillips and Kettle 1993) and suggested that there was 
“[s]omething rotten in modern society” (Daily Mail 1993), or that “[s]omething has 
gone dreadfully wrong in Britain” (Lynn 1993). Different root causes for the act were 
identified. Conservative cultural criticism, the bemoaning of lost virtues, contrasted 
with a more widely expressed sense of consternation in face of an act that seemed to 
disrupt what was thought to be possible – and to point to larger deficiencies in the moral 
make-up of British society (Hay 1995). 
The response of the Conservative government to this state of moral consternation was 
considered insufficient. Home Secretary Ken Clarke promised harsher penalties and 
announced plans for ‘secure training centres’ for young offenders (Travis and Bates 
1993). At the same time, he was accused of scoring “easy political points” (The 
Guardian 1993) by blaming Labour for being soft on crime and thus diminishing the 
severity of the act in the back and forth of party politics. The same complaint was 
levelled against Prime Minister John Major, who immediately after the Bulger murder, 
announced a ‘crusade against crime’. Major’s prescription, to “condemn a little more, 
understand a little less” (cited in Holborow 1993), appeared as a stereotype. Toughness 
on crime, longer sentences and less empathy for young offenders did not seem to appeal 
to the public in an environment where the concern was about more than the penalisation 
of young offenders.  
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The Conservatives’ display of law and order toughness seemed to ignore that elements 
of a “new punitiveness” (Garland 1996, 445) had been widely adopted. Tough criminal 
justice measures could not easily be drawn on to distinguish the Tory prescription. 
Moreover, it ignored that anxieties seemed to be directed at the state of the social fabric 
and society’s moral foundations. The Tory response was criticized by representatives of 
the Church of England for their neglect of the impact of unemployment and social 
polarisation (Copley 1993). The reproach was that Conservative politics was at least 
partly to blame for the growing sense of moral disorientation. From this perspective, the 
Bulger murder seemed to “epitomise … the crisis of the economic individualism 
ushered in by Margaret Thatcher. … [T]his was what happened when there was no such 
thing as society” (Jordan 1999, 203). In the New Statesman, Jeremy Seabrook deplored 
the Conservative’s double standards “when they spoke of the breaking-up of mining 
communities in the mid-eighties as a ‘good investment’, and when the ruin of all 
solidarities, collectivities and communal endeavour has been at the heart of their 
mission for the past 15 years” (Seabrook 1993, 13). The murder seemed to shed light on 
the nature of Thatcherism and the amorality of its social and economic philosophy.  
New social visions 
The exchanges about the meaning and significance of the murder occurred against the 
background of newly salient concerns with values and the moral constitution of society. 
Around that time, Geoff Mulgan (1995, 13) suggested that a new sense of insecurity 
across the Western world had triggered “an intensive search for a sense of community 
cohesion, for ties that can bind people together”. David Marquand (1996, 9, emphasis in 
original) saw the still “inchoate and tentative” intimations of this newly emerging 
theme: the “threat of fragmentation and anomie have fostered a new concern with the 
dangers of social exclusion and the a priori necessity for social cohesion”. Will Hutton 
(1995, 23-4) observed that Britain faced “explosive levels of stress. The individualist, 
laissez-faire values which imbue the economic and political elite have been found 
wanting – but with the decline of socialism, there seems to be no coherent alternative in 
the wings.” Represented by Mulgan, Marquand and Hutton, Labour’s intellectual 
vanguard had discovered a new political project that responded to perceptions of 
uncertainty and of a moral crisis. 
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The concern to remove “the factors which are fostering the social diseases of drugs, 
crime, political extremism and social unrest”, as Peter Barclay (1994, 34) put it in a 
report for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, had been established in British political 
discourse prior to Labour’s ‘modernisation’ and the soul-searching over the Bulger 
murder. How such concerns were about to be expressed and linked to a new social 
vision, however, was not established. The notion of social cohesion was not yet widely 
drawn on in the political debate. The concerns that it would capture, however, had 
become politically relevant. A few days after James Bulger’s murder, the Daily Mail 
(1993) editorialized that 
[t]here can be no cosy antidote to crime, no easy reversal of moral decline. Yet a 
political leader of vision could find a self-questioning and fearful people more 
than ready to respond to the stern penal and social measures that are needed. 
(Daily Mail 1993) 
Newly appointed as Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair’s response effectively pre-
empted the accusation that had commonly been levelled against the left. Freshly 
inspired by encounters with New Democrat strategists of the Clinton administration, 
Blair had just introduced a signature phrase, “tough on crime and tough on the 
underlying causes of crime” (Blair 1993a, 27; see Rentoul 1995; 2001, 192-4), and was 
able to brush off Conservative accusations of being ‘soft’ or ‘out of touch’ on crime 
with relative ease.84
The way Blair introduced the theme of community seemed to capture the Conservative 
concern with the loosening of a value-based consensus while pointing out ways to 
address this moral crisis through a new emphasis on responsibility. Blair (1996, 244) 
suggested that there “is nothing more destructive or corrosive in Britain today than the 
 A few weeks before the James Bulger murder, Blair had set out his 
position on law enforcement, graciously complimenting the Tories for aspects of their 
policies, while blaming the Conservative government for missing the point on the root 
causes of crime: “crime, ultimately, is a problem that arises from our disintegration as a 
community […]. It can only be resolved by acting as a community, based on a new 
bargain between individual and society” (Blair 1993a, 28). In a fragmented, polarised 
and morally disoriented society, Blair suggested, high levels of crime were bound to 
occur.  
                                                 
84  John Rentoul points out that Blair at this stage “had at last found a populist language in which to 
express the ethical socialist ideas which had formed his political convictions. Almost overnight he 
began to talk with the breadth and confidence of a possible Prime Minister” (2001, 198). 
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tearing of the social fabric and the rupture of social cohesion. We live in a society 
increasingly scarred by crime, persistent high unemployment, and family and social 
disintegration”. He went on to argue that “the breakup of family and community bonds 
is intimately linked to the breakdown in law and order” (Blair 1996, 247).85
Blair elaborated on these ideas in a programmatic speech on crime in Wellingborough, 
February 19, 1993, one week after the murder of James Bulger. 
  
A solution to this disintegration … must come from the rediscovery of a sense of 
direction as a country and most of all from being unafraid to start talking again 
about the values and principles we believe in and what they mean for us not just 
as individuals but as a community. We cannot exist in a moral vacuum. If we do 
not learn and then teach the value of what is right and what is wrong, the result 
is simply moral chaos which engulfs us all. (cited in The Independent 2007)  
Blair’s first notable appearance as Shadow Home Secretary was generally well received 
(e.g., Wintour and White 1993). It seemed to provide a more rational and empathetic 
alternative to the Tory’s punitive rhetoric and a worthy attempt to highlight solutions to 
the moral dilemmas of the nation. Blair was complimented on a “fresh, non-ideological 
approach on crime and its roots” (The Independent 1993, February 20), and other 
editorials commended Blair for realizing that “the solution does not simply lie in 
legislation, but in the rediscovery of a new sense of direction“ (The Guardian 1993, 
February 22).  
New Labour’s moral agenda fell on fertile ground, presumably not least as a result of 
widespread disenchantment with 14 years of Tory rule. Blair seemed to prevail in the 
struggle over the interpretation of the Bulger murder for how he combined visionary 
social thinking with a ‘law and order’ rhetoric (Walker 1997; Le Grand 2003). The 
features of this moral vision remained vague in 1993 and would be elaborated upon in 
the years up to 1997. Blair’s language of social morality and individual responsibility, 
illustrated with this snapshot picture, seemed to resonate with wide-spread public 
sentiments.86
                                                 
85  The report of the Commission on Social Justice, set in motion by Blair’s predecessor John Smith 
concluded that “[w]e badly need to mend a social fabric that is so obviously torn apart” 
(Commission on Social Justice 1994, 308). On these issues, the ‘Report on Wealth Creation and 
Social Cohesion in a Free Society”, commissioned by the Liberal Democrats and chaired by Lord 
Dahrendorf (1995) came to similar conclusions. 
 The notion of cohesion – without indicating a consolidated political 
programme – was increasingly used in this context: 
86  Much has been made of the diverse intellectual influences that underlie New Labour and, 
specifically, the worldview of Tony Blair (Driver and Martell 1997). Commentators point to the 
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Individuals prosper best within a strong and cohesive society. […] But a strong 
society should not be confused with a strong state; or powerful collectivist 
institutions. […] It is in the search for this different, reconstructed, relationship 
between individual and society that ideas about ‘community’ are found. (Blair 
1995, The Guardian, March 23) 
In his 2010 memoirs, Blair points to the Bulger episode and acknowledges that he had 
used the incident to his strategic advantage: “Very effectively I made it into a symbol of 
a Tory Britain in which, for all the efficiency that Thatcherism had achieved, the bonds 
of social and community well-being had been loosed, dangerously so” (2010, 57). He 
goes on to add, “I did it sincerely” (2010, 204), but suggests that his analysis of social 
breakdown was “easy but ultimately flawed”. Society “hadn’t [broken down] as a 
whole, only in part. I was to come to the right conclusion only at the very end of my 
premiership: instead of focusing general social policy on this class of people, they need 
specific, targeted action” (ibid.). Notwithstanding this clarification, the reference to how 
cohesion was at risk due to the misguided and amoral policies of the Conservatives was 
characteristic of the language of the time. The “dogmatism of the neoliberal Right had 
become a serious threat to national cohesion”, Blair (1998, 6) suggested in his Third 
Way pamphlet. Since it was not feasible, he suggested, to revert back to a “statist social 
democratic model” (ibid.), new political orientations were needed. 
The “class of people” that presented a test case for the development of policies that 
would correspond to this social vision were ethnic minority youths in the English North. 
Episodes of unrest in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham provided an occasion to develop 
policy strategies that followed the intellectual currents that had been defined in previous 
years: an emphasis on communal solidarity and morality, on social ties and 
responsibility. While the Bulger episode shows how a new social imaginary had begun 
to be articulated, the unrest in 2001 presented the occasion to flesh out a corresponding 
political agenda that was focused on ethnic minority groups. 
                                                                                                                                               
communitarianism of Amitai Etzioni (1993; 1996), to John Macmurray (Rentoul 2001: 41-3; Bevir 
and O Brien 2003), to Christian socialism (Wilkinson 1998), to social capital theorizing or even 
One Nation Conservatism (Kenny and Smith 1997). Hale (2006) points to significant 
discontinuities between communitarian thinking and New Labour ideas for how its conception of a 
conditional relationship between rights and responsibilities contradicts the communitarian 
disavowal of ‘procedural’ ties (2006, 163-4). Blair himself has shown little interest in consistency 
in this regard and had acknowledged a variety of possible influences on New Labour’s ethical 
positions (Blair 2000).  
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Urban Unrest 
There is a certain danger in overstating the significance of rhetoric and speech-making 
of a single, albeit influential, actor. We do not suggest that Tony Blair shaped the terms 
of the political agenda single-handedly, but rather that he influentially introduced ideas 
that became intellectually and strategically viable. Blair himself showed not too much 
interest in the politics of ethno-cultural diversity in Britain, and the unrest of 2001 is not 
even acknowledged in his 2010 memoirs. Themes of community, responsibility, moral 
conduct and social ties, however, had been established and became part of the repertory 
of arguments that the Labour government and its various exponents deployed when the 
disorder of 2001 had to be interpreted and when it became necessary to propose political 
initiatives in response. 
This section considers debates about ‘ethnic unrest’ in 2001 that took place against the 
background of a new problematisation of cultural diversity in Britain. We have already 
pointed to how self-segregation had become a significant concern in political debate. 
This new focus was accompanied by a reconsideration of the political paradigms of 
ethnic minority integration in Britain, notably of multiculturalism. As a matter of 
principle the new concern with social unity, as it began to be more prominently 
articulated in the 1990s, does not necessitate a rejection of theoretical models 
multiculturalism (see Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). In practice, however, new concerns 
with ‘segregation’ or ‘ethnic separatism’ have often resulted in a rejection of 
multiculturalism or in new problematisations of cultural diversity. Kevin Robins et al. 
(2001, 81) thus point to a “national mentality … [that] regards diversity, difference and 
complexity as a problem. Diversity is a problem because it is associated with the 
(imagined) dangers of cultural and political ‘fragmentation’ and ‘disorder’.” This 
problematisation of diversity is often difficult to pin down, and the various lines of 
attack on multiculturalism are difficult to disentangle (Lentin and Titley 2011). 
Moreover, it is often unclear whether attacks have led to changed political practices of 
ethnic minority accommodation or whether they constitute changed rhetorical priorities 
that may not fundamentally impact on established practices of minority accommodation 
(Meer and Modood 2009; Modood forthcoming). 
Even where the practical implications of a new rhetoric are unclear, it may still be 
significant to consider changing emphases for what they suggest and for how they 
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channel available political choices. A new focus has been put on dangers of ethnic 
segregation, which is seen to have resulted from an overly liberal and uncommitted 
attitude towards shared values and unifying ideas. In this context, new expectations and 
demands have been formulated as to how ethnic minority communities should relate to 
majority society. Recurrent moral panics over immigration further contributed to 
notable changes in how the media and policy-makers responded to such issues. Back et 
al. observe, in this regard, how the 2001 incidents functioned as a further “factor in 
prompting a shift away from [the] celebration of multicultural diversity” (2002, 446), 
and towards a concern with cohesion, shared identity, national togetherness, Britishness, 
and common moral bonds. The unrest of 2001 proved to be a catalyst for how such 
anxieties began to be articulated as part of a political programme. 
Precedents 
Historically, the United Kingdom has seen numerous outbreaks of urban violence (Tilly 
1995; Archer 2000). This stands in conspicuous contrast, as Michael Rowe (1998, 11) 
observes, to a “widespread amnesia in respect of Britain’s riotous history”, which is 
persistently expressed in a tone of bewilderment over how the values of British civility 
allow for uncivil conduct. Britain’s history “appears remarkably turbulent, with frequent 
outbursts of disorder” (Benyon 1987, 26). Since the 1980s, “ethnic riots” or “race riots” 
have become an established category for a type of urban violence with ethnic minority 
participation (Rowe 1998, 6). It is, in particular, a series of unrest in 1980, 1981 and 
1985 that would determine how this category of disorder was defined.  
The 1981 incidents in Brixton led to a debate that was only equalled twenty years later, 
with the development of the agenda of community cohesion. While Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher attributed the Brixton riots to ‘criminal thugs’, Labour’s Roy 
Hattersley pointed towards underlying causes of “despair and disillusion” (quoted in 
Benyon 1984, 5). The report into the 1981 disorder by Lord Scarman offered a 
meticulous narrative of the unfolding of the riots and an interpretation that seemed to 
take seriously the motivation of young black rioters: “It was a spontaneous act of 
defiant aggression by young men who felt themselves hunted by a hostile police force” 
(Scarman 1986, 46). Although the overt racism of stop-and-search practices by the 
Metropolitan police was downplayed (and ‘institutional racism’ only identified 18 years 
later in the Macpherson Report), Scarman offered a somewhat humane characterization 
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of those involved in the incidents, their motivations and grievances. The unrest in 
Toxteth, Liverpool, of the same year provoked additional efforts of interpretation and a 
relatively sympathetic long-term response by the Thatcher government that put Michael 
Heseltine (the “Minister for Merseyside”) in charge of a task force to address 
underlying causes of the unrest (see Parkinson and Duffy 1984).  
In relation to recurrent episodes of urban disorder in the 1980s, John Benyon (1987, 26) 
points to three different perspectives.87 A conservative perspective tends to emphasise 
the irrationality of the unrest and underlines the rioters’ motivation to, quite simply, 
“loot and rob” (ibid., 30). Criminality is the central theme of this conservative reading, 
and it is either the gullibility of misguided youth or their inherent “thuggishness” that is 
emphasized. Liberal perspectives, by contrast, tend to focus on conditions of unrest and 
consider how police misconduct, discrimination, and socio-economic disadvantagement 
prepare the ground for outbreaks of violence. The Scarman Report into the Brixton 
disorder can be considered as a liberal attempt “to understand the viewpoint of the 
rioters” (Lea 2004, 186). In the liberal types of explanation, disorder tends to be 
rationalized and attributed to structural conditions. A radical perspective attributes 
agency to those involved in the unrest and focuses on their collective action against 
oppressive structures and practices, but has been marginal in the interpretation of most 
episodes of unrest in Britain.88
The threefold distinction Benyon proposes corresponds to perspectives and explanations 
offered in 2001 that are of interest in the following discussion. The liberal type might 
emphasise issues of economic disadvantage and the experience of racism. The radical 
perspective – as marginal in 2001 as it was in 1981 – would consider the unrest as 
‘revolt’, ‘rebellion’ or ‘uprising’ (Campaign against Racism and Fascism (CARF) 
2001). The conservative perspective focuses on irrational behaviour, crime, and 
‘thuggery’. Paul Gilroy (2004, 134) sums up this perspective: “the rioters rioted because 
 
                                                 
87  This corresponds to a distinction in Dilip Hiro’s authoritative history of British race relations. Hiro 
(1992, 91) sees ‘three schools’ in how riots were analyzed: “those who attributed the disorder to 
sheer criminality and the propensity among young hooligans to imitate what they had seen on 
television screens. There were others who put the primary blame on the dreadful living conditions 
of the populace in inner cities. And finally there was a school which considered police misconduct 
towards blacks as the prime cause of the conflagrations.” See Slavoj Žižek (2011) for an 
interesting discussion of the applicability of these categories to the riots of August 2011. 
88  Paradoxically, the political motives of those involved in the 1981 unrest – just as those of 
participants in some outbreaks of historical unrest – and their legitimate grievances about racist 
policing in particular are now widely acknowledged. 
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they were alien. The proof of their alienness was the fact that they had rioted.” John 
Solomos (1992, 117) concurs and points to connections between race and crime that had 
been established in public discourse: 
[A] continuing preoccupation throughout the 1970s was the connection between 
deprivation and supposedly pathological or weak black cultures which produced 
‘special’ problems... This ideology had the effect of externalising the source of 
the ‘problem’, and locating it firmly within the black communities themselves.  
While the ‘problematic’ communities of the 1980s were of African Caribbean ethnicity, 
in 2001 the concern was predominantly with Pakistani or Bangladeshi heritage youths. 
Interpretations of the unrest became a site of debate about socio-economic, cultural, or 
religious features of these social groups, just as the analysis of unrest in the 1980s, and 
accounts pointing towards ‘Black criminality’, had been concerned with the African 
Caribbean presence in the United Kingdom (Hall 1978; Gilroy 1982). In these accounts 
it was not merely particular social or political problems that were negotiated, but the 
signification of the presence of these post-immigration groups in British society. The 
rapid shift of interest from the causes of the riots towards broader socio-cultural 
conditions is characteristic for this type of negotiation. 
As was the case with the Brixton riots, the 2001 incidents invited a range of different 
explanations. While the earliest incidents in Oldham seemed contested, since no 
coherent ‘reading’ of the events had been established, accounts were consolidated and 
reinforced when the unrest extended into August. The following sections explore the 
development of these interpretations.89
Oldham 
 
On 21 April 2001, Walter Chamberlain, a retired Oldham bus conductor, was beaten by 
a teenager who, reportedly, told the retiree to ‘get out of our area’. Over the next few 
days, Chamberlain’s bruised face appeared widely across the news media. It appeared to 
reinforce the notion that areas with large ethnic minorities populations had become 
inaccessible to ‘white people’ and ‘no-go-areas’ (Craig 2001; Bunyan 2001a). Police 
reports on increasing racial violence against whites further contributed to such 
perceptions (BBC 2001, February 9). The Daily Mail channelled this anxiety and 
                                                 
89  It is beyond the scope of this presentation to offer an account of how the events unfolded in either 
Oldham, Burnley or Bradford in much detail (however, see Kundnani 2001; Bagguley and Hussain 
2003).   
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located the attack on Chamberlain in the context of ongoing debates about immigration, 
integration, and Britishness. 
Oldham is being torn apart by two warring cultures. People like Walter 
Chamberlain feel marginalised and threatened by brutal youths who wish to gain 
ascendancy in the place of his birth. … The elderly citizens of Oldham are 
beginning to feel like isolated strangers in their town. (Lee-Porter 2001) 
Playing on similar registers, the British National Party (BNP) announced that it would 
be competing for Oldham’s two parliamentary seats and launched a series of campaign 
events. The National Front (NF) started marching in Oldham, demanding “racial 
justice” for Chamberlain and “white people” (The Guardian 2001, May 6; Tolputt 2001, 
The Independent, April 28). All this occurred against the background of strongly 
expressed concerns about issues of asylum and immigration in the run-up to the 2001 
general election. The Conservative leader, William Hague, travelled to Dover to 
announce that with under his Premiership Britain would be “a safe haven, not a soft 
touch” (quoted in Collings and Seldon 2001, 633). 
While a number of narratives exist that emphasize varying aspects of the incidents, core 
facts are undisputed. In response to racist attacks by right-wing extremists which had 
taken place over an extended period of time, groups of predominantly Asian youths 
went to the streets, and incidents culminated between the 26th and 28th of May, in street 
battles between a few hundred youths and riot police (see for example Ahmed et al. 
2001). Variation among accounts is largely part of broader differences in appreciating 
root causes of the occurrences, such as the Campaign against Racism and Fascism’s 
(2001) emphasis on the history of police violence and right-wing extremist intimidation, 
or, by contrast, the focus on irrational and wanton violence (Bunyan 2001b, Daily 
Telegraph, May 28). Indeed, while the “worst race riots ever seen in Britain” (Disley 
2001, Daily Record, May 28), appeared to leave commentators perplexed, the news 
media as well as politicians quickly began to offer explanations of the events. Liberal 
and conservative accounts were deployed and the concern with communal ties and 
social disintegration, in line with intellectual currents and New Labour priorities, 
operationalized for post-riot analysis. 
Simon Hughes put the blame on William Hague and the Tory’s anti-asylum rhetoric: “If 
politicians talk up things that encourage the view of racial difference then there is an 
indirect likelihood that will resonate with people, particularly with young people, 
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impressionable people” (in Jenkins, Baldwin and Kennedy 2001, The Times, May 28). 
The Conservatives resented the suggestions and were supported by leading Labour 
politicians, such as Blair, who insisted that “the central issue was one of law and order, 
rather than the language used by politicians” (cited in Johnston 2001). Ken Livingstone, 
for Labour’s left wing, pointed out that the lessons of the Macpherson Report on 
institutional racism had not sufficiently been considered in Oldham (Livingstone 2001, 
The Independent, May 30). Institutional racism and heavy-handed practices of an 
ethnically unrepresentative police force, he suggested, partially accounted for the 
incidents.  
The response to Simon Hughes had established a prominent theme that was reinforced 
in  the media. “There is no evidence … that Saturday’s unrest was significantly different 
from the yobbery that disfigures so many British towns at weekends”, it was suggested 
in The Daily Telegraph (2001). In The Independent, Deborah Orr argued that the 
perpetrators of the attack against Walter Chamberlain and the instigators of the 
disturbances should not to be treated separately from the average criminal: “They do 
vile and violent things because they enjoy it. But unfortunately there are a lot of people 
around them who seem willing to confirm that calling bad behaviour race war makes it 
a political act and not just pointless, ignorant, bullying, hate” (Orr 2001, The 
Independent, May 29). The assumption, it seems, was that the classification of the 
incidents as a distinct event, one that required interest in causes and conditions, would 
somehow exculpate the perpetrators and give the unrest a significance it did not deserve.  
Although analyses that were considering ‘root causes’ of the events were thus rejected 
by a conservative critique – widely shared by Labour and Conservatives – 
interpretations of the disorder were only beginning to be developed. Critics of 
multiculturalism, such as Norman Tebitt, pointed to Oldham and suggested that “[t]wo 
societies living side-by-side can lead to difficult moments” (cited in Jenkins, Baldwin et 
al. 2001, The Times, May 28).  Yasmin Alibhai-Brown suggested that recent social 
policy “has concentrated on issues of equity and even separate provision, and no 
attention has been paid to the issues that connect people” (Alibhai-Brown 2001a, The 
Independent, May 28). Melanie Phillips argued that a “multicultural agenda” had led to 
“tribalism”: “Only a common culture binds everyone together. … A harmonious culture 
depends not on telling people they are different but on forging common bonds” (Phillips 
2001, Sunday Times, June 3). The problem with multiculturalism, it was suggested in 
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the centre-left and centre-right media, “is [that it is] a recipe for permanent division” 
(Marrin 2001, The Guardian, May 29). The lack of meaningful interaction between 
Asian and majority communities became a central feature in the analysis of what had if 
not caused then at least facilitated the violence. The incidents in Oldham were presented 
as an indictment of policies that were alleged to have put too much emphasis on the 
separateness of groups and communities. The violence that had been witnessed in 
Oldham was beginning to be attributed to segregation and self-segregation, and to how 
misguided multicultural policies had led to ‘yobbery’ and the loss of control among 
ethnic minority youths.90
Burnley 
  
While the incidents in Burnley were used to further elaborate on respective diagnoses, 
they were, in particular, marked by a struggle over how they should to be connected to 
previous incidents in Oldham. The challenge posed by incidents in Burnley and 
Bradford seemed to require and facilitate explanations that would point to a continuity 
of events, rather than considering them as singular outbursts with contextual, maybe 
local, causes. Governmental responses to the unrest in Oldham were still characterized 
by the attempt to isolate the events and to treat them as exceptional and extraordinary. 
Tony Blair suggested that Oldham was untypical (see Johnston 2001, Evening News, 
May 28); Angela Eagle, then a junior Home Office minister, remarked that the incidents 
in Burnley were “quite different” (Blackman and Disley 2001, The Mirror, June 26) 
from Oldham. John Denham referred to a “series of individual incidents, apparently 
unrelated” (Herbert 2001, The Independent, June 26). As more unrest occurred, 
however, these attempts became more difficult to maintain and, indeed, the reference to 
overarching causes became significantly more common.  
Poverty and economic deprivation were discussed, since the neighbourhoods of Burnley 
where unrest had broken out in June 2001 were particularly hard-hit by unemployment 
(see Vasagar 2001, The Guardian, June 30). In relation to right-wing extremist attacks 
that had preceded – just as in Oldham – the unrest, the impact of BNP mobilizations and 
                                                 
90  The aftermath of Oldham saw the 2001 general election, a second landslide for Labour. Labour’s 
Environment Minister Michael Meacher took the safe seat of Oldham West and Royton. The 
BNP’s Nick Griffin came third and within 524 votes of the Conservative candidate, with an 
unprecedented 16 per cent of the vote. Michael Treacy, the BNP’s candidate in Oldham West and 
Saddleworth, achieved 11 per cent of the vote (Narain 2001, Daily Mail, June 8; The Sun 2001a, 
June 8). Nick Griffin remarked that, in his estimation, “multiracial Oldham has irrevocably broken 
down” (quoted in Jenkins 2001, The Times, June 9).  
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marches by the National Front was considered. Again, however, commentators 
regularly took issue with liberal explanations and the consideration of experiences of 
deprivation, of racial discrimination or racist attacks. The idea that “widespread racial 
prejudice … gives them [the ‘rioters’] the right to behave as badly as you wish and to 
victimise others” (Alibhai-Brown 2001b, The Independent, June 26) was rejected, 
though it was unclear who had made the according claim. David Blunkett brought “anti-
social behaviour” (cited in Kemp 2001, Press Association, June 27) into the picture and 
thus presented a framework to explain unrest, notably one that would point to 
‘thuggery’ and suggest strategies of behavioural modification (Flint and Nixon 2006). 
In how these explanations were presented, the ‘conservative’ interpretation of irrational 
incivility and violent thuggery was increasingly connected to the alleged failure of the 
multicultural model. Peter Hitchens in The Mail on Sunday, put the conservative 
understanding of incidents in Burnley as follows:  
If there is a threat of bloodshed and disorder on our streets, it is not the result of 
immigration or the presence of Asian communities in our midst. It is the general 
decay of good manners and restraint, the decline of order and justice in all our 
lives, that have brought the firebomb and the riot shield on to these English 
streets. (Hitchens 2001, The Mail on Sunday, July 1) 
The indictment of multiculturalism by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown and others, offered an 
account that would connect this perspective of moral decline and incivility to alleged 
failures of minority integration. Burnley was considered as an illustration of the need to 
reinforce a sense of “shared purpose between the tribes of Britain” (Alibhai-Brown 
2001b, The Independent, June 26). The separateness of minority groups was 
emphasized, and their segregation was increasingly considered to lie at the core of what 
had caused the violence. It was seen to account for a loss of behavioural control, to the 
decline of standards of civility, and to the violent thuggery that conservative 
commentators had seen all along. 
Bradford 
Earlier in the year, Bradford had already seen some disturbances on a smaller scale. The 
disorder, however, that unfolded over a few days following Bradford’s World of the 
City festival on July 7 completed the three major episodes of unrest in 2001 and would 
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be analyzed in conjunction with earlier events.91
The leftist Morning Star, however, did point to “serious economic and social problems 
[in Bradford that had] largely been ignored by Conservative and Labour governments” 
(Morning Star 2001, July 9). David Blunkett, by contrast, ridiculed such explanations 
and referred (in a number of statements) to a torched BMW dealership in Bradford’s 
Manningham area, while suggesting that in “my constituency, they can’t afford BMWs” 
(quoted in The Mirror 2001, Leader, July 9). While a few commentators pointed to 
inner-city degradation and a general feeling of exclusion and helplessness (e.g., Norman 
2001, The Times, July 12), the vast majority of accounts offered explanations of a 
different type. 
 Days before the unrest, Tony Blair had 
announced a ‘major study’ into widening wealth gaps along ethnic lines, and instructed 
Downing Street’s policy unit to carry out research. This initiative was largely conceived 
in response to the unfavourable findings of the Labour Market Trends report, which 
showed, despite the booming economy, widening gaps between rates of unemployment 
and levels of income. Government sources announced how this initiative was “much, 
much bigger than Macpherson in its scope and we hope it will set the standard for other 
countries to follow” (Waugh 2001, The Independent, July 5). This “major inquiry into 
race” did not re-emerge in the context of the Bradford incidents, where explanations 
drawing on experiences of deprivation and unemployment remained the exception. 
Almost timidly, The Independent (2001, Comment, July 9) responded to David 
Blunkett’s comments about ‘mindless violence’:  
Progress has been made towards racial equality in the past two decades, but it 
has been too slow and a new group is drawing attention to its grievances in a 
direct and unforgivable manner. Violence cannot be rewarded or tolerated, but it 
would be foolish not to take its causes seriously.  
 The Daily Mail, by contrast, supported Blunkett’s assessment: “With typical blunt 
common sense, he yesterday dismissed claims that the rioting which disfigured 
Bradford at the weekend stemmed from racism” (Daily Mail 2001, July 9). Similarly, 
Mick Hume in The Times rejected explanations that considered right-wing extremist 
provocations that had occurred in all three localities: “Fingering the far-Right is a way 
                                                 
91  There are considerable differences between the three localities and, in the case of Bradford, most 
notably the fact that its Asian community is not a minority but a majority in the Manningham area 
where much of the unrest occurred. For accounts of the unrest in Bradford see Harris (2001) and 
Herbert and Das-Gupta (2001). 
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of evading the real problems in places such as Bradford and Oldham” (Hume 2001, The 
Times, July 9). Labour MP Sion Simon went further to criticize the view of “the liberal 
establishment … that riots must necessarily be an outpouring of tensions so seethingly 
underlying that they were always bound eventually to boil over.” Rather, blame for the 
Bradford incidents was to be put squarely on the “the cynical intervention of outsiders”, 
most notably the “Trotskyist Left” (Simon 2001, The Daily Telegraph, July 9).  
Marsha Singh, Labour MP for Bradford West, reinforced the explanation of the events 
as ‘anti-social behaviour’. He referred to “yob culture … They take it upon themselves 
to be the law. … There is a hard core of 200 to 250 criminals who benefit from the sort 
of scenes witnessed yesterday. They are capable of manipulating and mobilising young 
people into the sort of behaviour we have seen” (quoted in Rayner 2001, Daily Mail, 
July 9). Terry Rooney, MP for Bradford North, followed themes established by the 
Home Secretary: “We need to bear in mind that Saturday was pure wanton, mindless, 
criminal violence” (quoted in Kallenbach 2001, Daily Telegraph, July 11).  
These local reactions were reflected in the governmental response. Blair began speaking 
of “thuggery” (Stokes and Jones 2001, Daily Telegraph, July 10) and announced, 
through a spokesperson, that the problem consisted of “local people intent on having a 
go at the police and destroying their own community” (The Sun 2001b, July 10). David 
Blunkett launched the call for tougher means of crowd control and involved himself in a 
debate over the introduction of water cannons and tear-gas (Blunkett: "I'll crush riots!", 
Kavanagh 2001, The Sun, July 9). The focus on anti-social behaviour or yobbery, 
however, clearly did not provide particularly plausible answers for why localities such 
as Burnley, Oldham and Bradford had experienced this unrest.  
The concern with ethnic segregation or self-segregation supplemented the analysis of 
the unrest as evidence of ‘thuggishness’.92
                                                 
92  One argument in this context was to reverse the connections drawn between race and unruly 
behaviour and to speculate that disorder was a sign of the adaptation of previously law-abiding 
Asians, as the Independent put it, to “the thuggish values of the host population” (The Independent 
2001, Comment, July 9). Another was to blame the failure of the community leaders to restrain 
young people in their communities (e.g., Roy 2001, The Daily Telegraph, July 9; The Times 2001, 
Features, July 9). 
 Maybe most conspicuously, the former 
Scottish National Party MP Jim Sillars drew a link between the Bradford unrest and 
what “multiculturalism has done in England”. Multiculturalism had 
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drive[n] them [young people of Pakistani background] into their parents’ past, 
and imprison[ed] them in ghettoes. … Forging that common pride, and urging 
loyalty on the part of all its citizens to its common sets of democratic and legal 
values is a better prospect for the future than a multiculturalism that has 
manifestly failed. (Sillars 2001, The Sun, July 10) 
It was in a similar context that the findings of a report into the conditions of race 
relations in Bradford were introduced. The tenor of the report by Herman Ouseley 
(2001) – considered in more detail below – was seen to be a stark warning about 
divisions along ethnic lines (Brooke 2001, Daily Mail, July 13; Dodd 2001, The 
Independent, July 10; Wainwright, Perkins and Travis 2001, The Guardian, July 13). 
The solution that the report envisaged was the promotion of a sentiment of togetherness, 
of ‘civic pride’, across the lines that divided Bradford (Ouseley 2001).  
The criminal justice response to the unrest in Bradford was characterized by 
unprecedented heavy-handedness. More than 200 of those involved in the riot received 
prison sentences from ten months up to nine years, with the majority of sentences 
between three and five years (Carling et al. 2004). Faisal Bodi remarked in The 
Guardian that, since the Director of Public Prosecution needed to consent to the riot 
charge under the 1986 Public Order Act, “there is every reason to suspect that these 
prosecutions are politically driven” (Bodi 2002, The Guardian, July 1) and that  
[i]n defining the events to which they relate as a criminal rather than a civil 
problem, the prosecutions demonstrate the government’s intention to treat the 
Muslim community as a law and order problem instead of a community 
relations/human rights challenge. (ibid.) 
John Lea (2004, 196), pointing to the coincidence of blunt law and order responses with 
a rhetoric of citizenship, responsibility and cohesion, remarked: “Citizenship has to be 
learned the hard way”. 
In evaluating some of the explanatory accounts that were applied to all three incidents, 
we suggest that changes in how causes were discerned and emphasized are evident. The 
reference to racist provocations preceding the incidents or to socio-economic 
deprivation to explain the attitudes of those involved in the disturbances appeared less 
acceptable, while their ‘irrationality’ or the ‘thuggishness’ of ‘mindless violence’ were 
diagnosed more frequently. The crisis of multiculturalism and how it was seen to have 
fostered separatism and segregation, were drawn on to consider why the unrest had 
occurred.  
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This snapshot of representations of the events shows how accounts were defined that 
would impact upon the political responses to the disturbances. The terms of this 
response varied from understandings of disorder in the 1980s. While the Scarman 
Report or Heseltine’s episode in Liverpool had brought about changes in police tactics 
and large-scale regeneration programmes, the 2001 mainstream emphasised criminality 
and ethnic segregation. There is a fit between these perspectives and New Labour’s 
social imaginaries that we have outlined previously. The refusal to acknowledge socio-
economic conditions or the racist provocations that preceded the unrest chimed with a 
philosophy of government that was directed at individual conduct and moral outlook.  
The Community Cohesion Archive 
The post-riot assessment of late 2001 is characterised by some diversity. Reports that 
were published differ, not only in terms of how much weight was given to varying 
explanations of what had occurred, but also as regards the depth of their inquiry, the 
thrust of their critical remarks, and the scope of their recommendations. While the 
report into the state of race relations in Bradford (Ouseley 2001) had been 
commissioned prior to the disturbances, the two reports that investigated the situation in 
Oldham (Ritchie 2001) and Burnley (Clarke 2001) were issued in response to the 
disorder. Simultaneous to their publication, Whitehall provided its own assessment of 
the underlying causes and the political initiative they required (Cantle 2001; Denham 
2001). In these reports, community cohesion was introduced as a strategic objective. 
The following briefly considers all five reports: Ouseley, Ritchie and Clarke for how 
they portray conditions in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham; and Cantle and Denham for 
their analyses and the development of community cohesion.  
Reading these reports allows, as John Lea (2004, 184) puts it, for insights into 
“museums of official discourse through which the practical working out, and 
metamorphosis, of dominant political ideologies about the relationship between 
ethnicity and social stability are revealed”. Derek McGhee (2003, 377) has pointed to 
these reports as the “community cohesion archive”, which is mined here for how 
political strategies were devised in correspondence to understandings of what had 
caused the unrest.93
                                                 
93   Scarman’s (1986) report into the Brixton disturbances of 1981 provided a detailed exploratory 
narrative of how the incidents unfolded (and was largely commended for this achievement). The 
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‘Community Pride, not Prejudice’: Ouseley’s report into Bradford 
The commissioning of Ouseley’s report preceded the Bradford unrest, and it was 
intended to explore the experience of urban decline and the observation, as stated in the 
report, of “growing divisions among its population along race, ethnic, religious and 
social class lines” (Ouseley 2001, 1). It was commissioned not primarily with the 
intention to arrive at remedies for the aftermath of the unrest and was not intended to be 
“a firefighter tackling the causes of last weekend’s riots” (Wainwright 2001, The 
Guardian, July 12). In the effort to conceive and analyze the causes of the unrest, 
however, Ouseley’s report was considered most conspicuously for how its findings on 
growing divisions appeared to confirm critical intuitions about the failure of 
multiculturalism. More complex aspects of the reasoning of the report were not 
conspicuously picked up in the immediate news coverage of the unrest.  
Regarding the causes of Bradford’s decline, the report pointed towards a circle of 
deprivation, decreasing communal pride, unwillingness to invest in the community, 
resulting in anti-social behaviour and crime. The report did not clearly privilege any one 
of these elements as preferred targets of political intervention and, significantly, did not 
advocate the adoption of urban regeneration programmes. It focused strongly on the 
city’s ‘corporate identity’, and its ‘city pride’. ‘City pride’, the report suggested, was the 
attitude that would allow for Bradfordians to positively relate to their environment, and 
thus to engage, invest and overcome ethnic separations. People, the report claimed, 
“said that the city pride went when the wealth left the District. From all backgrounds, 
people want to see civic and community pride at the heart of the economic revival” 
(Ouseley 2001, 2).94
Racism, Ousely (2001, 12) suggested, was a fact and characterized the experience of 
ethnic minorities in Bradford. As importantly as the reality of racist discrimination, 
however, the report pointed to the reaction of those subjected to discrimination. The 
 
                                                                                                                                               
various 2001 reports, by contrast, refused to give much consideration to how the unrest had 
unfolded and to their respective ‘trigger events’.   
94  At the time of the publication of the report, civic and city pride had been frequently considered and 
defined for political purposes such as in a report by Charles Leadbeater (1997) for Demos. Ouseley 
(2001, 12) suggested a “[l]ack of civic pride is reflected in litter-strewn streets”. John Burnett 
(2004, 13) criticized the notion: “To suggest that the Asian communities involved in the northern 
uprising did not already have a sense of civic pride, did not already care about their children’s 
education, were not already aware of the complexities of identity politics strikes at the very basis 
of their community identity itself.”  
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attitude of “[s]elf-segregation is driven by fear of others, the need for safety from 
harassment and violent crime and the belief that it is the only way to promote, retain and 
protect faith and cultural identity and affiliation” (Ouseley 2001, 10). The report 
launched a strong attack on ‘self-styled’ community leaders that were considered to be 
“in league with the establishment key people and maintain the status quo of control and 
segregation through fear, ignorance and threats” (Ouseley 2001, 10). Previous city 
development efforts that were supported by such local leaders had allegedly provided 
incentives for the portrayal of economic condition in negative terms and thus reinforced 
“low esteem” (Ouseley 2001, 11). Crime and anti-social behaviour, prevalent among 
young men “of all cultural backgrounds” (Ouseley 2001, 17), were exacerbated by an 
overly sensitive police that did “not dare touch them for fear that they would ‘riot’ and 
people from all sections of the community resent the police for what they see as 
‘nothing being done against criminals’” (Ouseley 2001, 11).  
The report did not clearly privilege any area of intervention and did not discount the 
experience of racism and social injustice. However, it put particular emphasis on ‘city 
pride’, heightened ‘self-esteem’ and a ‘corporate identity’ as solutions for Bradford’s 
most urgent problems. Racism, economic deprivation, segregated lives and crime were 
considered for how they impacted on ‘city pride’. Damaged ‘city pride’ allowed for an 
attitude of passivity and non-commitment, which, in turn, exacerbated social problems. 
Creating a “unifying vision” (Ouseley 2001, 1) was thus the “ultimate aim” in order to 
“create a District where people are justifiably proud of where they live, learn, work and 
play” (Ouseley 2001, 2). 
To achieve these aims, the report made four proposals in particular. The first was a new 
approach to citizenship education in Bradford’s schools, which was considered “pivotal 
in developing and sustaining civic knowledge and responsibility among children and 
young people across all cultural communities” (Ouseley 2001, 28). In terms that mirror 
the following concerns with cohesion in education, teachers were summoned to create 
“effective learning environments in which racial differences are seen positively by 
pupils” (Ouseley 2001, 26). Second, a ‘Centre for Diversity, Learning and Living’ was 
to be established to “focus on the people of Bradford, how they can share their diverse 
experiences and learn with and from each other about how these can contribute to the 
realization of the Bradford 2020 Vision through working, learning and living together, 
rather than separately” (Ouseley 2001, 30). Third, the report pointed to the need “to 
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overcome the difficulties which communities face in mixing, interacting, socializing 
and moving forward interactively for economic and social benefits”. For this purpose, 
the report demanded heightened “diversity knowledge” (ibid., 33) in the workplace and 
the introduction of according prerequisites in the Council’s recruitment policies. It 
called for “education programmes that are objective, honest and morally driven [and 
that] must be focused specifically in order to encourage compliance with pre-
determined acceptable behavioural standards” (Ouseley 2001, 32). Fourth, for the 
private sector the report advocated ‘equality and diversity contract conditions’ to ensure 
that “all publicly financed contracts have explicit conditions and criteria in pursuit of 
equality” (Ouseley 2001, 35). The report thus emphasized behaviour and attitudes – 
“pre-determined acceptable behavioural standards” that had to be achieved within 
“behavioural competency frameworks” (Ouseley 2001, 32). The positive corporate 
identity that Bradford had to achieve was seen to depend, for the most part, on the effort 
of individual Bradfordians to get their act together.95
Reports on Oldham and Burnley 
   
The Ritchie Report (2001) into the Oldham disorder was published in December 2001, 
simultaneously to the results of a series of other inquires into the Northern unrest. 
Commissioned to “consider the underlying causes and problems of tension between the 
communities in Oldham”, it was led by David Ritchie, a retired civil servant.  
The report followed an established formula and lamented the unwillingness of people 
“to shape up to their own responsibilities, beginning with their own attitudes” (Ritchie 
2001, 4). Equally, however, Oldham Council and the police were accused of failing to 
promote racial equality and in particular the Council was scolded for having failed to 
develop “bi-partisan approaches to key policy issues [and for its] persistent failure to 
face up to the deep seated issues of segregation” (Ritchie 2001, 14). Similar to 
                                                 
95  Despite a widely positive reception of the report, there have been various critical responses. 
Margaret Eaton, the Tory leader of Bradford Council (and chairwoman of Bradford 2020 Vision, 
the partnership that commissioned the report), suggested that the recommendations amounted to 
“another experiment in racial engineering and some form of Maoist cultural re-education” (quoted 
in Sutcliffe 2001, The Evening Telegraph, July 29). From a different standpoint, the New 
Statesman rejected the report: “White politicians and black or Asian race relations ‘experts’ babble 
endless nonsense. They talk of the need for black judges, black chief constables, black generals 
and other ‘role models’. Nobody on the streets of Bradford or Burnley could give a toss. 
Westminster deals in symbols and soundbites; the young Asians of Manningham deal in realities. 
They would trade any number of Mr Blunkett's adventure playgrounds and Lord Ouseley's centres 
of diversity for the prospect of decent jobs” (New Statesman 2001, July 16).  
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Ouseley’s report, the report pointed to the  “lack of opportunity for people to meet and 
talk across the community divides” (Ritchie 2001, 4). 
The Ritchie report identified a number of issues, ranging from education, health, and the 
economy to leisure, culture and the media and offered some recommendations (Ritchie 
2001, 10-15). It was met by an unwelcoming response from local officials who seemed 
to use available avenues to deflect its critical comments. The comparatively low-key 
background of the members of the review panel, and Ritchie himself, seemed to allow 
for the recommendations to be openly rejected.96
Simultaneously, the Burnley Task Force issued its report into the unrest (Clarke 2001). 
Chaired by Lord Anthony Clarke of Hampstead, a former chair of Labour’s National 
Executive Committee, the Task Force commanded more authority than its Oldham 
counterpart. As in other inquires, its terms were to report “not just the immediate causes 
of these problems” (Clarke 2001, 5), but also the “deep-rooted issues that have led 
Burnley to the point where violence and prejudice was allowed to dominate the town for 
those days in June” (ibid.). In its assessment of the unrest, the report concurred with the 
version presented by Burnley Police and suggested that  
 
the disorder was started as a result of a disagreement between criminal elements 
in both white and Asian communities … Although repeated comments were 
received that suggested that drug dealers and their associates were involved at 
the start of the disturbances, people were reluctant to give names of those 
involved (Clarke 2001, 36).97
                                                 
96  Oldham Council rejected the report for its “lack of academic rigour and flawed methodology” and 
for how it had relied “on the views of those self-selected few who sought the opportunity to 
express their views” (quoted in Carter 2002, The Guardian, June 29). Although they could have 
been subject to similar criticisms, such objections were not levelled against Ouseley’s and Clarke’s 
reports. Controversially, Ritchie had advocated an urban regeneration programme “with the 
explicit aim of achieving racially mixed schemes of private and socially rented housing” (Ritchie 
2001, 10). The Council responded that “Oldham is presented as a uniquely segregated society with 
a clear implication that the nature and extent of that segregation is a major cause for concern and 
underlies many of the social and economic ills, which the town faces. The Report draws one to the 
conclusion that the events of last May were a direct consequence of a segregated society. We 
doubt this analysis” (Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council and Greater Manchester Police 2002, 
5). Rather than engaging in “social engineering” (the council's interim response quoted in Herbert 
2002, The Independent, June 29), the Council referred to the “belief that cohesion can only come 
about through people freely choosing to increase mutual understanding, interaction, and 
participation in the life of the Borough” (Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council and Greater 
Manchester Police 2002, 12).  
  
97  The Task Force did not consider a racist attack on a taxi driver as among the immediate causes of 
the unrest, whereas it strongly emphasized previous fighting among Asian youths. It remains 
unclear how this alleged intra-communal fighting, as seems to be suggested, could have lead to 
wide-spread confrontations with the police. The suggestion that the unrest in Burnley had been 
connected to drug criminality, though it was not plausibly corroborated in the report, was widely 
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The report quoted Blair’s 2001 Labour conference address: 
The graffiti, the vandalism, the burnt out cars, the street corner drug dealers, the 
teenage mugger just graduating from the minor school of crime: we’re not old 
fashioned or right-wing to take action against this social menace. We’re standing 
up for the people we represent, who play by the rules and have a right to expect 
others to do the same. (Blair quoted in Clarke 2001, 6) 
In line with Blair, the Task Force’s report expressed strong indignation not only with 
‘thugs’ but with those elements that did not live up to “responsibilities”. Similar to 
previous reports, it propagated a “common vision” (Clarke 2001, 5). While its diagnosis 
of deprivation in Burnley seemed fairly frank, its remedies were focused on measures of 
local self-help to overcome urban decline (Clarke 2001, para. 3.10). The problem of 
segregation was mostly addressed as one of self-segregation: “The Task Force believes 
that if Asian communities want to progress then they must be open and honest about the 
failings of their own communities” (Clarke 2001, 50). 
In the report, warnings about decline and disintegration coincided with a positive appeal 
in an interesting way. Clarke professed to having “fallen in love with the town”, a “town 
of rich tradition and pride”, inhabited by people that “display the best elements of 
human nature” (Clarke 2001, 5). A few pages further, a fascinating reversal towards 
expressions of profound indignation occurred, significantly not just with ‘thugs’ but 
with wider attitudes: “if Asian communities want to progress then they must be open 
and honest about the failings of their own communities” (Clarke 2001, para. 3.4). This 
reversal seems exemplary of the simultaneity of praise and exhortation that is 
conspicuous in all three reports investigated here. Flawed realities are contrasted with 
potentials that could be realized if the concerned groups changed their ways and pulled 
themselves together.  
The ‘Bradford Race Review’ focused on the idea of ‘civic pride’ to counter urban 
decline and inter-ethnic discord. The ‘Oldham Independent Review’ was remarkable for 
how quickly it was rejected by its commissioning authorities. Clarke’s ‘Independent 
Task Force’ offered a mixture of law and order rhetoric with an emphasis on local self-
help, perhaps most closely approximating the way community cohesion would be 
introduced and defined in the following. All reports made recommendations of ‘civic 
pride’, ‘visions’, and ‘corporate identity’. The development of a ‘sense of belonging’ 
                                                                                                                                               
picked up in speculations on how all unrest had been related to drugs (such as in Denham 2001, 
para. 1.7).  
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and of a positive identification with the city were presented as appropriate responses to 
the unrest.  
Cantle: From Analysis to Political Practice 
While the previous three reports were all conceived with particular local contexts in 
mind, the attention soon shifted towards the broader national picture. Already in the 
reports, as well as in media coverage of unrest, there had been a tendency to move from 
local to national diagnosis, to search for shared features underpinning the local 
dislocations, and to shift from local analyses to diagnoses that were generalisable. In 
this regard, ‘Community cohesion’, the report of the Independent Review Team (Cantle 
2001) chaired by Ted Cantle, and ‘Building Cohesive Communities’ the report of the 
Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community Cohesion (Denham 2001) followed 
established trends.  
The Independent Review Team chaired by Ted Cantle, besides delivering a set of 67 
policy recommendations, began referring to “a field of community cohesion” (Cantle 
2001, para. 1.1). It established the notion for public policy use and suggested that 
governmental and civil society actors should adopt the concept and that “each area 
should now develop a Community Cohesion Strategy” (2001, para. 5.2.3). The report’s 
terms of reference did not envisage an extended investigation into the unrest, but rather 
a consideration of the “views of local communities”, to “identify good practice” and 
“weaknesses in the handling of ... issues at the local level” (2001, para. 1.1).  
In addition to its consideration of the three localities affected by violence, the review 
team visited Birmingham, Southall and Leicester. Particularly the latter two were used 
to draw contrasts. In Southall and Leicester, “there was a pride in their community”, 
“diversity was seen as a positive thing”, and an attitude of “openness and honesty meant 
that rumours and misunderstandings were less likely to gain credence and ferment 
resentment or jealousy” (2001, para. 4.3). While the report acknowledged that where 
“high levels of poverty and unemployment were found community cohesion was 
unlikely to be very evident” (2001, para. 4.5), it argued that the connection between 
poverty and unrest was not “straightforward” (2001, para. 4.12).  
In its first set of recommendations, the report claimed that “community cohesion 
fundamentally depends on people and their values. Indeed, many of the present 
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problems seem to owe a great deal to the failure to communicate and agree a set of clear 
values that can govern behaviour” (2001, para. 5.1.1). Strong emphasis was placed on 
the need to establish more clearly the “rights – and in particular – the responsibilities of 
citizenship” (2001, 20). The report’s headline recommendation was the introduction of a 
“statement of allegiance” that would have to precede the acquisition of citizenship in 
British naturalisation procedures, followed by the demand for a “national debate”—
which would lead to the adoption of “principles of a new citizenship” (2001, para. 
2.15). While the report offered some recommendations on “community leadership” 
(2001, para. 5.2) and suggested that political parties needed to become more 
representative of the diversity in Britain (2001, para. 5.3), its recommendations on 
issues of economic inequality remained localized (2001, para. 5.5). Regarding 
employment, for example, the near-exclusive concern was with the acquisition of skills, 
rather than with structural causes of long-term unemployment (2001, para. 5.13).  
The “physical segregation” of communities was mentioned prominently as part of the 
list of factors that were considered to have caused the unrest. 
The complete separation of communities based on religion, education, housing, 
culture, employment etc., will, however mean that the lack of contact with, and 
absence of knowledge about, each other’s communities will lead to the growth 
of fear and conflict. The more levels upon which a community is divided, the 
more necessary and extensive will be the need to foster understanding and 
acceptance of diversity. (2001, para. 5.7.3)  
Divisions of a ‘community’ may thus be overcome by what Ouseley’s report had 
already referred to as ‘diversity knowledge’, the recognition and acceptance of values 
and a change in attitudes.  
The terms of reference limited the focus of the Cantle report to a consideration of 
communal tensions. Accordingly, structural solutions to problems on a wider scale, 
such as an interest in deprivation or inequality, were largely absent. This may not 
surprise, since such perspectives had already been rejected in the understandings of the 
unrest that prominent governmental actors had proposed. Moreover, even though the 
report did not explicitly engage with multiculturalism, it followed the account that 
ethnic segregation had fostered communal divisions, which, in turn, had given rise to 
significant social problems.  
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The report also introduced some elements of a definition of the term ‘community 
cohesion’. In its appendix, it offered a sketch drawn up by Rosalyn Lynch (2001) of the 
Home Office’s Research Development and Statistics Unit. Lynch suggested that 
“[c]ommunity cohesion […] is about helping micro-communities to gel or mesh into an 
integrated whole” (Lynch 2001, 70). With reference to a Canadian definition, Lynch 
stressed the procedural character of cohesion as an objective that required continuous 
efforts (2001, 69). The bulk of the sketch, however, approached ‘community cohesion’ 
by identifying the factors standing in its way: residential and educational segregation, 
racism, competition for scarce resources among ethnic groups, misinformation and fear 
spread by the media. Citizenship education, diversity in housing and education were 
introduced as having a positive impact on community cohesion. This brief and arguably 
somewhat eclectic analysis in the report attempted to give some lineage to a policy idea 
that had been identified, arguably, before the report was written. It was intended to 
convey some semblance of scientific rigour, such as when it claimed, misleadingly, that 
“a great deal has been written about community cohesion” (2001, 70).  
Denham: Cohesion and Public Order 
The report ‘Building Cohesive Communities’ that was issued by the Ministerial Group 
on Public Order and Community Cohesion carried forward this definition of the 
paradigm. The Denham Report offered no new assessment of the unrest but provided a 
summary of the previous reports and offered an overview of the perspective of 
government.98
cannot create or impose community cohesion. It is something that communities 
must do themselves with Government’s help as enabler and supporter. The 
Actions we set out in the previous Chapter should be viewed in that light. They 
will only succeed in making a real difference if communities are fully engaged 
in, and take responsibility for, the task of civic renewal. (Denham 2001, para. 
4.1) 
 Significantly, it established a governmental commitment to community 
cohesion, as an objective that would be mainstreamed across public policy sectors. It 
suggested, however, that ‘government’  
                                                 
98  When David Blunkett announced the establishment of the Ministerial Group in the House of 
Commons, he pointed to the need for an “urgent review … of all the relevant community issues” 
and to the task of the Group to “seek views from people on the ground in areas which have 
suffered from violence the most, as well as in other places with similar social and demographic 
features which have not” (Hansard, 10 July 2001, Column 664).  
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While Denham’s report contained some new recommendations, it operated mostly 
against the backdrop of pre-existing governmental programmes whose efforts, it was 
suggested, needed to be altered to accommodate ‘community cohesion’. The report 
emphasised, among other areas, a focus on ‘shared values’ and identities: “A uniting 
identity can have a powerful effect in shaping attitudes and behaviour which are 
conducive to community cohesion” (2001, para. 3.10). It paid tribute to the role of 
‘civic pride’ in reducing communal tensions (2001, para. 3.14). It concurred with the 
Cantle Report by calling for the incorporation of ‘community cohesion’ as an “explicit 
aim of Government” (2001, para. 3.16), though it acknowledged the need “to establish 
how community cohesion might be measured” (2001, 3.17). It put emphasis on 
education (2001, para. 3.29-32), housing issues (2001, para. 3.22-28), and ‘community 
leadership’ (2001, para. 3.33). Regarding policing, it highlighted the interrelation 
between anti-social behaviour and cohesiveness, and envisaged strengthening 
consultation procedures between police and communities (2001, para. 3.67-76). 
The report pointed out how various existing governmental efforts could relate to 
cohesion as a strategic policy goal, and it highlighted the need to incorporate 
‘community cohesion’ as a strategic objective. This objective was defined against the 
background of a settled understanding of what had led to the unrest, disruptions in the 
local social fabric which, in turn, were seen to have behavioural causes or to be related 
to defects in identity or values. It suggested that “it will require courage in tackling the 
intrinsically difficult and controversial issue of social identities and values on which 
cohesion depends” (2001, para. 4.2). In the Denham report as well as in preceding 
documents, this task was largely conceived in relation to the creation of unifying city or 
national identities, framed in terms similar to the corporate identities that businesses or 
institutions often intend to create in order to infuse a positive ethos of work. The role of 
actually existing identifications among ethno-religious minorities was less frequently 
and more carefully broached (until the work of the Commission on Integration and 
Community Cohesion). 
Government, the report suggested, cannot be entrusted with the creation of community 
cohesion. Where it has a role to play, it is to remind communities of their shortcomings. 
It can facilitate the dissemination of good practices, persuade recalcitrant local actors to 
get into the community cohesion business and evaluate local efforts. As a new paradigm 
of British urban governance, community cohesion envisages continuous efforts by post-
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immigration groups to reconsider identities, to ‘shape up’ and to become active in order 
to comply with requirements that are ambiguous at best.  
How these priorities were put into practice is not easy to establish. With the requirement 
to mainstream cohesion, with funding dispersed to projects that made reference to 
cohesion, and with the 2006 introduction of a statutory duty to promote cohesion in 
state-maintained schools, the notion clearly became widely used. Its effectiveness and 
the extent to which its rhetorical pervasiveness was met by practices that would have 
been developed differently had priorities been otherwise is unclear. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the new orientation supported a shift from anti-racist priorities 
towards an emphasis on social ties and cross-communal networking (Thomas 2007). 
There is even more evidence of ambiguity, such as in the area of education. While 95% 
of English schools indicated an awareness of their duty to promote cohesion, 
understandings of what this duty entailed vary considerably and the list of terms 
associated with ‘community cohesion’ – from citizenship, multiculturalism, faith, 
tradition, age or deprivation – confirms a considerable scope for interpretation (Phillips, 
Tse and Johnson 2010, 29). Despite this scope, it is clear that some items remained 
excluded. Community cohesion largely suggests a focus on behavioural remedies, 
instead of a concern with socio-structural conditions or with the experience of racial or 
religious discrimination.  
The Report of the Commission on Integration and Community Cohesion 
After the attack on London Transport in 2005, reinforced priorities in the area of 
domestic security put some doubt on the delivery of community cohesion (Kundnani 
2009). The Commission on Integration and Community Cohesion (CICC) was 
introduced as an attempt to update scope and meaning of the concept and to develop the 
agenda further in response to new concerns. Introduced as a “new and honest” (BBC 
2006) effort to consider ethno-religious diversity in Britain, its launch was accompanied 
by repeated hints towards the failure of multiculturalism. Announcing the establishment 
of the commission, Communities Minister Ruth Kelly (cited in Chapman 2006) 
remarked that in “our attempt to avoid imposing a single British identity and culture, 
have we ended up with some communities living in isolation of each other, with no 
common bonds between them”. “[F]rom a period of near uniform consensus on the 
value of multiculturalism”, the new debates had to consider whether multiculturalism 
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was “encouraging separateness” (ibid.). The “near uniform consensus” on 
multiculturalism had, of course, already been questioned for a considerable amount of 
time, such as when the causes of the 2001 unrest had been debated. In this case, the 
emphasis on identities seemed to indicate that the Commission was expected to deliver 
new perspectives in the definition of community cohesion.  
To a considerable extent, the CICC report struck a similar tone to earlier reports. 
Community cohesion was defined as “the process that must happen in all communities 
to ensure different groups of people get on well together” (CICC 2007, 9). A focus on 
communal relationships, social capital and behavioural characteristics remained 
evident.99
The foreword by Dara Singh, chief executive of Ealing Council, introduced the purpose 
of the report as to consider “shared futures”, rather than “obsessing with those things 
that make us different” (CICC 2007, 3). Integration and cohesion, it is stated, are “not 
about race, faith or other forms of group status or identity” (CICC 2007, 5). By contrast, 
the report suggested that 
 One characteristic, however, that distinguished the report from earlier 
definitions of community cohesion was a certain localism and the reference to the 
complexity of social conditions that would make national solutions more difficult to 
apply. A further development in the report was a new emphasis on what constituted the 
core obstacles towards the attainment of community cohesion. The report did not put 
strong emphasis on social patterns of segregation or the behavioural trends 
underpinning ‘self-segregation’. It pointed to identity patterns among ethnic minority 
groups.  
identities remain, but increasingly, people are moving away from single 
identities to multiple identities not just based on race or ethnicity, but differences 
in values, differences in life-styles, consumption, social class, differences across 
generations, gender etc. People now have multiple identities and adjust these to 
the situation they are in – and this seems particularly true for the children or 
grandchildren of migrants. (CICC 2007, 34) 
                                                 
99  A difference between CICC (2007, 97) and, for example, the Cantle Report was the new emphasis 
on the promotion of ‘social justice’. This was not conspicuously picked up in the governmental 
response to the Commission’s report, where the concern remained unacknowledged and 
unconnected to the revised definition of cohesion (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2008). Overall, the concern to promote social justice appears rather limited: the 
emphasis is on media representations and communication strategies – showing that “justice was 
being done” in order for cohesion to be preserved (CICC 2007, 100-107). 
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Fluid and trans-nationally globalized identities were the basis for suggestions in the 
report. It prominently mentioned research findings showing that “people with more 
complex and multiple sources of identity are more positive about other groups, more 
integrated and less prejudiced” (CICC 2007, 35). These emerging dispositions were 
contrasted with older, traditional or conventional ethno-religious identities that seemed 
to be considered not simply as problematic but also as in decline. The report strongly 
implied that these were problematic and, given globalization and new urban diversity, 
historically anachronistic types of identification. While it is not always very clear how 
this emphasis on new identities informed the political recommendations of the report, it 
is evident that aspects of the politics it envisaged emerged on the basis of this 
diagnosis.100
The analyses in the report have not been undisputed. While new constellations of 
diversity are undoubtedly significant, it has been suggested that this picture may be 
incomplete. Demographic differentiation in one urban sphere, where “super diversity” 
(Vertovec 2007) is seen to have emerged, does not change that significant numbers of 
people, and in particular those who are less visible or interesting as specimen of ‘old’ 
kinds of diversity, continue to subscribe to group identities. The Fourth Survey, a large 
quantitative study of identity patterns among British ethnic minorities, established the 
remaining significance of religious identities among British Asians (Modood, Berthoud 
and Lakey 1997). Shared experiences of diasporic life continue to shape identities, not 
least in relation to religion, for groups that are ready to mobilize around grievances and 
common claims and in particular when shared value commitments are seen to be under 
attack (Modood 2005). In critical comments on the Commission’s emphasis on 
“multiple, fluid, diasporic, transnational and hybrid identities” Derek McGhee (2008, 
57) suggests that these “are lived in particular socio-political contexts” and do not 
“prevent the persistence of individuals also occupying multiple positions of 
marginalization and subordination” (2008, 58).   
  
The experience of discrimination, such as for being Muslim or African Caribbean, 
means that fluid identities may be experienced as socio-structurally ossified. The 
                                                 
100  The report’s rejection of ‘single group funding’ is probably the closest approximation to a political 
recommendation that corresponds to such understandings (CICC 2007, Annex D). Government 
dedicated £50 million to implement the report’s recommendations, though it is difficult, as in most 
of these cases, to establish the extent to which CICC proved influential in shaping governmental 
priorities. See Fortier (2010) for a discussion of the aftermath of the CICC report, which is beyond 
the scope of this investigation. 
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suggestion is that this experience continues to characterise at least aspects of the lives of 
post-immigration groups in Britain. Arguably, however, not merely the experience of 
structural constraints accounts for why certain ethno-religious identity positions remain 
salient for individuals within these groups. Positive conceptions of group- or faith-based 
identity markers continue to characterise how British ethnic minorities conceive of 
themselves and of their social position. ‘Super diversity’ or the emergence of hybrid or 
trans-national identities in one domain of British life do not discount other, maybe more 
consolidated and less differentiated group positions (Modood and Dobbernack 2011). 
Hence, Lentin and Titley (2011, 186) have rightly suggested that the CICC report is at 
risk of failing to recognize “how people have long struggled to carve out these spaces 
[for identities] and possibilities themselves”. The position of the report, which Lentin 
and Titley characterize as that of diversity, is formulated in a way that it “acts on the 
individual as a counterbalance to the dangers of community. … The language of 
freedom as practice has been inhabited by diversity as a form of governmentality, 
nudging conduct and self-management towards desired effects” (ibid.). While it is 
difficult to gauge such effects, it is clear that the report is guilty of a measure of 
sociological reductionism and of a wishful projection of desirable identity patterns. The 
fit of these patterns to the variety of ways in which post-immigration groups in Britain 
conceive of themselves in religious or cultural terms – or outside of groups as 
individuals with trans-national attachments – is not established in the report. It appears 
to disregard processes of self-definition as well as negative ascriptions and structural 
pressures that mean that ethno-religious identities remain socially significant. 
As this position is not just reflected in the work of Commission on Integration and 
Community Cohesion, it may be appropriate to consider its origins in some more detail. 
One of the intellectual figureheads of CICC was Michael Keith, now the Director of the 
COMPAS Centre at the University of Oxford, whose work is instructive in this regard. 
In his concern to defend the report, Keith pointed to how  
networks, movements and cultures which cross borders now create sentimental 
communities of identity whose spatial scales are distinct from ground based 
realities. New forms of conviviality are coming into being that cross the 
conventional racial boundaries that characterise some parts of today’s city. The 
spaces of old and reproducing articulations of bigotry and racism remain. But 
they may be becoming residual as they are by-passed. Contemporary calls for 
new forms of transnational co-operation and a supra-national conversations (sic) 
about poverty or climate change are hardly radical. (Keith 2007) 
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Keith points to the complexity of contemporary city-life and how this challenges 
identity-based categories that fail to respond: “ethnic specificity and cultural difference 
are invariably on the move” (Keith 2005, 5). Keith, however, remains at risk of eliding 
the fact that, although his analyses may seem appropriate for the domain of social life 
that he describes, there are other patterns of identification and sensibilities at work in 
other domains, in different social contexts or even within the same contexts but outside 
of his area of interest. Religious and group-based identifications remain, as Modood 
(2007) and others have convincingly argued. The exclusive concern with ‘the novel’ 
represents a risk of eliding ‘the old’ and of introducing a hierarchy of identifications. 
This conception appears to draw on a notion of progress that is unhelpful in this regard. 
Following this notion, ethno-religious identities are not complemented, but replaced by 
the trans-national sensibilities that Keith observes. Accordingly, a binary antagonism 
between two types of identities is seen to be at work. John Solomos and Les Back point 
to how in the literature on cultural politics and ethnic minorities in Britain, this 
antagonism has become a commonplace. The 
debate can be summarized as a choice between either embracing the complex 
multiple formation of itinerant culture produced through movement and passage; 
or the assertion of arborescent traditions that in one way or another rely upon the 
simplicity of racial and cultural essences. (1996, 155, emphases added) 
In earlier writings, Keith himself had pointed to the danger of binary opposition and of a 
simplistic ‘either-or’ and had remarked, with Pile (1993b, 33), that “in defining new 
ethnicities, there is clearly potential for the texts to signify a rejection of ‘old’ 
ethnicities”. Notwithstanding, this signification is evident in the CICC report for how it 
not just ignores ethno-religious and group identities, but suggests that these are 
potentially harmful and dangerous.101
While it is difficult, in particular after Labour’s recent electoral defeat, to estimate the 
remaining significance of the CICC report, its selective recollection of cultural diversity 
  
                                                 
101  This shortcoming of CICC, to some extent, mirrors particular developments in British cultural 
theory, where the interest in hybrid identities frequently coincides with a rejection of ethnic or 
religious types of identification (Gilroy 2000; Alexander 2002). In the cultural politics tradition, 
however, the insightful and nuanced work of Stuart Hall stands out as an attempt to point to new 
dynamics of identification without stigmatising those that do not conform. Hall (2000, 227), for 
example, suggests that while “[s]ome individuals remain deeply committed to traditional practices 
and values (though rarely without a diasporic inflection) others, so-called traditional identifications 
have been transformed by being intensified (e.g by hostility from the ‘host’ community, racism, or 
by changing world conditions, such as the rising salience of Islam). For others, still, hybridization 
is far advanced, but rarely in any assimilationst sense.” Hall points to a broader range of identity 
positions that he sees at work in contemporary Britain and that cannot be reduced the generalized 
transnational fluidity that is postulated by CICC. 
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in Britain is reminiscent of arguments that continue to inform public debate. In one such 
argument, diversity is pitted against multiculturalism: the former represents an 
acceptable flavour of cosmopolitan difference; the latter refers to unwanted religious 
identities, group-based claims, and – more than anything else – a problematisation of 
British Muslims. David Cameron’s (2011) recent juxtaposition of the failure of the 
“doctrine of state multiculturalism” is exemplary of similarly selective dealings with 
‘difference’: embracing one and disavowing the other. The exclusive concern with 
desirable ‘diversity’, ‘transnational sensibilities’, with the urban melange of hybrid 
identities in both academic and political discourse, allows evading the difficult and 
protracted questions that arise when claims are made from group-based positions 
(Modood forthcoming). If the sociological or political interest in the former means 
rejecting the latter as abnormal or outdated, or if a biased sociological diagnosis might 
inform the design of public policies that systematically disadvantage ethno-religious 
groups, there are good reasons for sustained critique.  
It may seem unclear how these critical comments correspond to our objective to 
examine logics of social activation. However, the urban spatiality that Keith outlines 
and that is evident, as a result of his contribution, in the CICC report is reminiscent of 
the construction of the ‘projective city’ – a city of flux, temporary networks and 
changing connections. Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005a, 105), whose work we 
have examined in Chapter 2, suggest that this city contains “flows, where nothing could 
be stabilized, accumulated or crystallized”. This social imaginary underpins “[n]ew 
maxims of success … to discriminate between behaviour that is satisfactory and 
behaviour that leads to exclusion; to put a value on qualities and attitudes that had not 
hitherto been identified as distinctive” (ibid.).  
The types of activities that were envisaged in community cohesion strategies – mixing, 
mingling, flexibility, and tolerance – are clearly not alien to British post-immigration 
groups, not even where there is a remaining significance of religious or ethnic identities. 
The diagnosis that their behavioural change will safeguard cohesion and address 
significant social problems is dubious at best. Self-segregation, we have previously 
suggested, is a highly problematic diagnosis. However, while earlier community 
cohesion strategies seemed to be based on a misreading of social realities, the CICC 
extends this misreading into the problematic territory of identities. While earlier reports 
suggested a change of behaviour, the CICC seems to ask for new kinds of 
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identifications. It shows a preference for trans-national, fluid and hybrid sensibilities, 
and it attempts to show that these are more desirable and conducive to community 
cohesion.  
Conclusion 
The chapter has discussed how Labour’s new social rhetoric, its emphasis on social 
morals and the reference to social fragmentation provided a background for the analysis 
of disorder in 2001. This background informed the understanding that a lack of contact 
between majority and ethnic minorities provided the most compelling explanation for 
social problems in urban Britain, and that this lack was largely the result of behavioural 
deficiencies among ethnic minorities. The interpretation of disorder in Britain is usually 
marked by squabbles between liberal and conservative perspectives. Community 
cohesion was not least successfully introduced as it attached itself to the mainstream 
conservative reading and drew the connection to diagnoses of self-segregation and to 
the perception of a crisis of multiculturalism. More generally, the turn towards 
community cohesion signalled a new emphasis on attitudes among post-immigration 
groups. When community cohesion was defined and developed in the 2001 context, it 
involved a new assessment of how significant problems in English localities resulted 
from deficient behaviour and how such deficiencies could be overcome by a new 
communal vibrancy, civic pride, heightened responsibility and, generally, new degrees 
of social and communal activity. 
The chapter has suggested that, for how it involves a behaviouralisation of social 
problems, community cohesion has changed the terms of debate on cultural diversity. 
The question that is being asked with community cohesion, John Lea (2004, 193) 
suggests, is “how have the socially excluded communities – poor whites and Asians – 
got into this mess, and what can be done – in particular what can they do – to restore 
their ‘community cohesion?”. Accordingly, “[r]esponsibility for social change [has been 
put towards] individuals and communities rather than the state” (Alexander 2007, 120). 
The scenario in which ‘community cohesion’, ‘civic pride’ or a heightened ‘sense of 
belonging’ stimulate economic regeneration or make racism disappear, however, relies 
on a crude model of human behaviour, understood as something that “can be neatly 
packaged and dispensed if the right conditions are met for [its] production” (Fortier 
2010, 19).  
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With a discussion of the post-riot analysis, the chapter has also provided a snapshot of 
how alternative priorities became irrelevant, as they were brushed off as implausible or 
subsumed into the analytical perspective of community cohesion. The request to shape 
up, to become active, self-reliant and responsible works within a framework of 
expectations where activity and responsibility have replaced concerns with structural 
inequality and racism. Clearly, inequality and racism are still being considered by 
exponents of the community cohesion agenda, but their role is distinct from how they 
informed previous political objectives. Ted Cantle, for example, suggests that that 
“community cohesion and equality are two sides of the same coin. One is unachievable 
without the other. Even the perception of ambiguity is unhelpful and likely to be 
counterproductive” (iCoCo 2006, para. 3.1 g, 17). The CICC (2007, 100-107) report 
suggests that for community cohesion to be achieved, social justice needs to be seen 
being done. It is the perception of racism or inequality that endangers cohesion. 
Following this new concern with perceptions, community cohesion has been introduced 
as a fragile construct that is predicated on sentiments and attitudes that are easily 
corrupted and that require constant promotion. Critical analysis might damage this 
strategic objective and prevent the behavioural change that community cohesion, as a 
“regenerative tonic” (Amin 2005, 614), envisages.102
  
  
                                                 
102  The extent of such rhetorical operations can be seen in an exchange between Cantle and Faisal 
Bodi in The Guardian. Responding to Bodi’s critique of Cantle’s agenda (Bodi 2006, The 
Guardian, June 7), Cantle expressed disappointment over this “attack on community cohesion” 
(Cantle 2006, The Guardian, June 9). Similarly, in response to earlier criticism by Bodi (2002), 
Oldham Councillor Jeremy Sutcliffe asked: “Does he not want to live in a cohesive society?” (The 
Guardian 2002, July 2). The suggestion seems to be that community cohesion is not merely a 
strategic policy objective; it is seen to have a rhetorical reality that makes critical engagement with 
the term undesirable and harmful.  
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Conclusion 
Considering the formation of three agendas of cohesion, the thesis has explored the 
claim that the inactivity of populations causes social problems and puts social cohesion 
at risk. It has not primarily questioned the plausibility or truthfulness of this suggestion. 
Instead, it has focused on how it has been articulated, and what remedies it entails. The 
examination of three agendas of cohesion could not, and was not intended to, identify 
constants. The aim was to consider different types of concern that became politically 
salient and to identify similarities as well as differences. The initiatives examined here 
were developed in distinct political and discursive environments. Depending on the 
respective context, different understandings of social problems and crises circulated and 
were captured in propositions about what constitutes or promotes the ‘cohesive society’. 
On the basis of empirical analyses of the formation of social cohesion agendas in 
France, Germany and Britain, the thesis has provided an account of how despite 
context-dependent particularities, the politics of cohesion in all three countries called for 
measures of social activation. In other words, different accounts of what constitutes the 
‘cohesive society’ entailed similar measures for promoting it. This puzzling observation 
has been the starting point for an investigation of how the concern for social integration 
– clearly an established governmental aim – gave rise to a new interest in dispositions 
and behaviour. The intention was to provide some of the groundwork that is needed to 
understand how the objective of social cohesion was linked to the strategy of social 
activation. The thesis has identified aspects of the political logic of social cohesion, 
summarily presented in Table 4, and how social imaginaries of cohesion correspond to 
remedies of social activation. In investigations of agenda-setting moments and of the 
rhetoric of prominent politicians, the thesis has examined three different political 
initiatives. This conclusion draws on insights from all three cases and revisits analytical 
concerns introduced in the first chapters.  
Dimensions of cohesion 
The thesis has sought to critically engage with and to advance the analysis of a 
noteworthy political phenomenon. Despite its conspicuousness, the emergence of 
concerns with social cohesion across European polities has to date received little 
systematic or critical attention. Where it has been examined, the political objective of 
cohesion has often been presented as a natural response to challenging social realities. 
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Critical analyses have largely been restricted to individual policy fields. Nonetheless, 
analyses of cohesion discourse within particular domains of concern, such as welfare 
reform, minority integration or political participation, have shed light on some of its 
suppositions. Some of the critical accounts of community cohesion, cohésion sociale or 
Bürgergesellschaft that we have drawn on in preceding chapters are of considerable 
merit. 
Table 4: Dimensions of the politics of cohesion  
 
 Scenario of 
disintegration 
Vision of 
cohesion 
Social 
activity 
Targets of 
activation 
 
Cohésion Sociale Exclusion 
sociale  
‘Humane’ 
society 
Compassion; 
proximity; 
‘humane’ 
concern  
Les exclus: 
either ‘all 
French’ or 
socially 
marginalized 
 
Community 
Cohesion 
Ethnic (self-) 
segregation; 
parallel lives 
Shared lives; 
vibrant 
communities  
Contact; 
mixing and 
mingling; 
tolerance and 
civility 
Ethno-religious 
minorities; 
Muslims in 
particular 
 
Bürgergesellschaft Apathetic 
citizenry; social 
sclerosis 
Self-reliance; 
active 
citizenship 
 
Economic, 
civic and 
social 
participation 
and self-
reliance 
The 
irresponsible, 
oversaturated 
collective 
 
The thesis aimed to contribute to such investigations by considering deployments of 
cohesion for their linguistic strategies, imaginary qualities and effects across fields of 
issues. The politics of cohesion, it has been argued here, projects a vision of society and 
concludes that social problems need to be countered with political prescriptions towards 
heightened activity. To explore such connections, the thesis has examined how notions 
of cohesion have been introduced and developed in debates about post-immigration 
groups in Britain, citizenship and social reform in Germany and the welfare state in 
France. It has paid particular attention, firstly, to the formative stages of agendas of 
cohesion; secondly, to how notions of social disintegration and, thirdly, unity were 
articulated; and, fourthly, to the turn towards activity that is characteristic of the politics 
of cohesion. The following recapitulates these dimensions alongside analytical and 
critical concerns that were introduced in the first two chapters. 
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The beginnings of cohesion 
The three agendas of social cohesion examined here all emerged around critical 
junctures. They were developed in the context of governmental initiatives that put 
forward new propositions regarding the condition of society, its problems and 
trajectories. The politics of cohesion, however, does not just respond. Its introduction 
was accompanied by propositions on how crises and their causes should be 
understood.103
Such invocations of crisis are characteristic of the beginnings of cohesion. They 
distinguish the interpretation of events and social processes in all three cases. Despite 
their dissimilarities, exclusion sociale, disorder in the English North, and German social 
sclerosis were portrayed as critical moments that required a new consideration of the 
terms of social integration and new public policy activity. Social imaginaries were 
marketed in response to such crises, and society became a site for inventive and 
strategic work. Much of this, as was suggested in Chapter 1, can usefully be understood 
as the construction of problem images that attribute “cause, blame, and responsibility” 
(Stone 1989, 282). There are tangible benefits in the creation of such images. Notions of 
social cohesion were introduced in environments where political actors competed for 
advantageous positions and rhetorical openings to define political objectives and 
outmanoeuvre opponents. The emergence of cohesion in all three cases is characterised 
by such strategic calculations. 
 Many of these understandings were pre-existing and well-established. As 
Lentin and Titley (2011) have recently argued in considerable detail, British 
multiculturalism has been defined as in perpetual crisis (see also Vertovec and 
Wessendorf 2010). Its crisis mirrors that of the welfare state whose allegedly 
overbearing and immobilizing nature was treated as a rhetorical commonplace when 
Bürgergesellschaft became a significant idea in German political debate. Fracture 
sociale offered a particular understanding of the crisis of social exclusion, a crisis that 
had been acknowledged across the spectrum of French politics in the 1980s and 90s. 
                                                 
103  There is a distinction between invocations of crises and the protracted conflicts that characterize 
the social negotiation of cultural diversity, welfare politics or political participation. Reinhart 
Koselleck (1989, 311) usefully suggests that “[s]ocial relations, conflicts and their resolutions and 
their changing presuppositions are never congruent with the linguistic articulations by virtue of 
which societies act, conceive of themselves, interpret, change and form anew.” The reality of 
social processes and political contestations that are conceived as critical, Koselleck (1973) 
suggests, emerges as a result of intellectual work.  
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Jacques Chirac proclaimed a fracture sociale in 1994/5 in order to define a platform for 
his presidential campaign that was distinct from those of the other candidates. Fracture 
sociale offered a novel interpretation of a crisis whose elements had been widely 
acknowledged. This crisis, the occurrence of exclusion sociale, had been the subject of 
various interpretations. Among those, the Socialists’ concern with material social 
problems captured only insufficiently a diagnostic dimension that Chirac would supply, 
the humane touch. The concern with the moral and psychological dispositions of the 
French population allowed for the drawing of a contrast between Chirac’s position and 
the priorities of his opponents, which were portrayed as technocratic and inhumane.  
In the early 1990s, Tony Blair’s discovery of a moral crisis offered tangible strategic 
benefits, regardless of whether it was supported by deep-seated beliefs or not. 
Conservative preoccupations with moral decline, immoral behaviour and crime were 
drawn upon and reinterpreted. New Labour put forward an explanation for various 
problems that mobilized conservatism against the Conservatives and pointed to the 
amoralism of the Thatcher years as a root cause of social pathologies. It is indicative of 
the strategic nature of this positioning that Tony Blair himself noted how “effectively” 
he had managed to turn the murder of James Bulger “into a symbol of a Tory Britain in 
which, for all the efficiency that Thatcherism had achieved, the bonds of social and 
community well-being has been loosed, dangerously so” (Blair 2010, 57). As a device 
of contrast-creation, this redefinition of society succeeded, certainly if measured by the 
attention it brought to the then Shadow Home Secretary Blair. The appeal of a 
moralistic and behavioural account of social disintegration was established in political 
discourse. In 2001, it was deployed in the interpretation of unrest in Burnley, Oldham 
and Bradford and, later, found an expression in the concept of community cohesion.104
                                                 
104  Tony Blair (2010, 204) remarks that he only realized towards the end of his premiership that 
society “hadn’t [broken down] as a whole”. This is a departure from the moralizing rhetoric that 
was the key feature of his political speech-making in the 1990s, beginning with when he framed 
the Bulger murder as “a symbol of Tory Britain” (Blair 2010, 57). His suggestion that this was 
“good politics” (Blair 2011) affirms the rhetorical value of disintegration, which is not to provide 
an account of society as it is, but to make effective and plausible projections. Despite his shift of 
emphasis (“bad policy”) he continues to suggest, for example, that the riots of 2011, although not 
“symptomatic of society at large” are “a phenomenon of the late 20th century”. He points to 
incivility and lack of self-control among marginal and disaffected populations, most of whom “are 
shaping up that way by the time they are in primary school or even in nursery”. Their disaffection 
has to be addressed by means of behavioural and punitive interventions. Blair (2011) would have 
done so himself, he suggests, had there not been “a constant backdrop of opposition … on civil 
liberty grounds” and by Gordon Brown. 
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Finally, Gerhard Schröder’s Zivile Bürgergesellschaft was part of a strategic attempt to 
locate his politics of welfare reform in a more encompassing social imagination. The 
ideas that there was a crisis of solidarity, that the German social collective had become 
apathetic and its social model sclerotic, had been widely accepted. In the discourse of 
Bürgergesellschaft it was furthermore established that the welfare state was partially or 
entirely to blame for this crisis and for the decline of the German social model, which 
was variously constructed and invoked. The language of Bürgergesellschaft has been 
deployed to establish this causality as common sense and to sketch out an alternative 
vision of social solidarity. Schröder’s coalition government would draw on this notion 
of crisis in its introduction of a new system of welfare provision that put emphasis on 
activity and responsibility. Bürgergesellschaft in its civic, localist, and socio-economic 
dimensions provided a vehicle for such reforms. 
The language of cohesion offers benefits in particular situations and allows for strategic 
positioning. The establishment of a contrast to ‘the old’ is characteristic of this 
positioning: old ways of doing things, of conceiving of social solidarity, social 
assistance, crime or urban unrest, are contrasted with novel and innovative approaches 
that allegedly make use of resources of social solidarity that had previously been 
ignored. Old dispositions and identities – inflexible, inactive, or ethno-religious for 
example – are contrasted with new, active and flexible subjectivities. Despite the 
dissimilar nature of the three cases and the respective concern with French welfare 
provision, German civicness and British minority communities, various versions of 
cohesion themes offered similar benefits by creating such contrasts and outmanoeuvring 
opponents that were thereby portrayed as proponents of old ways. This strategic 
thinking characterizes the formative stages of notions of cohesion, and is open to being 
analyzed with a focus on problem images or causal stories. However, despite the merits 
of this perspective, it does not sufficiently account for the appeal of cohesion and its 
sense of immediacy and urgency. For this we have to consider social imaginaries. 
Social disintegration 
Sociologists standing in the tradition of C. Wright Mills (1959) speak of the 
‘sociological imagination’ that is needed to draw analytical connections across domains 
of social life. Analysts of politics have been less inclined to consider the role social 
imaginaries play in the political process. Where they have done so, they rarely consider 
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political rhetoric or social policy language. Pointing to this type of rhetoric, John Clarke 
(2007, 840) highlights a moment of projection and imagination and suggests that “[t]he 
‘body social’ is the focus of ‘mapping’ projects – both in its own right and in terms of 
its potential relations to the ‘body politic’.” The concern with specific and identifiable 
issues and events is transposed to illustrate invisible social trajectories and to map out 
the ‘body social’ for how it may be amenable to political intervention. This 
characterizes the politics of cohesion, where the concern with empirically identifiable 
issues was creatively embellished, projected into the future and considered for its 
implications regarding social disintegration and cohesion. 
The thesis has used the concept of social imaginaries as a tool for investigating such 
processes. The three perspectives introduced in Chapter 1 highlight the role of meaning 
and fantasy and point towards potentials for social critique. Charles Taylor (2004, 23) 
refers to the “ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with 
others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are 
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations”. For Cornelius Castoriadis (1987, 143), social imaginaries are “the 
organizing patterns that are the conditions for the representability of everything that the 
society can give to itself”. Ernesto Laclau, finally, points to how imaginary 
understandings of society become naturalized and “literalized” to the extent that they 
provide broad horizons of plausibility: “[t]he fascination accompanying the vision of a 
promised land or an ideal society stems directly from this perception or intuition of a 
fullness that cannot be granted by the reality of the present” (Laclau 1990, 62-3).  
The appeal of cohesion does not rely on imaginations of utopian fullness or of some 
undistorted communal future life alone; nor is it exclusively apocalyptic and concerned 
with social collapse. The defining characteristic of the politics of cohesion is that it 
works across both imaginary registers. Jason Glynos and David Howarth (2007, 147) 
elaborate on this coincidence. A “horrific dimension” of social disintegration connects 
to its utopian counterpoint and to a “fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle 
is overcome”.105
                                                 
105  This corresponds to Michel Foucault’s (1997, 118) account of problematization as a work of 
thought, though it adds a specific concern for the operation of fantasy that is absent in Foucault’s 
writings. 
 The urgency of cohesion relies on how the two are brought together: 
notions of social breakdown and disintegration connect to the promise of wholesome 
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sociability. The promise is that where society falls apart, a sense of collective activity 
can make it whole again.  
In the examination of three cases, the thesis has sought to identify the usage of these 
two dimensions in social cohesion politics. Regarding disintegration, New Labour 
engaged in the kind ‘social mapping’ that John Clarke refers to, as illustrated in the 
interpretation of the James Bulger murder and of the unrest in 2001. Segregation and 
self-segregation, in particular, supported the development of the community cohesion 
agenda. Events were often creatively embellished, dramatized and framed as metaphors 
for social malaise. The lawlessness of ‘ethnic enclaves’ became vivid, such as in 
representations of the attack on Walter Chamberlain in Oldham. The “no-go areas” that 
had allegedly emerged in various parts of the country served as an illustration of the 
character of those problematic populations whose subsequent violence could be seen as 
the confirmation of fundamental social pathologies. These pathologies which were then 
presented as the result of laissez-faire multiculturalism and the absence of shared 
values. The breakdown of Britain along ethnic lines, the “sleepwalking” into 
segregation that Trevor Phillips famously coined, the “nightmare” of “fully fledged 
ghettos” (Phillips 2005), or of Bradford in “the grip of fear” (Ouseley 2001, 1), 
provided a horizon for the dramatization of issues to which community cohesion 
constituted an allegedly appropriate response.  
The imagination of Bürgergesellschaft mobilized anxieties of a different kind. Roman 
Herzog (1997) spoke of a “sense of paralysis”. He characterized the German population 
as an oversaturated, irresponsible collective, dependent on welfare transfer and 
immobilized by vested interests. The idea of ‘lagging behind’ played a particular role in 
this imagination, since economic positioning had traditionally constituted a key 
expression of national pride in post-war Germany. On this imaginary canvass of status 
loss and social sclerosis, Bürgergesellschaft was introduced as an emotional appeal that 
promised to remedy the ills of collective inactivity.  
Finally, when Chirac introduced fracture sociale, he was able to draw on the 
imagination of decline that was powerfully expressed in the commemoration of the 
trente glorieuses. This idea of decline was used to give meaning to a broad spectrum of 
social problems that were circumscribed by notions of social exclusion. Working with 
ambiguous interpretations of exclusion sociale, Chirac defined fracture sociale as a 
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psychological disposition, the loss of certainties, and a sense of moral crisis: the 
“relative and precarious calm of today is a mere result of the fear of tomorrow” (Chirac 
1994, 47). Anxiety about the trajectory of French morals, a loss of certainty and 
compassion were part of the negative scenario of disintegration that Chirac invoked. 
In different forms, themes of social disintegration were conspicuous in all three cases. 
Tony Blair (1998, 20) suggested that “societies risk falling apart in division, rancour 
and distrust”. Social cohesion, he stated together with Gerhard Schröder (2003, 112), 
needed to be maintained “in the face of real and perceived uncertainty”. With fracture 
sociale, Jacques Chirac invoked disintegration as a core motif of his electoral platform 
in 1995. Although we have been particularly interested in agenda-setting moments and 
in the rhetoric of prominent politicians, it is clear that their ideas of disintegration were 
mirrored and reinforced in public commentary and the media coverage of various 
critical events. It has not been the central concern of this study to dispute the urgency of 
the problems that these and other political deployments of cohesion circumscribe, or to 
argue for different, maybe more realistic, ways of imagining society and defining 
problems. The problems that Chirac, Schröder and Blair invoked were widely 
acknowledged and may have been experienced as matters of considerable urgency. 
They were, however, transposed, projected and ‘mapped out’ regarding their meaning 
for the condition of the ‘body social’, thereby suggesting that cumulative problems put 
fundamental aspects of social life into question. Social disintegration was introduced as 
an ever-present but equally ever-abstract risk. Its imagination became urgent in relation 
to a corresponding imagination that posited an ideal of social life, that of the cohesive 
society.  
Social unity 
A projection of wholesome and undistorted social life provided the counterpoint to 
social disintegration. For Britain, this was encompassed by the idea of vibrant 
communities where culture and religion, if of any importance, would be objects of 
mutual appreciation. Racism, the suggestion often seems to be, can be brushed aside by 
members of ethnic minority groups who in spite of their socio-economical marginality 
pull themselves up. The idea with community cohesion is that populations have to be 
united by a vision, subscribe to a sense of civic pride and have the “diversity 
knowledge”, as Ouseley (2001, 33) put it, that would enable them to cope with adverse 
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circumstances. These ideas of positive behavioural potentials contrast with the portrayal 
of rioters as thuggish, community leaders as irresponsible and ethnic minorities as 
largely inward looking, inflexible and potentially violent. This contrast became visible 
in the media representations, the post-riot archive of reports and the political definition 
of cohesion. In the report of the Commission on Integration and Community Cohesion 
(2007) it was developed further: the report considered ethno-religious identities as 
problematic and contrasted these with more fluid dispositions, trans-national 
sensibilities and super-diversity. The suggestion was that community cohesion would 
require, or at least be much easier to attain, not just with new attitudes but with new 
identities. 
The humane society invoked by Jacques Chirac drew on a similarly stark contrast. It 
suggested that the technocratic orientation of bureaucrats had made French society cold 
and inhumane. Despite his liberal policy record, Chirac reinvented himself as a 
representative of the moral centre. He defined his mission as that of rectifying a moral 
crisis and of providing a sense of psychological security. In agendas of cohésion sociale 
this humane vision of collective solidarity was spelt out and became a widely used 
element of Gaullist political rhetoric. The politics of cohésion sociale drew on the 
confluence between understandings of exclusion sociale as a moral crisis, a mental state 
and a humanitarian mission. It provided a vision of social cohesion that would be 
achieved in a society of compassion, humanity and social proximity. 
The notion of Bürgergesellschaft, finally, provides examples of how a vision of a new 
community can play a role in political debate. The potentials of Bürgergesellschaft were 
constructed by drawing on German post-war achievements and were invoked in 
political marketing. The “foundational myth of the Federal Republic, national symbols 
and communal sentiments” (Speth 2003, 3) were drawn on to establish a contrast to the 
current crisis of collective social sclerosis. Against the sclerotic status quo of the 
German social model, extraordinary situations were used to illustrate aspirations of 
solidarity. The flooding of the River Oder or the post-war ethos of reconstruction 
provided for such illustrations where sustained collective efforts had made extraordinary 
achievements possible.  
Similar to parallel notions in Britain and France, this positive vision of social unity 
remains elusive. The thesis has suggested that the trajectory of decline, if taken literally, 
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is as difficult to envision as the nature of the humane and cohesive society that is 
invoked. H.L.A. Hart (1967, 3, emphasis added) stated that social disintegration reflects 
“disguised tautologies … depending entirely on the meaning given to the expressions 
‘society,’ ‘existence,’ or ‘continued existence’ of society”. While the elusive, nostalgic 
or unrealistic nature of both imaginaries requires scrutiny, we have been more 
concerned with how this meaning came about. The rhetorical coincidence of 
disintegration and unity is a shared feature of the politics of cohesion. Likewise, all 
cohesion agendas investigated in this thesis aim at achieving a change of mentalities, to 
provide psychological certainty, and to instil social groups with a new spirit of activity. 
In order to become compelling, these objectives generally require the reiteration of 
notions of social disintegration and unity. The marketing campaigns of the 
BürgerKonvent in Germany exemplify how scenarios of disintegration and visions of 
social unity were reiterated and publicized to support the request for behavioural change 
and socio-economic reform. The conjunction of these themes has been characteristic of 
the politics of cohesion in all three cases.106
The active society 
  
This study has endeavoured to illustrate how cohesion connects to the idea of the ‘active 
society’, made up of flexible and mobile subjects. Although the ‘active society’ is an 
idea with some pedigree and precedents in civil society thinking, the political turn 
towards activation that has been described here stands out as a novelty. It has become 
common to point towards inactivity, immobility, and inflexibility as pertinent causes of 
social problems and to propose policy measures of activation in response. Over the last 
three decades, activity has been introduced as a corrective towards various social 
shortcomings and as a core objective in the design of public policy.  
                                                 
106  This connection between cohesion and disintegration seems to reflect what social theorists have 
pointed to as the logic of risk (see also Fn. 1). For Ulrich Beck (1992, 20) a feature of modernity is 
that “risks and destruction ... must be reaffirmed over and over again”. For Giddens (1998, 63), 
risk is “the energizing principle of a society that has broken away from tradition and nature.” In 
both accounts, the management of risks is considered as the mode of governance that is 
characteristic of social modernity. Risk can be rhetorically invoked and politically deployed by 
governments to illustrate social trajectories and engage populations (see Diamond and Giddens 
2005; Giddens 2007). Problematically, risk theory tends to elide that it is its own social projections 
that make ‘energization’ and activation appear as appropriate measures. Such projections, rather 
than the appropriateness of the label of ‘risk’ to natural forces beyond political control, require 
examination. This elision, of course, also extends to how social disintegration, fragmentation and 
complexity are treated as naturally given in the politics of cohesion. 
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While activation was originally conceived in relation to unemployment and social 
benefits, the politics of cohesion has been a vehicle for an expansion of ideas of social 
activity. Not only the workforce is open to be redefined with a view to its in/activity, 
but also various populations whose mobility, flexibility and behavioural outlook are 
seen to fall below certain standards. The imperative of socio-economic activity has been 
conjoined with ideals of civicness and social contact, among others, to support a 
perspective that conceives of active citizenship, mixing or occupational activity in 
similar terms. All of these emerged as concerns for government and as dispositions that 
needed to be fostered – or imposed where fostering does not work. Activation now 
informs various political strategies that are conceived where immobility has been 
introduced as a danger to social cohesion. It is the default prescription in the design of 
policies that target allegedly problematic populations. 
The concern with activity, mobility and responsibility need not be met by a set of 
tangible policy measures and legislative efforts. However, this thesis has argued that 
even in instances in which it fails to give rise to such tangible changes, it has important 
political effects. This is the case because the consideration of social problems with the 
repertory of themes that cohesion provides renders alternative propositions implausible. 
In all three cases there was a displacement of alternatives when cohesion was 
introduced in opposition to competing perspectives. In Britain, alternative 
understandings of the causes of urban unrest and remedies that pointed towards socio-
economic conditions were sidelined when community cohesion became a predominant 
perspective. Similarly, the concern with the structural disadvantages facing 
marginalized populations in the French banlieues, which had seemed compatible with 
earlier understandings of exclusion sociale, was out of touch with cohésion sociale. In 
Germany, the idea that collective civic and socio-economic activity needed to be 
heightened made alternatives, such as those concerned with institutional reform and 
socio-economic improvement, appear implausible. Alternative perspectives with 
historical precedent, as well as ideas that had previously been drawn on in the pursuit of 
progressive politics, became unavailable when social cohesion was introduced as 
explanation and remedy.  
This type of long-term change, although it circumscribes the adoption of political 
agendas of cohesion, could not be systematically explored in the thesis. For France, 
Jacques Donzelot (2006, 3) suggests that progrès sociale had previously occupied the 
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place that, in the 1990s, cohésion sociale would assume. He points to this shift and 
argues that, with cohésion sociale, politics ceased to be considered “the guarantor or 
custodian of social progress”, and was instead characterized as “that which incites civil 
society to produce cohesion in a competitive environment” (2006, 11). Similarly, 
progressive orientations have been in decline in Britain and Germany, and the politics 
of cohesion has played some role in their deterioration (Lister 2001; Worley 2005). 
Multiculturalism – the proposition that cultural pluralism is not a threat but a valuable 
resource – has been under attack for some time (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010). Not 
just multicultural objectives, but also objectives connected to the ideal of racial equality 
have been curiously displaced in recent political discourse (Lentin and Titley 2011, 49-
84). Surveying the turn towards toughened requirements of civic integration across 
Western Europe, Christian Joppke (2007, 25) concludes that the “main purpose of social 
inclusion is social cohesion – that is, order, not justice”. Bürgergesellschaft, in turn, 
employed ideals of civic and democratic self-determination in the suggestion that an 
apathetic collective needed to do with less state support. It stood in more or less direct 
opposition to ideals of social solidarity embodied in the welfare state. While it would go 
too far to credit community cohesion, Bürgergesellschaft or cohésion sociale with such 
shifts, these initiatives clearly played a role in dislocating and diminishing progressive 
objectives. 
Apart from displacing former political initiatives, the politics of cohesion also 
channelled new ones. Immobilisme, social sclerosis, being stuck in old ways of thinking, 
acting and being were defined as problematic. Introduced as a contrast, the politics of 
cohesion posited the need for a break. British post-immigration communities were said 
to have the potential to be vibrant. Their potential vibrancy could only be productively 
tapped into on the basis of reformed attitudes. Accordingly, community cohesion 
addressed sentiments and dispositions: “clear values that can govern behaviour” (Cantle 
2001, para. 5.1.1). The notion of civic responsibility that was characteristic of the 
German Bürgergesellschaft, tapped into similar behavioural potentials. Cohésion 
sociale prioritized activity, such as in the labour market, and contrasted this with earlier 
understandings of what had caused social exclusion.  
These orientations towards activity have been conceptualized in the social-science 
literature on governance. The contribution of activated individuals is either celebrated as 
empowerment or considered a necessity in the effective pursuit of governmental 
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objectives under difficult conditions. Social complexity and fragmentation – the social 
imaginary of ‘new governance’ – are seen to require a turn away from the state in the 
provision of public services. The idea with empowerment is that older governmental 
methods were imposing a stranglehold on creative potentials for self-governance. This 
appeal to freedom, creativity and self-empowered activity is entailed in all social 
cohesion agendas. The suggestion that cohesion can be achieved through the 
contribution of empowered citizens clearly encapsulates an ideal of democratic, self-
governed activity. Activity is introduced in contrast to older social constraints and as a 
vision towards newly invigorated ideas of citizenship, participation and social 
engagement. 
There are obvious limitations to understanding activation as an instantiation of ideals of 
liberty and autonomy. The creation of active subjects usually cannot be achieved 
without coercion. Where activity is not forthcoming, it becomes a requirement that 
informs measures with which individuals are targeted in order to activate them. 
Moreover, ideals of liberty are frequently defined and applied in a sweeping manner, 
notwithstanding differential potentials among individuals to live up to such ideals. 
These often seem to be derived from the particular circumstances of classes that already 
are civically engaged or socio-economically active in a particular way. Their conduct is 
generalized and informs new expectations that are put to people whose circumstances 
might make it difficult for them to aspire to the required standards. Mitchell Dean 
(2003, 134) thus rightly points to a tension: “‘governance’ conducted with the aim of 
‘activating’ individuals comes to place obligations above freedom, and use[s] sanctions 
and coercive measures in the establishment of a particular form of life”.107
The critical interest pursued in this investigation was to point out such biases. The 
rhetoric of empowerment rings hollow once the selectiveness of how problematic 
populations are defined and targeted is revealed. Distinctions between desirable and 
undesirable types of social activity leave little scope for choice, and ideals of social, 
civic or economic empowerment remain curiously incomplete. As their incompleteness 
shines through, the politics of cohesion becomes open to be contrasted with 
democratically defined purposes and perspectives on society. Considering such 
 
                                                 
107  The coincidence of different types of power, as is well known, is also what Michel Foucault (1991, 
102) suggests. Rather than a displacement of sovereign and disciplinary power by governmentality 
and biopolitical power, he points to a “triangle” of techniques: “domination and discipline remain 
infrastructural to liberal governmentality” (Curtis 2002, 98). 
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alternatives raises rather daunting questions on the institution of new social imaginaries 
and a different, self-constituted type of politics. Although the thesis could not engage 
with these possibilities, it concludes with a tentative discussion of potentials beyond the 
politics of cohesion. 
Beyond social cohesion? 
This study has examined ideas of considerable fluidity. In all three cases the 
tenuousness of ideas and objectives made it difficult to consider the turn to cohesion as 
a reflection of long-term change. The thesis has not attempted to get to the ideological 
bottom of the politics of cohesion, as this would have deflected attention from the 
messy and fluctuating realities that have been investigated here. Despite this analytical 
choice, at this stage it may be appropriate to draw some tentative conclusions on how 
the turn to cohesion reflects changes beyond immediate agenda-setting and corresponds 
to broader concerns in critical social theory. 
The political programmes that have borne out cohesion purported to disavow ideology. 
Of course, their post-ideological pretensions need to questioned, similarly to how claims 
towards an “end of ideology” (Bell 1960) have been called into doubt, for example 
those by Francis Fukuyama (2006). Even so, the disavowal of ideology is a shared 
element of the political rhetoric of social cohesion. Jacques Chirac’s platform of 1995 
and in subsequent years, Gerhard Schröder’s Neue Mitte and Tony Blair’s New Labour 
all claimed to ‘value what works’ (Finlayson 2003; Bevir 2005). Despite the fact that all 
drew on the rhetorical appeal of values and community, they also claimed to pursue 
‘evidence based policy’. Exponents of cohesion renounced older explanatory paradigms 
and political ideas as ideological and deluded. The turn towards behaviour, dispositions 
and social activity was presented as a matter of pragmatic concern and as a more 
humane orientation to public policy.  
This ambiguity of pragmatic and moralistic orientations may be why it is difficult to 
establish the nature of the political project pursued with social cohesion. How cohesion 
connects to ideas of social progress, justice or equality – in terms of its content, but also 
in terms of the scope of its aspirations – is less than straightforward. It has already been 
suggested that the different cohesion agendas examined here experienced rather limited 
life-spans. Contrary to their grandiose ring, the grands projets of French public policy, 
Chirac’s relance sociale of 2004 or Sarkozy’s recent grand débat on French national 
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identity lasted for mere months before being abandoned and forgotten. In Germany and 
Britain, too, the political initiatives that have been investigated in previous chapters do 
not persist: neither community cohesion nor Bürgergesellschaft currently play a 
significant role in political debate. While notions of cohesion at the moment of their 
introduction seem profoundly influential in shaping policy, they were open to be 
revised, superseded or simply exhausted in a short amount of time. Cohesion does not 
appear to be a political objective that can sustain long-term commitments towards social 
change. 
The fluidity of the politics of cohesion and its disavowal of ideology raise questions 
regarding its account of alternative futures. The coincidence of the turn to cohesion with 
the relative decline of progressive ideas in the formulation of political objectives begs 
questions to that effect. For example, Wendy Brown (2001, 23) suggests that the growth 
of moralizing political language, a phenomenon that would include references to 
cohesion, should be considered as a sign of “powerlessness” and the “symptom of a 
broken historical narrative to which we have not yet forged alternatives”. Brown (2001, 
20) argues that 
where there was once a millenarian, redemptive, or utopian project around which 
to organize the various strategies of the political present, such projects have 
splintered politically at the same time that they have been quite thoroughly 
discredited.  
The changing political role of social utopia has been of interest for some time. Jürgen 
Habermas, as referred to before, argues that with the declining significance and 
increasing precariousness of the salaried, industrial workforce, the promise of social 
improvement through the mechanisms of the welfare state has become hollow. Today, 
we see “the disappearance of the utopian contents of the laboring society” (1989, 68).108
Diagnoses of the decline of political utopia contain interesting ambiguities. On the one 
hand, many seem to celebrate its demise for how it opens up the space for the pragmatic 
pursuit of political objectives, which are considered to be guided by ‘values’, not 
utopia.
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108  For Habermas, communication can be the paradigm to provide new reassurances and re-infuse 
utopia into society. More recently, he points to religion as a resource that may complement the 
normative foundations of the democratic-constitutional state and prevent their atrophy (Habermas 
2005). 
 A different perspective on contemporary politics, on the other hand, points to 
109  There is, of course, also a more philosophical rejection of utopia and progress (eg., Gray 2008; 
Scruton 2010, 62-79). 
209 
the remaining role of utopia, such as of imaginaries of the good society that continue to 
underpin the formulation of objectives, though they might be concealed. Ruth Levitas 
(2010a) points to utopia as an “imagination of society and ourselves [that] expands the 
range of possibilities” (Levitas 2010b, 546); she acknowledges, as do others, that the 
overt formulation of such alternatives has not been a strong point of recent mainstream 
politics. 
Critical perspectives 
The projection of alternative social imaginaries – Cornelius Castoriadis’ (1987) 
‘imaginary institution of society’ or the ‘imaginary reconstitution of society’ that 
Levitas (2005) speaks of – poses both conceptual and practical challenges. They 
nonetheless may be important to consider in relation to the politics of cohesion. 
Individuals that can be activated, it has been suggested, need to be located on an 
imaginary social map. Retracing the politics of cohesion, the thesis has examined how 
visions of society were conceived, projected and mapped out in different national 
contexts. In how it has examined these projections, the thesis has pursued concerns that 
mirror issues raised in critical social theory, specifically in contributions that examine 
political dimensions of the construction of social meaning. A concern for Ernesto 
Laclau (1990; 1996), Chantal Mouffe (1993; 2000), Jacques Rancière (1995; 2006) and 
Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) is how social categories that are experienced as fixed and 
beyond revision can be challenged. This challenge, they suggest, can be the starting 
point, as much as it is the prerequisite, for reinvigorated democracy. Their account of 
utopia is one where social meaning is created rather than imposed. 
But what is the potential for this approach to inform a project of political change? State 
activity, it could be argued, is always accompanied by social projections, definitions of 
social problems and accounts of alternative futures that are institutionally determined. In 
his influential work on welfare politics, Hugh Heclo (1974, 305) points to the role that 
fantasy invariably plays in the formulation of political objectives: “Politics finds its 
sources not only in power but also in uncertainty – men collectively wondering what to 
do. […] Policy-making is a form of collective puzzlement on society’s behalf”. From a 
somewhat more post-modernist perspective, it is suggested that the multiplicity of social 
phenomena and indeterminate understandings of society require efforts to ‘fix’ meaning 
(Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 96), to offer intelligible accounts of society, its problems and 
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trajectories. The appeal to “a promised land or an ideal society” (Laclau 1990, 63) is 
characteristic of public policy initiatives that speak to and seek to mobilize 
constituencies.  
Judith Butler, too, has pointed to the role of fantasy in how ‘the state’ charts out society 
in order for complex phenomena to become intelligible. Butler (2002, 28) argues that  
the appeal to the state is at once an appeal to a fantasy already institutionalized 
by the state and a leavetaking from existing social complexity in the hope of 
becoming ‘socially coherent’ at last. What this means as well is that there is a 
site to which we can turn, understood as the state, that will finally render us 
coherent, a turn that commits us to the fantasy of state power.  
Butler suggests that the projection of social meaning – the definition of social problems 
or of the ‘cohesive society’ – reflects a human need for intelligible categories and 
authoritative definitions, which are put forward in response to requests for clarity and 
coherence. Given the indeterminacy of society, ‘the state’ is expected to engage in its 
ordering. 
The implications of this and other critical perspectives for how to go beyond the politics 
of cohesion are not straightforward. Social theorists, including Butler and Laclau, often 
seem better placed to speak from a level of generality, such as about the ‘fantasy of state 
power’, than to pursue the minutiae of rhetoric and interpretations that are characteristic 
of social policy-making. For example, when Butler refers to ‘the state’ as that which 
responds to expectations for intelligibility, she invokes a clumsy concept. While ‘the 
state’ may codify and authorize particular social understandings, these understandings 
emerge from within the competition of various state and non-state actors. In focusing on 
the interpretive work carried out by such actors, the thesis has sought to show that the 
politics of cohesion – for its ordering and ‘fixing’ of society – did not occur in response 
to natural conditions or exogenous expectations. Social imaginaries were defined and 
proposed in the context of competitive pressures. Even when we acknowledge that there 
is a need for society to be rendered intelligible (by ‘the state’, institutions or politicians), 
this does little to clarify what types of social imaginaries emerge at particular points in 
time. Critical social theory, while it speaks to concerns about the imaginary work that 
policy-making entails, needs to be grounded in an engaged exploration of political 
realities, such as the changing ways and contexts in which social unity is considered to 
be at risk.  
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Such changes could only be of limited concern here. There are, of course, different 
ways of conceiving of social unity and diverse beliefs about what holds society 
together. Following the loose categorization that we have introduced in the discussion 
of Durkheim’s perspective in introduction and first chapter, social cohesion can be 
considered as an integrationist conception of social unity that does not require 
substantive homogeneity. It is compatible with liberal-democratic regimes, where only a 
limited consensus needs to exist, and difference and disagreement are not considered 
inimical to social unity. Different from the unity envisaged by the anti-Dreyfusards or 
their contemporary exponents, integrationism is predicated on dispositions, beliefs, 
values and attitudes that are considered to be accessible to all.  
In reality such dispositions are never completely shared, while the value consensus that 
sustains liberal democratic regimes often seems at risk of being overstated (see Unger 
1975; Bader 2001). The extent of the minimalist consensus that may be required for 
citizens to collaborate and coexist is not our concern here, but it is clear that this 
agreement does not stand in the way of even fundamental revisions. Social values may 
reflect cultural horizons and be revised in the course of cross-cultural engagement (see 
for example Parekh 2008). Understandings of ‘the good life’ or ‘the good society’ are 
historically dependent, as is evident when older social definitions, some of which may 
have previously been considered foundational for social unity, were superseded. 
Conceptions of family life, sexual identities, and gender divisions, for example, have 
repeatedly been challenged and revised in response to claims that were democratically 
articulated. Their revision coincides with new propositions on what principles, ideas and 
attitudes may account not just for social stability, but for the kind of society that is 
deemed desirable. While such potentials for contestation and social self-definition are, 
of course, often unrealized, they point to a democratic ideal, maybe even a democratic 
utopia. The terms of social integration are not beyond revision, society can be re-
imagined and re-constituted, and this endeavour can be a starting point for democracy. 
This does not need to amount to a wholesale rejection of integrationist ideas, such as of 
social integration through activity, and how they inform current conceptions of social 
unity. It merely indicates an entry point for the democratic revision of the terms of 
social integration. 
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Biases of integration 
Integrationist conceptions of social unity contrast with understandings that are grounded 
in cultural, religious, ethnic or racial homogeneity. In contemporary European politics 
these orientations seem to mark two poles in the debate about the integration of ethnic 
minorities and other populations whose presence is seen to pose a challenge to social 
harmony. In Germany, Leitkultur contrasts with conceptions of civic belonging. While 
Britishness is often defined in terms of inclusive, albeit vague, values, Englishness 
seems more difficult to separate from ethnic connotations but also offers a more 
tangible identity for many. In response to the electoral success of the Front National, 
the French centre-right is increasingly concerned to define a culturally thick horizon of 
Frenchness (Besson 2009; Sarkozy 2009). Integrationist and substantialist or essentialist 
conceptions of social belonging are conspicuous, and usually not perfectly separated in 
these country contexts. 
The inclusivity of integrationist ideals is not consistently mirrored in the inclusive 
practice of liberal democratic regimes. In fact, such ideals rarely seem undiluted. 
Foundational values, human rights for example, are not infrequently presented not just 
as horizons to which everybody has equal access, but as culturally grounded and 
particularly accessible to ethno-cultural insiders. Leitkultur, understood as a summary 
statement of value commitments, may reflect what Christian Joppke (2008) has coined 
as the ‘paradox of universalism’ in how civic identities are currently defined across 
Western Europe.110
Overlaps between essentialism and integrationism are similarly evident outside of the 
domain of immigrant integration. The ‘feral underclasses’ that were widely cited in 
recent public commentary in Britain are constructed with a similar ambiguity (Clarke 
2011; Henley 2011). The problematic nature of populations is traced to an account of 
cultural otherness – to either ‘chav’, ‘gang’ or even ‘black culture’ (Jones 2011a; 
 In practice, however, Leitkultur is delineated as ‘Judeo-Christian’ 
and defined so as to exclude significant ethno-religious minority groups, which are 
symbolically written out of this horizon of values.  
                                                 
110  Joppke suggests that where, in Western Europe, national identities are currently supposed to be 
strengthened or made more tangible, their content is usually defined by drawing on liberal-
universalist ideas (equality, fairness, etc.). These are widely shared beyond national context and as 
such, Joppke suggests, cannot provide for the flavour of national specificity that is supposed to 
distinguish national identities (Joppke 2008; 2010) 
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2011b). Portrayals of the populations from which the rioters of August 2011 were seen 
to have emerged – similar to representations of the émeutes of November 2005 – drew 
attention to irresponsible parents, single mothers and lax morals. Such interpretations 
coincided with the stigmatisation of populations as essentially different that allowed 
mainstream observers to interpret their violence as a manifestation of “unleashed human 
evil” (Hitchens 2011). 
Similar ambiguities apply where activity is considered as a mode of social integration. 
There are good reasons to be critical of how particular expectations of activity were 
introduced and attitudes defined that corresponded to such expectations. The definition 
of such requirements, and how these were placed on the doorsteps of particular social 
groups, highlights a selectivity in the politics of cohesion that is evident in all three 
instances that have been examined. Social spaces were conceived where individuals, no 
matter what their respective capacities or resources, were asked to comply with pre-
established understandings of liberty, flexibility and mobility.  
Perpetually activated individuals, captured in a network of measures and initiatives 
intended to facilitate responsible conduct, find themselves in situations where they are 
pushed towards undefined ideals. Standards of sociability are imposed and deviance, 
defined as irresponsible, unsociable, or anti-social conduct, is penalized. Particularly 
those that are considered problematic, i.e. welfare recipients, ethnic minorities, 
inhabitants of sink estates, or the unemployed, are blamed for their alleged inactivity 
and face the brunt of pressures towards activity. That disadvantaged social groups are 
targeted, that it is their immobility that is problematized, needs to be pointed out with 
recourse to a reinvigorated language of unfairness and injustice. The politics of 
cohesion and its account of activation reflect a hierarchy of character types that requires 
scrutiny (Boltanski 2011). That privileged groups, such as those that are living in the 
affluent zones of Britain, Germany and France, are not called up to evince a particular 
‘cohesiveness’ points to a selectiveness that ought to be critically exposed. 
But the politics of cohesion needs to be subjected to a second type of critique, too. The 
idea of perpetual activity creates pressures for everybody, even for advantaged 
populations that are called up to make their life-stories fit the shape of a managerial 
project. The social goods that were seen to require movement and flexibility did not, in 
the three cases that have been studied here, emerge as a result of democratic concern or 
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collective agency. How such social imaginaries can be democratized, or at least be 
democratically amended, is a question that goes to the heart of the political process in 
liberal democracies. There is clearly a desire for social objectives of current regimes to 
be newly debated and reconsidered, exemplarily shown by ¡Democracia Real YA! in 
Spain, social justice protests in Israel or student protests in Britain. The relative poverty 
of the social imaginary that corresponds to the politics of austerity is being challenged, 
and this – one would hope – may be the beginning of a reinfusion of social meaning that 
is different from the politics of cohesion. 
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